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Citizens participate in many spheres of society: in informal networks of family and friends 
(social participation), in voluntary associations (civic participation), and in the sphere of 
politics (political participation). Interestingly, there are large differences across countries. For 
instance, Italians and Spaniards visit their extended family twice as often as Americans and 
Danes. In Scandinavia and the Netherlands more than 80% of the citizens are a member of at 
least one voluntary association, whereas this is approximately 20% in Poland and Greece. With 
regards to political participation, turnout at national elections is much higher in continental 
countries like Belgium and Luxembourg than in Anglosaxon countries like the United States. 
What causes these differences? Why do citizens participate differently in various countries?
This book aims to explain these differences in participation by studying state institutions as 
determinants of citizens’ participation. It offers a comprehensive overview and systematic 
test of  different ways in which state institutions are related to social, civic, and political 
participation. Hypotheses are deduced from rivaling actor-centered institutionalist theories 
and tested on recent, high-quality cross-national data sets, using hierarchical modeling. These 
analyses show that state institutions do indeed matter. State institutions stimulate social and 
civic participation by offering collective resources (like social security and civil rights), and 
reduce participatory inequality within countries by redistributing individual resources (like 
time and money). State institutions stimulate political participation by raising the incentives 
to participate through decisive elections and high political stakes. Finally, democratic rule 
stimulates the relationships between social, civic, and political participation: these relationships 
are  stronger in longstanding democracies than in newly established democracies.
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1.1. introduction
Throughout the Western world citizens engage in social activities: informally with 
friends and family (i.e. social participation), as members of voluntary associations 
(i.e. civic participation) and in political processes like voting, campaigning and pro-
testing (i.e. political participation). Across Western countries, however, citizens differ 
immensely in the extent to which they engage in these social activities. Contact with 
the family, for instance, is considerably less important in Scandinavian countries like 
Denmark and Finland than in the rest of Europe (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). 
Meetings with neighbors are far more common in Eastern Europe than in Southern 
Europe (Gesthuizen et al. 2008). Involvement in at least one voluntary association 
was reported by 86% of the Dutch, compared to 57% of the Belgians and 39% of 
the French (Dekker and Van den Broek 2005). Similarly, in the early 1990s, Dutch 
citizens were on average member of 2.7 (out of a possible thirteen) types of voluntary 
association, followed by the Swedes (2.08), the Americans (1.98) and the Norwegians 
(1.96). This is very high compared to for instance the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian 
citizens, where on average respectively 0.36, 0.55, and 0.61 types of associations are 
joined (Curtis et al. 2001). With regards to election turnout, continental Europe had 
an average turnout rate of over 80%, while in Anglo-Saxon countries considerably 
fewer citizens cast their ballots, and Switzerland only reached 44% (Powell jr. 1986). 
Yet, with regards to party membership rates, Switzerland scores much higher than the 
European mean of 5% of the electorate. In Finland and Austria membership rates 
are especially high, with respectively 9.6% and 17.7% of the electorate, while the 
United Kingdom (1.9%), France (1.6%), and Poland (1.2%) close the list (Mair and 
Van Biezen 2001). All in all, differences in citizen participation rates in social activi-
ties in various spheres of society are large.
Although reports on country level differences in the average participation rate 
continue to be published (Newton and Montero 2007; Norris and Davis 2007; 
Pichler and Wallace 2007; Adam 2008), the discussion should move forward to-
wards an understanding why participation rates are higher in some countries than 
in others. The crucial questions then shift from description to explanation: Why are 
citizens in some countries more likely to participate in social activities than in oth-
ers? Why does citizen participation in family, associational and political life differ so 
strongly across countries? 
1.2. citizen pArticipAtion: three spheres of society
This dissertation distinguishes between three forms of citizen participation in com-
munity life: social participation (in the intimate sphere), civic participation (in the 
associational sphere of civil society), and political participation (in the sphere of 
the state). This distinction between three forms of citizen participation in social life 
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follows the schematic division of society in spheres by Hegel, Marx and Gramsci 
(Cohen and Arato 1992), which is conventionally represented as a triangle (see Fig-
ure 1.1). In the corners of the triangle one finds the private or intimate sphere, the 
sphere of the market, and the sphere of the state. The middle of the triangle consti-
tutes a fourth sphere: the sphere of civil society. 
Participation in the sphere of the market is left out of the analysis, as – unlike 
the other spheres – it is based on ‘principles of exchange, anonymity, competition 
and abstract, instrumental rationality [...] with an ever-present tendency to generate 
social disembeddedness’ (Larragy 2001). Social, civic, and political participation, by 
contrast, are considered to generate a sense of community (Eliasoph 1998; Putnam 
2000; Uslaner and Brown 2002; Skocpol 2003). Each of these forms of participation 
is divided into several modes (see Figure 1.2).
In the private sphere, informal and intimate contacts with family, friends and neigh-
bors take place. Social participation takes place via ties of both the primordial network 
of close family, and the broader informal network of general friends, neighbors, col-
leagues and acquaintances (Larragy 2001). Primordial ties are generally ascribed and 
safe, whereas the broader informal network is to a larger extent freely chosen and less 
secure. 
Civil society is broadly defined as ‘an inclusive domain of secondary associations 
that mediates [...] between the three primary domains of the market, the state and the 
family’ (Larragy 2001). In this dissertation, civic participation is defined as membership 
of and activity in voluntary associa ti ons. Based on their primary aim, we distinguish 
between three types of voluntary associations (cf. Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007): lei-
sure organizations (social, recreational), interest organizations (defend socio-economic 
interests of members) and activist organizations (advocate broad, societal interests). 
Leisure organizations are more or less directed to the informal sphere, interest organi-
zations to the market sphere, and activist organizations to the sphere of the state.
Figure 1.1. Societal triangle Figure 1.2. Modes of citizen participation
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Figure 1.2. Modes of citizen participation
In the sphere of the state, citizens interact as empowered subjects. As subjects, 
the interactions of citizens with the state are not voluntary: one is subject by birth 
and/or by nationality. State responsiveness and accountability enables citizens to 
participate actively in this sphere. Political participation is the set of activities under-
taken at the input side of the political system, to influence the policy process and its 
outcomes (Verba et al. 1978). We distinguish between conventional political partici-
pation (which takes place within the representative electoral system, like campaigning 
and voting) and non-conventional political participation (which aims to influence 
politics from outside the representational system, like public demonstrations).1 
Social, civic, and political participation have been labeled – somewhat sardonical-
ly – an ‘all-purposive elixir for the ills of society’ (Uslaner and Dekker 2001), because 
of their many – supposedly – beneficial side-effects. Citizens would benefit from par-
ticipation, which has been claimed to stimulate physical and mental health (Wilson 
2000), generosity (Brooks 2005), income in later life (Baer 2006), economic career 
(Moerbeek 2001, Ruiter 2008), status attainment (Lin 1999; Lin 2001), entrance to 
professionals outside formal channels (Mars and Altman 1992), democratic values 
(Flanagan et al. 1998; Hooghe 2003), and trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Claibourn 
and Martin 2000; Jennings and Stoker 2004). Citizen participation would also func-
tion as the glue that keeps society together and as the oil that lubricates the economy. 
Countries where more citizens participate civically are supposedly more prosperous, 
healthier, less criminal, more stable and more democratic (Putnam 1993; Lijphart 
1998; Halpern 2005). Most of these supposed benefits, however, are heavily debated 
(cf. Fiorina 1999; Stolle and Hooghe 2003).
1.3. puzzles, lAcunAe, Aims, And reseArch questions
Cultural and institutional approaches
As we attested above, the levels of social, civic, and political participation differ 
profoundly from country to country. We distinguish between two general approaches 
that have been proposed to explain these cross-national (as well as cross-regional) 
differences: the cultural approach and the institutionalist approach. According to the 
cultural approach ‘the ability to cooperate socially is dependent on prior habits, tra-
ditions, and norms’ (Fukuyama 1995): differential levels of citizen participation are 
thus caused by differing cultures. Established, deeply rooted societal norms would to 
a large extent determine whether citizens participate or not. Banfield (1958), for in-
stance, refers to Western culture, which enables citizens to ‘create and maintain’ asso-
ciational life, while he doubts that non-Western cultures can do the same. Fukuyama 
(1995) stresses the centrality of family life in Japanese culture to explain why strong 
1  Political participation may be involuntary. Countries like Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Greece and Austria, 
for instance, know a system of compulsory voting that is in some cases actively sanctioned by law.
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social ties outside the family are scarce. In the book Culture’s consequences Hofstede 
(2001) related cultural characteristics (operationalized by five ‘value dimensions’ for 
over fifty countries, based on the average scores in a survey amongst employees from 
an international company) to describe and explain a range of attitudes and behaviors 
of citizens, including family relations and associational involvement. 
In his exemplary study of Italian regional governments, Putnam (1993) finds large 
regional differences in citizens’ participation between the North and the South. He 
traces these differences back to times long before the Italian unification in the 19th 
century, and claims that historically differing civic cultures are the source of differing 
contemporary participation rates. These cultural differences, in turn, are explained 
by institutional divergence between North and South Italian regions between the 
11th and the 14th centuries. Whereas the North was dominated by communal and 
excommunal republics, the South was reigned by the feudal autocracy of the King-
dom of Sicily. In other words, Putnam ultimately explains currently differing levels of 
citizens’ participation and different types of social networks – via cultural differences 
– by institutional arrangements of seven to ten centuries in the past.
From Putnam’s cultural explanation a new question arises, though. If the insti-
tutional setting of the distant past is considered to affect social, civic, and political 
participation nowadays, is it not at least as likely that contemporary state institutions 
might do the same? Over the last decade, many social scientists have criticized previ-
ous studies of citizen participation for neglecting the crucial role of contemporary 
state institutions (Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996; Foley and Edwards 1996; Uslaner 2001; 
Szreter 2002; Onyx and Bullen 2001; Bowler et al. 2003; Skocpol 2003; Parboteeah 
et al. 2004; Roßteutscher 2005). The state provides the formal institutional frame-
work within which participation takes place (Onyx and Bullen 2001). Because citizen 
participation is embedded in ‘the political system: its legal condition, political actors, 
type and strength of political institutions’ (Roßteutscher 2005), it might even have a 
‘critical facilitating role’ (Szreter 2002). ‘To understand any polity we must look first 
at the political settlements that ground it, and to the effects that such settlements 
have on social forces and civil society’ (Foley and Edwards 1996). The resulting insti-
tutional approach proclaims a crucial role for the institutions: state institutions set 
the constraints within which citizens participate. They offer and redistribute citizens´ 
resources to participate and set the context in which specific incentives to participate 
may be stressed (see 1.4)
Puzzles and lacunae
Despite the growing acknowledgment that contemporary state institutions can be 
relevant contexts for citizen participation, there is no theoretical consensus as to how 
state institutions could stimulate citizens to participate in social activities. Surpris-
ingly little empirical research has been done to actually test the impact of state insti-
tutions on social, civic, and political participation systematically (Parboteeah et al. 
2004; Freitag 2006). Moreover, empirical analyses on the impact of state institutions 
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on citizen participation have been both scarce and fragmented: they tend to focus on 
the effects of different contextual characteristics on different forms of participation using 
different measurements in different sets of countries (including single country case studies) 
from different sets of explanations. 
As a consequence of this fragmentation in the literature, scholars have come to 
some contradictory and seemingly contradictory conclusions on the effect of state 
institutions. For instance, with regard to social security expenditure, Scheepers et al. 
(2002) find a negative overall effect on social participation, whereas Van Oorschot 
and Arts (2005) conclude that there is no effect on social participation. And while 
social security expenditure thus may or may not have a negative effect on social 
participation, there is evidence that it stimulates civic participation (Salomon and 
Sokolowski 2001). Similarly, evidence that democratic rule stimulates civic partici-
pation (Halman 2003; Parboteeah et al. 2004) has been challenged in recent years 
(Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Contradictory findings may arise because scholars have 
studied the impact of different sets of state institutions on different modes (and 
measurements) of participation for different groups of respondents in different sets 
of countries.
In short, little research has been done on the effect of state institutions on citizen 
participation. What research there is, has been fragmented and as a result shows 
both lacunae and puzzles. 
Aims and research questions
Considering these lacunae and puzzles in the state of the art, this dissertation aims 
to improve both theoretical and empirical knowledge on the differential effects of state institu-
tions on social, civic, and political participation and their relationships from a cross-national 
perspective. We will fill theoretical and empirical gaps by studying a range of state 
institutions as the determinants of three forms of participation. This dissertation 
integrates social, civic, and political participation in one study. To overcome the frag-
mented nature of the literature, we apply a single research design on different forms 
of participation, and simultaneously study the effects of a range of state institutions. 
Theoretically, this dissertation combines strands of research from different fields to 
formulate rivaling hypotheses regarding the impact of state institutions. We integrate 
these theories into two mechanisms that we derive from the actor-centered institu-
tionalist approach (Scharpf 1997). We distinguish three ways in which states function 
as relevant contexts in which citizens participate: state institutions may not only be 
the cause of differences in average citizen participation rates between countries, but 
also the cause of differences in participatory inequality within countries as well as 
the cause of (differential) relationships between different forms of citizen participa-
tion. Empirically, this dissertation provides a systematic test of rivaling hypotheses 
on three forms of citizen participation in a strict research design, while taking other 
rivaling (individual and contextual) explanations, derived from complementary theo-
retical considerations, into account.
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This dissertation will answer three research questions. First, the wide country 
level differences in social, civic, and political participation rates that have been found 
by several authors since Almond and Verba (1963) remain largely unexplained (e.g. 
Curtis et al. 1992; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Dekker and Van den Broek 2005; Ba-
descu and Neller 2007; Pichler and Wallace 2007; Adam 2008). Taking composition-
al and cultural explanations into account, this dissertation will test the importance 
of state institutions to explain differing levels of social, civic, and political participa-
tion. Therefore, our first research question reads:
1. To what extent does variation in state institutions explain the differential social, civic 
 and political participation levels between countries?
Our second research question turns to unequal participation rates within countries: 
not all citizens are equally likely to participate. The empirical record shows that both 
civic and political participation are highly unequal (cf. Verba et al. 1978; Verba et 
al. 1995; Bekkers 2005; Moerbeek 2001), because some citizens have more resources 
than others, or have more incentives to participate (Pattie et al. 2004): generally, men 
are more likely to participate than women, the rich more than the poor, the higher 
educated more than the lower educated. This contrasts with traditional democratic 
ideals that associational life (i.e., civic participation) is egalitarian (Skocpol 1999), 
and with democratic needs that political participation rates are not only high, but 
also equal (Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1998). 
Moreover, the degree of participatory inequality also tends to differ across coun-
tries (Verba et al. 1978; Topf 1995; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). This implies that 
some countries are better able to meet the democratic ideal of equal participation. 
But why is this the case? State institutions are a likely suspect to explain differences 
in participatory inequality. They affect the incentives to participate (the benefits of 
participation) and redistribute the resources needed to participate (the means of 
participation) from the haves to the have-nots. Yet, testable claims that some state 
institutions are superior to others in reducing participatory inequality have not yet 
been tested empirically. Therefore, we come to the following question:
2. To what extent does variation in state institutions condition the degree of 
 participatory inequality between social groups?2
Third, several studies have grouped social, civic, and/or political participation 
together in a single research design (cf. Putnam 2000; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; 
Pichler and Wallace 2007; Gesthuizen et al. 2008). Yet, analytically, scholars have 
rarely studied their mutual correlations. Theoretically, relations between social, civic, 
and political participation are not so evident.3 On the one hand, time displacement 
2  This question is both equivalent to another (see paragraph 1.8): to what extent does the effect of state 
institutions on social, civic, and political participation differ across social groups?
3  Although social, civic, and political participation are treated as separate but related concepts, the   
distinctions between the three are in fact blurry. Where does involvement in activist voluntary associa-
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theory (Van Deth 1997; Hirschman 1979) would suggest that time spent on one form 
of participation would diminish the possibilities to also engage in another form of 
participation. On the other hand, in line with the social capital theory, participation 
may breed participation in a social spiral (Lichterman 2005): when they participate 
in one form, citizens would develop social skills, a pro-social mindset and a larger 
social network, which are in turn useful resources to participate in other forms. This 
explanation is raised in the schools of democracy theory (Tocqueville 2000 [1835–
1840]; Morales and Geurts 2007). Finally, relations may be spurious. In that case, 
social, civic, and political participation are not (causally) related, but determined 
similarly by factors like resources (time, money, skills) or incentives (motivation): citi-
zens who engage in one form of participation are predisposed to participate in other 
forms, not because of a direct (causal) relation, but because through selection effects 
they are more likely to have resources and motivations to participate. All in all, at 
the individual level, the empirical relationships between social, civic, and political 
participation have hardly been assessed systematically, and certainly not cross-nation-
ally. Even though we group these three forms of participation together on theoretical 
grounds, to what extent are they related empirically?
Relationships between social, civic, and political participation need not be equally 
strong across countries (Bowler et al. 2003). State institutions may affect the relation-
ships between social, civic, and political participation. All explanations mentioned 
above may be transposed to the contextual level. First, state institutions may strength-
en the importance of constraints on time and money, thereby inducing a negative 
(or: less strong positive) association. Second, state institutions may stimulate spill-
over effects, for instance by linking voluntary associations to political life. Third, to 
some extent relations between social, civic, and political participation may be spuri-
ous due to state institutions. Therefore, we come to the two final research questions:
3a. To what extent are social, civic, and political participation related cross-nationally?
3b. To what extent does variation in state institutions condition the relations between 
 social, civic, and political participation?
The three sets of research questions are graphically displayed in Figure 1.3. The design 
of the dissertation allows a systematic analysis in several ways. First, this study will in-
vestigate three forms of participation simultaneously and with a similar theoretical ap-
proach (see 1.4). Hereby, it will provide a more comprehensive, i.e., more systematic, 
explanation regarding the importance of state institutions for citizens’ participation. 
Second, this study develops hypotheses from rivaling theories on a wide range of state 
institutions, rather than from a single theory or on a single state institution. Hereby, 
tions (i.e., civic participation) end, and political activism (i.e., political participation) start? Is involvement 
in informal associations like lifestyle groups and digital communities social or civic participation? This 
debate is of course mostly about semantics. To deal with blurry conceptual boundaries, we leave out 
modes of participation that could fall under the umbrella of two types of participation, like for instance 
participation in political parties (which simultaneously take part in associational and political life).
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it will offer a more stringent test through comparative analyses of cross-national survey 
data (see 1.5). Previous comparative research in this field often limited itself to one 
such institution, most notably the welfare state regime. However, such bivariate tests 
may lead to erroneous conclusions, since institutional characteristics themselves are 
correlated. Third, this study adopts the technique of hierarchical modeling (see 1.6). 
This enables us to acknowledge the various relevant levels of analysis simultaneously, 
which in turn is necessary to answer the research questions correctly.
1.4. overArching theory: Actor-centered institutionAlism
To answer the research questions, we take up an actor-centered institutionalist ap-
proach (Scharpf 1997). This approach focuses on ‘enduring structural constraints 
on human behavior’ (Cortell and Petersen 1999), and the choices individuals make 
within these constraints (Ingram and Clay 2000). Although actor-centered insti-
tutionalism emphasizes the role of institutions, the approach is not deterministic. 
Rather, actor-centered institutionalism is in line with methodological individualism 
(Coleman 1990). ‘Institutions are important because they shape or influence the behav-
ior, power and policy preferences of actors. The emphasis here on shaping and influencing 
implies that institutional dynamics, whilst often important, do not explain everything’ (Bell 
2002 – italics in original). Individuals are autonomous actors (agents) for whom institutions 
(structures) provide the context. Institutions ‘offer opportunities for action and impose 
constraints’ (Lecours 2005) and set ‘the rules of the game’ (North 1990). Citizens’ behavior 
results from individuals’ pursuit of their interests ‘by making choices within constraints’ 
(Ingram and Clay 2000; Lecours 2005). 
We follow Hall’s (1986) definition of institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals’. This definition includes both formal and informal set of rules, laws as 
well as customs (North 1990). To explain country level differences in participation, 
we specifically look at national level state institutions: general state policies and stan-
dard government practices. 
Contextual constraints: incentives and resources
The actor-centered institutionalist approach of choices within constraints infers two 
general mechanisms through which state institutions might affect the behavior of 
citizens. In the actor-centered institutionalist approach, citizens are considered to be 
autonomous actors that are constrained by their contexts. We propose two ways in 
which contextual constraints affect citizens. Due to contextual constraints, specific 
incentives may be more salient than others, while citizens may be provided with (re-
distributed) individual and collective resources. To assess how state institutions affect 
citizen’s participation, we should therefore first turn to individual level theories that 
explicate why some citizens are more likely to participate than others.
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At the individual level, two complementary general theories have been used to 
explain citizen participation. Citizens participate when they have both the motiva-
tion (incentive, need) to participate and the means (resources) to realize this. Incen-
tive-based theories emphasize citizens’ motivations to participate (Pattie et al. 2004), 
for instance to fill a need for an economic safety net, or to defend socio-economic 
interests. According to these incentive-based theories, not all citizens have the same 
inclination or incentives to participate.4 Resource-based theories emphasize the means 
that citizens have to participate, like time, money, social skills and social networks 
(Schlozman et al. 1999). Citizens who have more means to participate, will be more 
likely to participate. Incentives and resources are in fact complementary and neces-
sary preconditions to participate: citizens require both incentives to participate and 
the resources that enable them to act accordingly. However, analytically, we distin-
guish between incentive-based and resource-based theories for their different empha-
ses, because they lead to rivaling – and even opposite – hypotheses.
This dissertation transposes these individual-level explanations to the contextual 
level to propose innovative theoretical directions to the actor-centered institutional-
ist approach. As structural constraints, institutions may affect citizens’ incentives 
to participate and/or the resources that enable them to participate. The saliency of 
specific incentives to participate depends on the institutional context. For instance, 
when states offer social security, citizens may have less need to socialize with others 
(i.e., participate socially or civically) to obtain an economic safety net. This is the 
central claim of the crowding out thesis, which is tested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3. Similarly, when state institutions stimulate inclusive governments and broad 
coalitions, citizens may have less need to participate politically, since less is at stake 
and their vote is heard anyway (see Chapter 5). With regards to the resource-based 
theories, institutions may be prime agents in two ways. First, they offer collective 
resources, like prosperity, social security and civil rights (see Chapters 2 and 3). Civil 
rights, for instance, are a resource, as these rights are means for citizens to participate 
freely. Second, state institutions may redistribute resources. Most notably, the welfare 
state redistributes money (i.e., gross income) and time (i.e., care tasks) from the haves 
to the have-nots. Consequently, participatory inequality between those with time 
and money and those without are likely to diminish after redistribution. This line of 
reasoning is expanded in Chapter 4.
All in all, we distinguish between incentive-based and resource-based theories 
within the actor-centered institutionalist approach throughout this dissertation. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 even play off rivaling theories that build on these general per-
4  This does not match well with the ‘developmental perspective’ of participation (Parry 1972), in which case 
citizen participation is considered to be an end in itself, the fullest expression of a person. Man would be a 
zooion politikon, an inherently social creature, while participation provides citizens with a sense of belonging 
(Lin 2001; Maslow 1970). By contrast, incentive-based theories proclaim that not all citizens have the same 
desire to participate. Rather, participation may be an activity that may get in the way of other preferred 
activities (Van Deth 2000; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
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spectives in a single analysis. Moreover, in these chapters we derive opposite hypoth-
eses from the incentive-based and resource-based theories for the same institutional 
characteristic. In Chapters 2 and 3, we come to expect from the incentive-based 
theory that social security expenditure has a negative effect on social and civic partici-
pation, whereas from the resource-based theory we come to expect the opposite. In 
Chapter 5, the incentive-based theory leads us to expect a negative effect of consen-
sualism on political participation, while the resource-based theory leads us to expect 
a positive effect. By testing complementary and contradictory hypotheses, we offer a 
test of the two institutionalist mechanisms.
The chicken and the egg
Although we are primarily interested in the state institutional environment as a deter-
minant of citizen participation, state institutions (and especially their performance) 
have also been considered the consequence of participation. In fact, the performance 
of democratic states has traditionally been considered the outcome of participation 
(Almond and Verba 1963). This has resulted in a chicken and egg debate: do state 
institutions stimulate or hamper citizens to participate, or does citizen participation 
create enduring laws, rules and social constraints?
In his seminal book ‘Making democracy work’ Putnam (1993) argued the latter, 
when he concluded that citizen participation affects the institutional performance 
of the Italian regions. Putnam was able to exclude the institutional environment as 
a possible cause for citizen participation, as all regions started with the same set of 
political institutions in his sophisticated research design. Yet, the influence of state 
institutions on participation could not be ruled out in most other studies. Many of 
these studies, in turn, have been criticized for overlooking the institutional environ-
ment as a cause of participation (Levi 1996; Harriss and DeRenzio 1997). Indeed, 
Putnam (2000) emphasizes that state institutions can stimulate civic participation, 
while maintaining that citizen participation affects state performance.
The causal direction of the relationship between participation and state institu-
tions can go both ways. Empirically, cross-sectional analyses cannot prove or disprove 
the validity of either proposition. Nevertheless, we cope with this problem in several 
ways. 
Theoretically, state institutions are likely to affect the behavior of actors. State 
institutions are generally stable and inert (Krasner 1984): they hardly change, and if 
they do it is mostly through small, incremental steps (Cortell and Petersen 1999).5 In-
stitutions continue to exist, even when they are no longer sustained by the actors and 
social processes that brought about these institutions: ‘most individuals cannot even 
5  Institutional change is either ‘episodic and dramatic’ (Krasner 1984) or ‘incremental and gradual’ 
(North 1995). Episodic change radically transforms a broad institutional setting, as in the Central and 
Eastern European countries after the fall of communism. Such large scale, radical change is uncommon. 
Incremental change is the most prevalent form of institutional change. It is caused by specific issues and 
therefore limited to the limited transformation of a single institution.
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conceive of alternative institutional arrangements’ (Koelble 1995). The assumption 
of institutional stability is especially valid for Western, liberal-democratic countries 
(Harty 2005), not coincidentally the set of countries this dissertation focuses on. 
Methodologically, to some extent, we deal with the causality issue by taking contex-
tual measures from the years before the individual level data on citizen participation. 
Theoretical design
We briefly recapitulate our theoretical design. This dissertation distinguishes be-
tween two main approaches: the cultural approach, according to which participation 
is caused by habits, traditions, and norms, and the institutionalist approach, accord-
ing to which participation is caused by (state) institutions. This dissertation adopts 
an actor-centered institutionalist approach, according to which citizens make choices 
within constraints that are set by (state) institutions, while using the cultural ap-
proach to formulate a rivaling explanation. 
Within the actor-centered institutionalist approach, we distinguish between two 
main mechanisms through which we relate state institutions to citizens’ behavior: 
institutions affect the level and distribution of citizens’ resources that are needed to 
participate, as well as the saliency of citizens’ incentives to participate. Based on the 
type of resources and incentives that are emphasized, we formulate several resource-
based and incentive-based theories. Finally, from these theories we derive rivaling 
and sometimes opposite hypotheses on the expected effect of specific contextual 
characteristics on social, civic, and political participation.
1.5. AnAlyticAl design: cross-nAtionAl dAtA
This study answers three research questions on the impact of state institutions on 
three forms of citizen participation. Characteristics of a rather abstract context are 
linked to the behavior of individual citizens. To answer these research questions, 
large-scale, quantitative analyses of cross-national survey data are a logical and valid 
approach. Although qualitative studies are a rich source of knowledge on citizens’ mo-
tivations to participate and mechanisms at the micro-level and case studies have shed 
light on country specific patterns (e.g. Mars and Altman 1992; Eliasoph 1998), they 
are less well-equipped to relate abstract and complex state institutions to behavior of 
so many individuals. We employ comparative research to disentangle the differential 
effects of a wide variety of institutions on a wide array of modes of participation. The 
effects of institutional environments on participation is studied through cross-section-
al comparisons of citizens living in a large number of different Western countries.
The cross-national surveys we use – the European Social Survey, the International 
Social Survey Programme (issp), and the second module of the Comparative Stud-
ies of Electoral Systems – are useful and reliable sources of information on citizens 
and their behavior: they are designed to collect information at the individual level 
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in a systematic and uniform way. Moreover, even though cross-national surveys are 
secondary data, the validity of measures in these surveys fit our research design 
very well. However, there is one risk in the use of cross-national survey data that 
we should acknowledge. In recent years, methodologists have questioned the cross-
national equivalence of quantified measures available in survey data (Adam 2008), 
although this problem is probably less stringent for behavioral than for the attitudi-
nal measures. We coped with these problems in several ways. 
First, we used a most similar design by focusing exclusively on Western liberal 
democracies. The specific set of countries under study differs across and within the 
chapters of this thesis. However, in all cases the findings should only be generalized 
to the population of European or Western countries. Second, we tested whether 
the scores on the dependent variables were indeed cross-nationally equivalent and 
hence comparable. For civic participation we, therefore, had to exclude several 
countries from our analysis (cf. Chapter 3, 4, 6, 7). Third, we tested the robust-
ness of our measures of participation by amending it or comparing it to alternative 
measures (cf. Chapter 2, 4). Finally, by testing the effects of state institutions on 
multiple dependent variables, multiple modes of social, civic, and political partici-
pation, we reduced the risk that is associated with the assumption of cross-national 
equivalence.
In recent years the number of cross-national surveys has boomed. They range 
from very large-scale surveys in over fifty countries all around the world (like the 
World Values Surveys, which we did not use because its measures of citizen partici-
pation were not sufficiently detailed) to smaller scale surveys that emphasize tight 
and uniform data collection (like the European Social Survey and the Citizenship 
Involvement and Democracy). Throughout this dissertation, we focus on Western, 
liberal democracies. In some chapters we use survey data that were only collected in 
Western countries (i.e., the European Social Survey data in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and 
7), in others we used a globe-spanning data set from which we excluded non-Western 
countries (i.e., the International Social Survey Programme 2001 in Chapter 2, the 
International Social Survey Programme 2004 in Chapter 4, and the Comparative 
Studies of Electoral Systems 2001–2006 in Chapter 5). 
We restrict ourselves to Western countries in order to enjoy the benefits of a 
most similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970).6 The most similar systems 
design compares countries that share many general characteristics, but neverthe-
less differ on the relevant independent variable (i.e., state institutions), and the 
dependent variable (i.e., citizen participation). This facilitates pinpointing these 
differences on the dependent variable to specific country characteristics, as shared 
characteristics are excluded by design. When countries share general characteristics 
like culture or history, these characteristics logically cannot explain differences in 
6  In all fairness, the nomer of a rather similar systems design, or a comparable cases design (Lijphart 
1975) may be more appropriate. The most similar systems design is often used to label very small N 
studies. 
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participation rates. The explanation has to be found in characteristics along which 
these countries differ. 
The Western countries in our study, and especially the European ones, share 
many relevant characteristics and form a ‘meaningful entity’ (Meulemann 2008a). 
There are several advantages to the most similar design in large scale, cross-sectional, 
quantitative analyses. First, the design reduces the above mentioned problems of 
cross-national equivalence. Second, the design reduces contextual noise: by focus-
ing on a culturally and institutionally rather homogeneous group, we automatically 
control for several factors that are not in our models. Third, the design diminishes 
the risk of influential cases: influential (groups of) countries that determine findings 
(cf. Van der Meer et al. 2009). Yet, although the most similar design strengthens the 
robustness of the findings, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this 
dissertation should not be simply generalized outside the group of Western, liberal 
democracies. 
We combined these individual level, cross-national survey data with contextual 
characteristics. Contextual data were derived mostly from external data bases like 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), Eurostat, 
International Monetary Fund (imf), World Bank and the Quality of the Government 
(Teorell et al. 2007a) data sets. We collected and constructed contextual variables 
that best reflect our hypotheses, and generally refrained from the use of typologies 
(like the historical typology of welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990)) for 
two reasons: theoretically, typologies tend to be implicit theories that we aim to make 
explicit, while empirically, typologies cause a loss of data (scp 2001; Gelissen 2001). 
We compared the effects of the contextual variables for consistency with the effects 
of similar measures derived from other data sets. For instance, we compared the con-
textual characteristic of consensualism along the party-executives dimension (derived 
from Lijphart 1999) to the electoral system to which it is highly correlated (derived 
from the QotG data set). Likewise, we compared the measures of economic devel-
opment and social security expenditure of the imf to its counterparts from oecd, 
Eurostat and World Bank. 
1.6. method of AnAlysis: hierArchicAl models
In this dissertation, the dependent variables are at the individual level: ultimately 
this study answers why some citizens participate, whereas others do not. However, 
our research questions are concerned with the interplay between characteristics of 
individual citizens and the context they live in. We therefore distinguish at least two 
levels of analysis: the individual (micro) level and the country (macro) level.7 These 
7  This study is primarily concerned with the interplay between these two levels of analysis (the individual 
and the country/state). Only in Chapter 5 we include a third, non-geographical level of analysis – 
governmental periods. Although other levels (i.e., the groups our respondents are part of, the schools 
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levels of analysis should be analyzed simultaneously. The simultaneous analysis of 
several levels of analysis is the basic premise of hierarchical modeling, also known as 
multi-level modeling. 
Behind hierarchical modeling lies the idea that individuals are embedded in their 
contexts. In other words, citizens do not live in the same context. Moreover, these 
contexts may affect different citizens differently. Hierarchical models take this nested 
structure into account methodologically. Individuals within the same context have 
shared characteristics, that should be studied at the appropriate level. Hierarchical 
analysis does this by analyzing the variance within and the variance between contexts 
simultaneously. Consequently, we can use it to assess the effects of micro- and macro-
level characteristics simultaneously. Micro-level characteristics (i.e., characteristics of 
individuals) can explain both the individual variance within and the contextual vari-
ance between clusters due to composition effects. Macro-level (or contextual) charac-
teristics can only explain the variance between clusters (i.e., countries).
The multi-level structure is reflected both in our data and in our research ques-
tions. Data-wise, in cross-national surveys data was collected through a multistage 
sampling procedure: first, a sample of (Western) countries, then a sample of individu-
als within each participating country. In the resulting data sets, individuals are thus 
nested in their country; meaning that individuals within the same country are not 
independent. With regards to our research questions, hierarchical modeling allows 
us to test (a) whether state institutions (context) affect individual participation, (b1) 
whether the effects of state institutions is similar for all citizens, and (b2) whether 
state institutions condition participatory inequality between social groups.8 
For a more extensive layman´s introduction to hierarchical analysis, we refer to 
Meulemann (2008a). For a more technical exposition on hierarchical analysis, we 
recommend Snijders and Bosker (1999). 
Conventional alternatives: aggregation and disaggregation
The use of hierarchical analysis is best illustrated by comparison to its alternatives. 
Hierarchical analysis is superior to the two more conventional alternatives, namely 
macro (country) level analysis of aggregated data and (ols) regression analysis of dis-
aggregated data. In the first alternative, individual level characteristics are aggregated 
to the country level and analyzed accordingly (e.g. Delhey and Newton 2005). How-
ever, aggregation leads to a loss of data, as the individual level variance is discarded. 
The individual level information is often crucial, most certainly for the objectives of 
this dissertation. First, after aggregation one cannot pull contextual effects and com-
they visit or the neighbourhood/municipality they live in) might be important to explain social, civic, 
and political participation as well (cf. Tilly 2005), we do not include them: the cross-national surveys 
do not include (systematic) information at intermediate levels. Moreover, we have no a-priori reason to 
assume that the exclusion of meso-levels from our analysis will affect the relationship we investigate this 
book, namely the impact of state institutions on social participation.
8  Methodologically, b1 and b2 are equivalent.
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position effects apart. This is especially problematic when different effects are to be 
expected from an individual level determinant and its macro level average (cf. Ruiter 
and De Graaf 2006 for a study on religiosity of individuals, devoutness of countries 
and volunteering; Tolsma et al. 2009 for a study on ethnicity of individuals, ethnic 
diversity of neighborhoods and social cohesion). Second, aggregation prevents the in-
vestigation of cross-level interaction effects between macro- and micro-level variables. 
This is needed to assess whether state institutions affect citizens differently, and 
whether they affect participatory inequality. Third, aggregation may often lead to the 
problem of an ecological fallacy. This dissertation tests theories that are formulated 
at the individual level. To test such theories in an aggregated analysis, we should 
assume that individual characteristics may be inferred from the characteristics of the 
group to which these individuals belong. Too often, this assumption is wrong.
The second alternative is disaggregation of macro-level variables (e.g. Van Oors-
chot and Arts 2005; Putnam 2007). The macro-level of analysis is discarded, which 
seems to allow the use of ols regression analysis. However, this violates the assump-
tion of independence of observations: although the nested structure of the data is 
ignored, it is not gone. More importantly, to test the effect of macro-level variables 
in disaggregated analyses, country level characteristics will be assigned to individual 
citizens. In this dissertation, disaggregation would mean assigning characteristics of 
twenty to thirty countries to twenty to thirty thousand respondents. For these macro-
level variables the relevant sample size is thereby increased dramatically and the 
corresponding standard errors are underestimated – all under the wrong assumption 
of independence of observations. Consequently, the risk of Type i errors strongly 
increases: macro-level variables are far more likely to be erroneously considered sig-
nificant determinants.
Issues with macro-level sample size
Although it is designed to cope with the problems of aggregation and disaggregation, 
hierarchical modeling is considered to be unproblematic when the number of cases 
at the macro level is at least fifty (Maas and Hox 2005). However, in cross-national 
survey research this demand is hardly ever met. Moreover, there appears to be a 
trade-off between the number of countries that participate in a cross-national survey 
and the quality, uniformity and detail of the data. The rule of thumb when hier-
archical modeling can be used differs from author to author: it ranges from ten to 
fifty macro-level cases (cf. Meulemann 2008a; Maas and Hox 2005). The survey data 
used in this dissertation cover twenty to thirty countries. Although – despite the low 
number of countries – hierarchical modeling is rapidly becoming common practice 
(cf. Brambor et al. 2005), we should acknowledge the consequences of a low number 
of macro-level cases. Three issues need to be overcome.
First, recent simulation studies show that a low sample size at the macro level 
causes a bias on standard errors (Browne and Draper 2000; Maas and Hox 2004a, 
2004b, 2005). With a macro-level sample size of thirty, estimated standard errors 
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are 15% too low (Maas and Hox 2004a, 2005). In other words, this increases the 
risk of Type i errors. However, there is only a negligible bias on the other parameter 
estimates. We cope with the issue of underestimated standard errors by keeping the 
alpha at 5% (one-tailed), which is rather strict for twenty to thirty countries and in 
line with most of the cross-national literature on participation.
Second, because of the low sample size, we have to be extra careful about macro-
level outliers. Outliers are more likely to become influential cases (i.e., influence the 
outcomes) when the sample size is small. To cope with this problem, we have done 
robustness checks throughout the dissertation: testing for possible influential (groups 
of) cases and analyzing the effects of their in- and exclusion (cf. Van der Meer 2009). 
Moreover, although the number of countries is rather small, we remained critical 
regarding the quality of the data. We excluded several countries from our analysis, 
based on empirical evidence that the survey or context data from these countries 
were not equivalent across countries.
Third, the combination of a small macro-level sample size and many macro-level 
determinants increases the risk of Type ii errors and harmful collinearity. We cope 
with these problems in two ways. Most importantly, we perform perturbation analy-
ses: we add random errors to the contextual factors in our multi-variate hierarchical 
models, which should signal harmful collinearity (Belsley 1991). Moreover, both with 
regards to macro-level effects and cross-level interaction effects we carefully build up 
our models: from bivariate relationships (in a hierarchical design) to blocks of deter-
minants to the full models.
Variations in hierarchical modeling
In this dissertation, hierarchical modeling is the general design used to cope with 
nested data. Like regular ols regression analysis, hierarchical modeling has many 
variations. Depending on the nature of the research questions and the characteristics 
of the dependent variables, we apply several forms of hierarchical modeling. We per-
form linear and ordinal hierarchical analysis (Chapter 2), logistic hierarchical analysis 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 6), three-level binomial logistic hierarchical analysis (Chapter 5) 
and hierarchical multiple group structural equation modeling (Chapter 7).
1.7. contributions
Of the three general research questions we formulated, the first one has been raised 
before in the literature, though not answered as systematically as in this dissertation. 
The second and third research questions logically follow from discussions in the 
literature, but have not been raised before. In the process of answering these research 
questions, several wide-spread assumptions and untested claims will be made explicit 
and tested for their validity. By answering these research questions, this study contrib-
utes to the scientific literature on social capital, civil society and democratic citizen-
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ship.9 More generally, this dissertation contributes to the two disciplines of political 
science and sociology. In terms of political science, this study links the (normative) 
demands of democratic citizenship to new institutionalist and behavioralist ap-
proaches, in which social, civic, and political participation are explained by institu-
tional contexts. The resource and incentive theories that have been used to explain 
citizen participation at the individual level are transposed to the contextual level to 
give theoretical direction to the actor-centered institutionalist approach. Sociologi-
cally, this dissertation sheds new light on two of the three overarching questions of 
the discipline (Ultee et al. 1993), namely social cohesion (why citizens engage in pro-
social behavior, i.e., contribute to their communities) and inequality (why citizens do 
not participate equally). 
This dissertation is equally relevant to society at large, i.e., the non-academic 
community. In general, the research questions in this dissertation regarding partici-
pation of citizens concern many Western societies. Political ideologists since Alexis 
de Tocqueville emphasize the importance of citizen participation, and argue that the 
state should support it (Skocpol 2003). These claims are observed among social-dem-
ocratic (e.g. Giddens 1998; Giddens 2000), liberal (e.g. Dahl 1971), neo-conservative 
(cf. Skocpol 2003) and communitarist (e.g. Etzioni 1968; 1994) ideologists. Party 
manifestos emphasize citizen participation as well. Similarly, democratic movements 
stress the importance of citizen participation and the construction of an institutional 
environment to stimulate it. Even though the norm of actively participating citizens 
may be disputed (cf. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), this dissertation illuminates 
how state institutions might stimulate the level of participation, both directly and 
indirectly. More specifically, several wide-spread political claims regarding the citizen 
participation are tested empirically. Political ideology, for instance, is heavily influ-
enced by neo-Tocquevillian notions like the crowding out thesis, according to which 
social security expenditure limits (the need for) participation (Skocpol 2003; Van der 
9  Although this dissertation finds its origins in the social capital approach and builds extensively on 
the rich theoretical and empirical literature in this tradition, the term social capital is not used to define 
any of the concepts. The broad but influential definition by Putnam (1993) of social capital as ‘features 
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions’ paved the way for many widely divergent definitions and operationaliza-
tions of social capital. Over the years social capital as a concept has been broadened so widely, that it 
risks becoming meaningless (Woolcock 1998; Portes 1998) and has been dismissed as ‘a totally chaotic, 
ambiguous, and general category that can be used as a notional umbrella for almost any purpose’ (Fine 
2001). In a non-exhaustive study, Grootaert (2001) found no less than fifty different indicators of social 
capital (ranging from murder- and divorce rates to the quality of the bureaucracy and from turnout rates 
to institutional and social trust).
Social capital has both been defined by its supposed consequences (Sobel 2002) and by its supposed 
origins, including by state institutions (cf. Collier 1998; Halpern 2005). In these definitions, the term 
social capital would function as a black box, as our study would at its core be a study of the effect of 
social capital on three forms of social capital. This does not mean we renounce the use and importance 
of the social capital approach in general, but merely the use of social capital as an empirical concept: ‘a 
vague keyword is not sufficient a reason to condemn a promising line of research’ (Sobel 2002).
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Meer 2006). The validity of this claim is tested empirically in Chapters 2 and 3. The 
schools of democracy thesis, according to which citizens learn to participate politi-
cally in voluntary associations (Tocqueville 2000 [1835–1840]; Morales and Geurts 
2007), is studied in Chapter 6. 
1.8. outline of the book
The actor-centered institutionalist approach and the cross-national, hierarchical 
research design, theoretically and methodologically, respectively, enable the study for 
answers to the three research questions raised above. These three research questions 
and the distinction between three forms of citizen participation form the backbone 
of this dissertation, as they structure the next six chapters. Within these chapters the 
research questions will be broken down into several sub-questions that enable a more 
systematic analysis. A schematic outline of the book is displayed in Scheme 1.1.
The distinction between three forms of participation (and their sub-modes) 
enables a focused and systematic study on the influence of state institutions, both 
on the level of participation and in the distribution of the likelihood of participa-
tion across social groups. The effects of state institutions on participation will first 
be studied separately for each form of participation in the next four chapters. The 
hypotheses we test in these chapters are concerned with the overall-effects of the 
institutional context on participation rates and participatory inequality. 
In Chapter 2, the first research question is answered for social participation. It 
shows to what extent state institutions affect the level of social participation cross-
nationally. The chapter differentiates theoretically and empirically between primor-
dial ties and secondary ties. Some institutional effects are expected to be opposite for 
primordial and secondary ties. For both modes of social participation one incentive-
based and two resource-based institutional theories are tested.
In Chapter 3 and 4, the focus is on civic participation. To overcome the fragment-
ed nature of the literature, Chapter 3 follows a similar theoretical and analytical re-
search design as Chapter 2. First, Chapter 3 constructs and validates a cross-national 
measurement of modes of civic participation, reducing four types of involvement in 
a multitude of voluntary associations (membership of, participating in, volunteering 
for and donating money to voluntary associations) to three cumulative scales (scalo-
grams). These scales are used in several of the following chapters. Second, it answers 
the question to what extent state institutions explain the difference between coun-
tries in the level of civic participation. 
Building on the findings in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 shows to what extent the degree 
of participatory inequality within countries is explained by the institutional context. 
It answers the second research question for civic participation through resource-
based theories. Although citizens with few resources are less likely to participate civi-
cally, social security expenditure may reduce participatory inequality for civic partici-
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pation by redistributing individual resources and offering collective resources.
Next, Chapter 5 considers the extent to which the institutional environments 
affects both the level of political participation and participatory inequality. It answers 
the first and second research questions for political participation. Political theorists 
have argued that modern, liberal democracies require high and equal levels of politi-
cal participation. We argue that participatory inequality is mainly a problem for de-
mocracy, when it occurs along ideological lines. By using out incentive- and resource-
based theories, rivaling hypotheses are formulated as to why some regimes are better 
equipped than others to stimulate high and equal levels of political participation. 
The final analytical chapters, Chapters 6 and 7, answer the third research ques-
tion and focus on the associations between forms of participation. Chapter 6 dissects 
the single dominant theory in this field, namely the neo-Tocquevillian theory on the 
association between civic and political participation. According to this theory, volun-
tary associations function as ‘schools of democracy’ in which members are socialized 
to participate politically. The schools of democracy theory is investigated separately 
in Chapter 6 for two reasons. Theoretically, it gives an account of the dominant neo-
Tocquevillian theory. Empirically, it tests whether the often assumed uni-directional 
causality (i.e., from civic to political participation) is plausible. Chapter 6 thereby 
offers more insight on the nature and strength of the relationship between civic and 
political participation.
Chapter 7 builds on the measures and findings of the previous chapters. The 
three forms of participation (social, civic, and political) are combined in a single 
multi-level structural equation analysis for three related aims. The first aim is to 
determine empirically to what extent the three forms of participation are related to 
each other. The second aim is to determine to what extent the institutional environ-
ment affects the relations between the three forms of participation. Additionally, 
Chapter 7 gives more insight in the causal relations between the three forms of par-
ticipation and their individual and contextual correlates. By comparing the model of 
Chapter 7 to the separate analyses in Chapters 2 to 5, the structural equation model 
distinguishes direct from indirect effects. 
Finally, Chapter 8 recapitulates the theories and findings of the separate analyti-
cal chapters to answer the three main research questions. After a reflection on the 
theoretical and methodological choices made in this dissertation, we conclude with 
the implications in this field for theory, methodology and policy.
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2.1. introduction1
Public wisdom holds that it is hard, if not impossible, for states to control private 
social life. Supposedly, citizens participate socially (i.e., meet or help family, friends, 
and neighbors in the intimate sphere) largely outside the scope of state interference. 
Nevertheless, over the last decade politicians and political ideologists have aimed 
to stimulate social participation in family life and local communities through state 
policies (Van der Meer 2006). Similarly, several scholars emphasized the state as a 
relevant facilitator of social participation (cf. Levi 1996, Tarrow 1996, Onyx and Bul-
len 2001, Szreter 2002): it provides the formal institutional framework within which 
social participation takes place. Institutional differences might explain the – as of 
yet largely unexplained (cf. Pichler and Wallace 2007) – country level differences in 
social participation that we described in the beginning of this book.
Surprisingly little empirical research has been done to actually test the impact of 
state institutions (Parboteeah et al. 2004; Freitag 2006), especially when it comes to 
social participation. Although in the social capital approach it had been linked theo-
retically to civic and political participation, social participation has long remained a 
separate field of interest from these other forms of participation.2 Consequently, no 
more than a few comparative studies (e.g. Scheepers et al. 2002; Van Oorschot and 
Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Pichler and Wallace 2007) have looked 
at the association between state institutions and social participation. These studies 
focused on a single state institution, rather than a range of them. Moreover, both 
theoretically and empirically, most of these studies did not distinguish between differ-
ent modes of social participation.
The extent to which individuals contact, meet, or help each other informally is 
what we label social participation. This encompasses many informal social contacts 
1  An excerpt of this chapter (on primordial ties) has been published as Van der Meer, T.W.G., Scheepers, 
P. and Te Grotenhuis, M. (2009). ‘States as molders of informal relations? A multilevel test on social 
participation in 20 Western countries’. European Societies 11 (in press). Another excerpt of this chapter 
(on secondary ties) has been published as Van der Meer, T.W.G., Scheepers, P. and Te Grotenhuis, 
M. (2008). ‘Does the state affect the informal connections between its citizens? New institutionalist 
explanations of social participation in everyday life’, in: Meulemann, H. (ed.) Social capital in Europe: 
similarity of countries and diversity of people? Multi-level analyses of the European Social Survey 2002. Leiden: 
Brill. A previous draft of this chapter has been presented as T. van der Meer, M. te Grotenhuis and  
P. Scheepers (2006) Informally connected: new institutionalist explanations for participation in informal 
networks. Paper presented at the Ad-hoc Gruppe ‘Sozialkapital und Zivilgeselllschaft – Mehrebenenana-
lysen des Europäischen Sozialen Survey’, 33rd DGS Kongress, Kassel (October 13, 2006).
2  In recent years attention for social participation from a social capital approach has been on the rise. 
Researchers described processes of individualization as a breakdown of intimate social networks (Beck 
1992), whereas others discovered increases in informal participation (Stolle and Hooghe 2005). Young 
cohorts were depicted emphasizing the personal and the private over the public and the collective 
(Putnam 2000). Other researchers described a process of informalization; young cohorts participating 
less in formal associations, but more in informal circles of acquaintances, friends, and neighbors (e.g. 
Scheepers and Janssen 2003).
stAtes of freely AssociAting citizens
44
outside formal organizations like voluntary associations, work or politics. We make 
two distinctions. First, social participation may be characterized in terms of quantity, 
i.e., frequency of contact, and quality, i.e., content of contact. This distinction cor-
responds to a theoretical distinction proposed by Mangen et al. (1988). They refer to 
associational solidarity (frequency of interaction) and functional solidarity (exchange 
of support, goods, and services). 
Second, we distinguish between primordial ties and secondary ties. Primordial 
ties are based on the strong, close relationships with family (kinship) and the local 
community (clanship). Kin and clan are ‘supposed to be a strong social community 
based on shared norms and values and consisting of members with a natural func-
tion to help and care for each other’ (Komter and Vollebergh 2002). In this chapter 
social participation along primordial ties encompasses contacts with close family and 
with one’s best friends. Participation along secondary ties takes place in a broader 
informal network of more general and distant friends, neighbors, relatives, and other 
acquaintances. The distinction between primordial and secondary ties is primar-
ily gradual: primordial ties (especially family ties) are more likely to be ascribed, 
whereas secondary ties are chosen. Yet, ascribed or not, to some degree individuals 
can choose to what extent they involve themselves in these ties. We claim that this 
element of choice is framed by state institutions.
Therefore, we come to the following research questions:
1. To what extent do the levels of  social participation differ cross-nationally?
2. To what extent do state institutions determine the different levels of  social participation, 
  taking individual characteristics into account?
3. To what extent is the impact of  state institutions on social participation similar across 
  social categories?
This chapter contributes to the literature on social participation in three ways. First, 
it presents theoretical accounts as to how state institutions affect social participation. 
We derive and test hypotheses following three lines of reasoning, which provide us 
with contradictory and complementary views. Second, we take a range of state insti-
tutions into account, whereas other research has been limited to analyzing only one 
such institution, most notably the welfare state. By not including other state institu-
tional measures in the analysis, one might erroneously conclude that a correlation 
constitutes a ‘real’ causal relation. Third, compared to previous comparative studies, 
we refine the broad concept of social participation both theoretically and empirically. 
Taking advantage of recent high quality cross-national data and based on separate 
measures of the International Social Survey Programme 2001 and the European 
Social Survey (ess) 2002, we will test the impact of state institutions on several modes 
of social participation separately.
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2.2. hypotheses 
In line with the actor-centered institutionalist approach we propose three mecha-
nisms through which the institutional environment affect social participation rates 
cross-nationally. The traditional crowding out builds on the assumption that social par-
ticipation is partly caused by economic incentives, i.e., the need for socio-economic 
security. The collective resources thesis does not focus on incentives, but on resources 
to participate. These resources need not only been individual, but may also be col-
lective – in the form of public wealth, social security, leisure time and infrastructure. 
Finally, building on studies on countries that are in a democratic transition, the 
public sphere thesis emphasizes resources of a different kind – like civil rights and 
democratic rule – that enable citizens to participate in the public sphere and depend 
less on social participation. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.1.
Crowding out
The crowding out thesis has been traced back to the writings of Tocqueville and Nis-
bet (Van der Meer 2006). At its core, the crowding out thesis explains social partici-
pation from the need for an economic safety net: family and friendship ties function 
as a safeguard against economic hardship, and people pursue and maintain these ties 
to have an economic safety net. The crowding out thesis is therefore an incentives-
based explanation: people are considered to participate socially to fulfill (higher) 
economic needs.
At the individual level, those who are aware of their (financial) dependency may 
invest in their social ties to construct an economic safety net (Flap 1999). However, 
states may also take up the function of an economic safety net by offering social 
security against unemployment, disability and disease, and by offering state pen-
sions – not as charity, but as an individual social right. Thereby, the state takes over 
(i.e., crowds out) the supportive role of family and friends (Habermas 1990 [1961]). 
People no longer need to depend on their social network, but rather on the state, 
and therefore have less (material) incentives to participate socially. In short: ‘Social 
expenditures and comprehensive social programs ‘crowd out’ informal caring rela-
tions and social networks, as well as familial, communal and occupational systems of 
self-help and reciprocity’ (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). Vice versa, states that lack 
such extensive social security systems force their citizens to rely on their families and 
friends and hence stimulate social participation.
Evidence for the crowding out thesis is mixed at best (cf. Scheepers et al. 2002; 
Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006). Yet, the differential 
findings might be reconciled when we consider that the crowding out effect may not 
be equally strong for different social groups. We expect that the inverse relationship 
between social security and social participation is stronger for people with a low in-
come than for people with a high income, as the latter have less economic incentives 
to participate socially to begin with. People with a low income depend more on social 
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security than people with a high income. Therefore the crowding out effect of social 
security should be more apparent among the economically weak – i.e., the poor.
Finally, as the crowding out thesis is fundamentally concerned with the economic 
function of social participation, we expect to find the strongest, negative effects of 
social security expenditure on measures of informal help provision. Whereas the 
frequency of social participation is also likely be driven by some other incentives than 
the need for an economic safety net, informal help provision is not. When states 
take over the economic function of social participation by offering social security, we 
should first expect that less help is needed and offered in informal networks – and 
only as a consequence thereof that the frequency of contact would diminish.
In line with the crowding out thesis, we test the following hypotheses on the ef-
fects of state institutions:
H1a The lower the level of social security expenditure in a welfare state, the higher the   
 level of social participation. 
H1b The negative effect of social security expenditure on social participation is stronger for 
 economically weak people (i.e., the poor and social security recipients) than for econo-
 mically strong people (i.e., the rich and the employed).
Collective resources
The second line is a resource-based explanation of participation (Brady et al. 1995). 
Whereas the crowding out thesis focuses on incentives, the collective resource theory 
emphasizes individual or collective resources to participate socially: those with more 
resources have more means, and are therefore more likely to participate socially. 
Scholars have long emphasized the role of individual resources, like time, money, 
and skills (Pattie et al. 2004). For instance, there is evidence that citizens are more 
likely to participate socially when their income is higher (Komter and Vollebergh 
2002).3 However, not all resources are at the individual level. Some resources are col-
lectively provided, like social security and economic development. 
Social security is an economic safety net for its citizens. In times of hardship they 
can rely on social security to fulfill at least their basic needs. A state that offers a high 
level of social security satisfies the need of its citizens for socio-economic security, 
and indirectly stimulates them to participate socially. This effect would be most ap-
parent for citizens with a low gross income, who benefit most from social security to 
obtain a relatively high net income. However, all citizens will find that a minimum 
income level is guaranteed by the state.
Concurrently, we come to the same hypotheses from a different starting point, 
namely Maslow’s theory on the hierarchy of human needs. Whereas the crowding 
out thesis considers social participation to be motivated by (economic) safety needs, 
Maslow (1970) claims it is motivated by the higher ranking need for belonging and 
3  Note that this empirical finding does not match with the basic assertion of the crowding out thesis 
that the poor should be more likely to participate socially, as they have more need for economic security.
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status. We would expect that economic security is not the goal of social participation, 
but rather a precondition for it. People with an economic safety net (i.e., living in a 
country with extensive social security expenditure) are more likely to fulfill their need 
for belonging and status, i.e., participate socially.
Contrary to the crowding out hypothesis H1a, the resource theory leads us to 
expect a positive relationship. We come to the following two hypotheses: 
H2a  In welfare states with a high level of social security expenditure, citizens are more 
 likely to participate socially. 
H2b  There is a stronger effect of social security on social participation for the economically 
 weak than for the economically strong – i.e., for the poor than for the rich.
In addition to individual income, national income also has a positive effect on the 
economic and physical safety of citizens. Economic development at the national level 
increases the resources in a society. Wealthy countries offer more economic means 
(money, infrastructure, and even leisure time through labor division) to participate 
extensively (Halman 2003). Moreover, it also has a positive impact on trust, pro-
social attitudes and general feelings of reciprocity (Knack and Keefer 1997). Finally, 
through economic development we also capture the average resources of alters in a 
society, i.e., the resources of those citizens we did not interview: individual income 
only presents information on one end of the social ties (‘ego’, or the respondent), 
but not on the other ends (‘alters’). But if ego needs resources to participate, so do 
the alters. In other words, when alters have more resources, ego is also more likely to 
participate.
For these three reasons, we expect countries with a high level of economic de-
velopment to show higher rates of social participation. Although economic devel-
opment is not a state institution, and although governments have only a limited 
influence on economic development, we incorporate it in this chapter both as an 
important control, and as part of the resource theory. Moreover, we expect this effect 
is stronger for for the economically weak than for the economically strong. Lacking 
individual level resources, the economically weak are more likely to benefit from a 
generally high level of economic development than the economically strong. 
H3a  In states with a high level of economic development, citizens are more likely to partici-
 pate socially.
H3b  There is a stronger effect of economic development on social participation for the 
 economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e., for the poor than for the 
 rich.
Public sphere
The public sphere thesis claims that patterns of social and civic participation depend 
on opportunity structures: citizens will opt to meet their needs through that particu-
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lar mode of participation which most likely maximizes the benefits. Modernization 
theorists (e.g. Heitmeyer 1997) propose that, over time, individuals have increasingly 
become free, able to choose how and to what degree they wish to participate. When 
citizens are less likely to reach their goals in the public sphere, they are more likely to 
participate socially (Hochschild 1997). Studies on (post-) communist societies showed 
these public modes of participation are less viable alternatives, when the state is re-
pressive (Howard 2003a; Bian 1997; Völker and Flap 2001). In these repressive states, 
citizens ‘compartmentalized their lives into small social networks made up of people 
whom they know well’ (Uslaner and Badescu 2003), i.e., the nuclear family and a 
few close friends (Mars and Altman 1992; Gibson 2003; Howard 2003b). These 
networks functioned ‘as a refuge, a shelter, from the meddling by the government 
and party into their private lives’ (Völker and Flap 2001). Participation in the public 
sphere was no serious alternative due to uncertainty about the intentions of strangers 
and the dire consequences of mistakenly trusting untrustworthy others. Therefore, in 
communist societies, public distrust about a repressive state drove citizens away from 
the public sphere and into private networks (Howard 2003a, 2003b).
These propositions on the repressive state and an untrustworthy public sphere 
may not only apply to communist countries, but also to democratic regimes (Elia-
soph 1998; Howard 2003b). Democratic societies, too, differ in the extent to which 
they guard the safety of the public sphere. States have great powers safeguarding the 
autonomy of its citizens in the public sphere, as they create the institutional setting 
with formal and informal laws in which citizens may participate. Institutional settings 
that support civic autonomy actually decrease individuals´ need for social partici-
pation. Repressive states limit the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere, 
undermine civic autonomy, breed insecurity about public networks (Rose 1994), and 
promote social participation (Bian 1997) through several characteristics. 
First, social participation may be negatively affected by the extent to which civil 
rights are enforced. Civil rights – like the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
association – are a warrant for undisturbed access to the public sphere. When states 
choose not to enforce these civil rights or to limit them in times of war or civic 
disturbance, we expect citizens to revert to social participation. Countries where civil 
rights are hardly enforced will have a higher level of social participation than coun-
tries where civil rights are strongly enforced. 
H4 The weaker a state enforces civil rights, the higher the level of social participation. 
Second, corruption in the state bureaucracy is considered to have similar effects. 
Objectively, corruption hampers the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere, 
as it gives public officials strong but unchecked discretionary powers (Transparency 
International 2000), fosters inequality in the public sphere due to fraud and coercion 
(Warren 2004). Subjectively, people who perceive of the public sphere as corrupt 
tend to have less institutional trust and opt to participate in localized, informal 
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networks instead of in the broader public sphere (Eliasoph 1998). In highly corrupt 
states citizens mainly depend on family ties to contact officials and find entrance to 
state arrangements (Mars and Altman 1992). Hence, our third hypothesis claims:
H5 The more corrupt a state is, the higher the level of social participation.
Finally, in liberal democracies civic freedoms are protected by the state. In young 
democracies, however, social and political trust have to be gained: civil society has to 
emerge and political life needs to stabilize before the public sphere functions as well 
and – more importantly – is perceived to be as safe as in longstanding democracies 
where citizens are better socialized in the system (Rose 1994; Howard 2003b). After 
a democratic transition (i.e., abrupt institutional change), it takes time and insti-
tutional stability for the (perception of a) safe public sphere to arise. Therefore, we 
expect social participation to be high in new democracies compared to longstanding 
democracies: 
H6 The younger the democratic regime of a country, the higher the level of social partici-
 pation.
We would expect the negative effects of civil rights enforcement, absence of cor-
ruption and democratic rule to be most apparent for primordial ties. The close ties 
of family and best friends are most secure and trusted, whereas a broader informal 
network is less trustworthy (Mars and Altman 1992; Völker and Flap 2001).
National level of  religiosity as a contextual control
Besides these seven determinants, we include a single measure of religiosity as a 
cultural determinant of social participation to assess whether state institutions offer 
an additional explanation. In the cultural approach the effect of religiosity at the 
national level has repeatedly been emphasized. Next to the religiosity of individual 
citizens, the national level of religiosity is considered to stimulate involvement in vol-
untary associations as well through network effects (Kelley and De Graaf 1997), both 
for religious and especially for non-religious citizens (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). 
This network explanation starts with two assertions. First, religious citizens are more 
likely to participate than non-religious citizens (cf. Reitsma 2007). Second, in devout 
countries there is a higher share of religious citizens in social networks than in secular 
countries (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Because they are more likely to have socially active 
persons in their networks, citizens would be more likely to participate in devout societies 
than in secular societies, since ‘the norm to volunteer could be stronger’ (Ruiter and De 
Graaf 2006) and ‘they are more likely to be recruited and motivated by the large number 
of religious fellow citizens’ (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Consequently, social participation 
would be stimulated by a highly religious context, beyond a composition effect. We there-
fore expect the national level of religiosity to be positively related to social participation. 
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Individual level determinants
While testing these hypotheses, we controlled for individual level determinants that 
were found to be significant in previous research (cf. Flap 1999; Komter and Volle-
bergh 2002; Scheepers et al. 2002; Scheepers and Janssen 2003; Bekkers and De 
Graaf 2006) to take composition effects into account. These studies show that social 
participation tends to be stimulated by education, length of residence in a commu-
nity, citizenship and religiosity, while age, urbanization and time constraints (house-
hold size) tend to be negatively related to it. Women are more likely to participate 
socially than men. However, for several individual level determinants these studies 
were less conclusive, leading to opposite expectations. With regards to marital status, 
for instance, married people have better means (i.e., more resources) to manage 
large social networks than unmarried people: they have accumulated contacts and 
have more time to help others. On the other hand, people who are not married may 
have more incentives to build and maintain a large social circle, in the absence of a 
spouse. 
Income is a crucial individual level determinant in this chapter. It may have a 
positive or a negative impact on social participation, depending on the theoretical 
perspective that is emphasized. On the one hand, the rich may have less need (i.e., 
incentives) for social participation than the poor (Flap 1999); on the other hand, the 
rich may have more resources like time and money, and even a stronger motivation 
to participate socially (Komter and Vollebergh 2002). Scheepers et al. (2002) found a 
positive relationship between income and social meetings with family members, and 
a negative relationship between income and social meetings with friends. 
We do not only control for background characteristics, we test for participation 
along secondary ties to what extent intermediate determinants (Davis 1985) add to 
the explanation of social participation. Several individual restrictions might reduce 
social participation, like a lack of health, a lack of personal or financial happiness, 
a lack of feeling safe in one’s neighborhood, a lack of trust or a lack of time (f.i. due 
to mass media consumption) (Putnam 2000). Theoretically, these characteristics may 
intermediate between background characteristics and state institutions, and social 
participation on the other hand.
Line of reasoning Hypothesis State level characteristic
Expected 
effect
Effect expected to 
be strongest for
Crowding out H1a/H1b Social security expenditure - The poor
Collective 
resources
H2a/H2b
H3a/H3b
Social security expenditure
Economic development
+
+
The poor
The poor
Public sphere
H4
H5
H6
Civil rights enforcement
Level of corruption
Years of democracy
-
+
-
None expected
None expected
None expected
Table 2.1. Country level hypotheses: an overview
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2.3. dAtA And meAsurement
The research questions and hypotheses in this chapter are formulated on two levels: 
the individual level (level 1) and the state level (level 2). Unfortunately, not all aspects 
of social participation were covered in a single cross-sectional survey. Therefore, we 
derive our individual level data from two cross-national data sets. The International 
Social Survey Programme (issp) module on Social Networks (2001) – collected be-
tween 2000 and 2003 – contains questions on social participation along primordial 
ties, i.e., with several specific members of the family as well as on friends. The first 
module (2002) of the European Social Survey contains questions on social partici-
pation along secondary ties: meeting socially with friends, relatives or colleagues; 
providing help not counting (paid) work and work for voluntary organizations; and 
having anyone to have intimate discussions with. We analyze the two data sets sepa-
rately, first showing the results for participation along primordial ties (measured by 
the issp data), followed by the results for participation in a broad, informal network 
(measured by the ess data).
The measures of social participation in the issp 2001 and ess 2002 data sets are 
more valid and more detailed than those used in previous studies, that used proxy’s 
of participation in the World Values Survey data set (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) 
or by a measure that was only applicable to a subset of the general population in the 
Eurobarometer data set (Scheepers et al. 2002). This chapter does not suffer from 
such limitations.
Country selection: issp
Twenty nine countries participated in the 2001 issp module. We left out the few 
non-Western countries, as the validity of the assumption of institutional stability is 
questionable for these countries (Harty 2005). We also excluded France due to a low 
response rate (14%), and Cyprus and Japan due to lack of contextual data. In the 
end, we are left with 20 societies (see Appendix A, Table AI), containing a total of 
27537 respondents of 18 years and older: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United 
States. All countries are democratic, and – with the exception of Israel – dominantly 
Christian. The average response rate is 60%. The sampling procedure differs per 
country (see the issp report on http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/code-
books/issp2001app.pdf).
Country selection: ess
Relevant questions on social participation in secondary ties were asked in all twenty-
two countries that participated in ess 2002: seventeen Western European countries, 
four former communist countries from Central Europe, and Israel. We decided to 
split the German sample into the former West and East Germany, in order to test the 
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effect of democratic rule. Luxembourg was left out of the analysis, being an outlier 
regarding several independent variables, both at the contextual (national income 
– see Appendix A, Table AII) and the individual level (nearly a third of the respon-
dents in the Luxembourg sample reported that they were not a citizen of Luxem-
bourg). This is due largely to the number of foreign employees active in the country. 
Eventually, we focused on 22 societies, containing a total of 38 436 respondents of 
15 years and older. To a large extent, these 22 societies were comparable on general 
cultural and political characteristics, as they were all Western or Western-oriented 
liberal democracies. 
Dependent variables: issp
Due to data limitations, we only analyze the frequency of interaction in primordial 
ties (i.e., associational solidarity) and not the quality of these interactions (i.e., func-
tional solidarity). We distinguish three modes of social participation along primor-
dial ties: respondents’ frequency of meetings with (i) nuclear family, (ii) best friend, 
and (iii) extended family. We therefore constructed three variables, based on two- and 
three-stage questions of the issp 2001. 
The measure of participation with the nuclear family is constructed by combining 
the respondent’s scores on four measures: meetings with his or her father, mother, 
adult son or daughter (whom the respondent has the most contact with), and sibling 
(whom the respondent has the most contact with). We summed these scores and di-
vided them by the respondent’s number of alters in the nuclear family. For our study, 
the average score is a better measure than the sum score. Of course, a respondent who 
visits both her mother and her father weekly has more informal contact than one who 
has only one parent which she visits weekly. This difference would be reflected in 
the sum score, and not in the average score. However, the difference between the two 
respondents is created by family composition – the number of living relatives – rather 
than by the choice to participate socially. This heavily distorts the sum score. As we do 
not aim to explain the number of living relatives, but the degree of informal contact 
given the availability of relatives, we will use the average score. It measures the intensity 
of participation with the nuclear family, given the number of alters. 
The measure of participation with the extended family is constructed by combin-
ing respondents’ scores on contact with his/her uncle or aunt, and with his/her 
cousin (both ranging from never (0) to more than twice in the last four weeks (2)). 
This measure is constructed differently from the previous one, as we do not know 
the number of alters in the extended family. We exclude those who have no uncles/
aunts or cousins from the analysis. 
The measure of participation with one’s best friend is more readily available in 
the data set. We only have information on contact with the single best friend, and 
not on contact with the whole network of friends. Yet, as we are explicitly concerned 
with close ties, our measure of contact with the single best friend is more suitable 
than information about a larger network of friends.
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For contact with the nuclear and extended family, we coded respondents who 
stated not to have any (living) relatives of that kind as missing and left them out of 
the analysis. For contact with one’s best friend, this was more problematic. While 
family members are largely ascribed, friends are chosen. Our measure only captures 
the contact frequency of those respondents that report to have a single best friend. 
Three groups of respondents (over 5000 respondents in total) are thereby excluded: 
(i) respondents that do not have close friends; (ii) respondents that had a close friend 
that died; (iii) respondent with several close friends, but not a single best friend. It 
would be interesting to include the first group in our models as the least involved 
respondents (even below those with friends, but without regular contact). Unfortu-
nately, the issp data do not allow us to distinguish between the three excluded catego-
ries of respondents, as three different questions present inconsistent information. 
Therefore, we had to leave out all these respondents, i.e., those without close friends 
and those with too many close friends.
This resulted in the following distribution of respondents (see Table 2.2).
The measures of participation with one’s best friend and with the nuclear family (or 
more precisely: with each of the four underlying measures) range from 0 (no meet-
ings) to 7 (he/she lives in the same household as I do).4 The third measure – partici-
pation with the extended family – ranges from 0 (no contact in the last four weeks) 
to 4 (more than twice contact with uncle or aunt, as well as more than twice with 
cousin in the last four weeks). 
For the measure of participation with the nuclear family we introduced two types 
of controls to take further effects of family composition out of the equation. Just as 
4  The categories of this 8-point scale are: 0 (never), 1 (less than several times a year), 2 (several times 
a year), 3 (at least once a month), 4 (at least once a week), 5 (at least several times a week), 6 (daily), 
7 (lives in same household). We conceive of the latter category as the most intensive value of social parti-
cipation. For friendship ties the prevalence is rather small: less than 2% lives in the same household as 
his/her best friend. Yet for the nuclear family living together is more common: 6% lives with a sibling, 
10% with a father, 14% with a mother, and 15% with an adult child. 
One might plausibly argue that category 7 has a qualitatively different meaning from the other 
categories. Therefore, we estimated our parameters twice: including and excluding the respondents in 
category 7. The outcomes of the analyses were nearly identical for the level 2 and interaction effects 
we are most interested in, both for contact with the nuclear family and contact with one’s best friend. 
Including the respondents living with their contacts thus does not affect our findings.
Variable Valid N No (living) relative/friend System missing
Nuclear family 24772 317 434
Closest friend 21100 2235 1437
Uncle, aunt, cousin 17639 5389 1744
Table 2.2. Sample size for three modes of social participation
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we control for characteristics of ego (the respondent) to assess composition effects, 
we should do the same for relevant characteristics of the alters in the relationship. 
The issp contains two relevant characteristics that we take into account. The first 
control concerns the question which alters the respondent can have contact with. 
As people are more likely to meet their mother or child than father or brother, it 
matters whether they have a (living) father, mother, sibling and/or child when we 
explain participation with the nuclear family. The second control concerns the 
selection bias in the measurement of social participation with one’s son/daughter 
and with one’s brother/sister. These variables measure participation with the child 
or sibling whom the respondent has the most contact with. The number of siblings and 
the number of adult children is likely to affect this measure of social participation, 
either positively (respondents who can select from a larger pool are more likely to 
have a relative with whom they share interests) or negatively (they have to divide 
their time over more close kin). Because we are not interested to explain the number 
of siblings or children, but the contact citizens have given the number of siblings or 
children, we control for it in our models. Otherwise family size would have convo-
luted our models.
Dependent variables: ess
We analyze three measures of social participation in the ess data set.5 We treated 
them as measures of the frequency and the content of social participation in the 
broad, informal network.
The quantity of social participation (associational solidarity) was operationalized 
by asking how often respondents met socially with friends, relatives or colleagues. 
Answers ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). The quality of social participation (func-
tional solidarity) was operationalized by two measures in the ess data set. The first 
focused on the extent to which respondents provided help to others, outside of work 
and voluntary organizations. As these formal organizations were not included in the 
formulation of the question, the measure captured functional solidarity in an infor-
mal network. It ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). The second measure of quality of 
social participation focused on having someone to have intimate discussions with. 
This reciprocal service between partners is an element of functional solidarity. The 
measure is dichotomous: either respondents claim to have anyone to have intimate 
discussions with, or they do not.
5  The ess data set includes yet another measure of social participation. Respondents answer the 
question of how often they take part in social activities compared to others of the same age. The relative 
measure of frequency of social participation is positively related to the ‘absolute’ estimated frequency of 
social meetings, both at the individual level and at the contextual level. Nevertheless, we will not include 
the relative measure in this chapter. The meaning of the scores is conceptually unclear, because of the 
undefined ‘others’. Country level differences on this measure therefore become difficult to interpret. 
Moreover, we stumbled on an unexpected bias: in all countries participating in the ess, people think on 
average that they participate less than ‘others’.
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Country level determinants
We collected institutional data from the year before the individual level data were 
collected for the issp and ess, respectively. For some countries, data were not available 
for the appropriate year. In these cases we used data from the previous or next year 
if we could ascertain that characteristics hardly changed between adjacent years. For 
economic development, however, we took all measures strictly from the same year, to 
measure the relative extent of economic development of countries, and not to bother 
with inflation correction.
As our hypotheses are concerned with the level of social security expenditure, 
we do not apply the typology of welfare state regimes by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Although it is often used in this field of research (cf. Scheepers et al. 2002; Van 
Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006), the typology of Esping-
Andersen encompasses a multitude of elements besides social security expenditures, 
and cause a loss of empirical data (scp 2001; Gelissen 2001). We therefore use the 
imf-statistics on social security and health care expenditure in 2000 from the annual 
Government Finance Statistics and standardized the expenditures as a percentage of 
the gdp. These self-reported imf-statistics are internationally comparable because of 
the strict definitions the imf applies. The imf-measure correlates strongly (>0.9) with 
oecd and ilo data. 
As a measure of economic development, we applied different (but highly correlat-
ed) measures for the two data sets. For the issp data we used the gdp/capital ppp, the 
gross domestic product per head of the population (per capita) corrected for differ-
ences in price levels (Purchasing Power Parity, or ppp), provided by the World Bank. 
For the ess data, we used gni/capita ppp, the gross national income (gni) per head of 
the population (per capita) corrected for differences in price levels (Purchasing Power 
Parity, or ppp), provided by imf. These measures are strongly correlated (>.99) to each 
other and to kindred measures of the oecd and Eurostat.
The measure of length of democratic rule, based on Inglehart (1997), indicates 
how long a country has been democratic without disruption (with 1920 as starting 
point). The maximum age of a democracy in 2000 is 80.
Our measure of civil rights enforcement is based on the annual index from the 
Freedom House. Freedom House (2002) defines civil liberties ‘to include the free-
doms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state’. 
Countries are ranked on a scale that ranges from 1 (no civil liberties) to 7 (high level 
of enforced civil liberties). Although the index has been criticized as subjective (Bol-
len and Paxton 2000), it is the best cross-national measure at our disposal. 
By absence of a cross-country measure of corruption, we recoded a measure of 
perceived corruption, namely the Corruption Perception Index (cpi ) 2000, issued 
by Transparency International. The cpi is based on multiple surveys in which ex-
perts (international businesspersons, state officials and scientists) were asked to rate 
countries’ level of corruption. The measure of corruption ranges from 0 (no corrup-
tion) to 10 (highly corrupt). The cpi correlates strongly (>.99) with the World Bank’s 
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Control Corruption Index (cci ), which is based on largely the same surveys.
Finally, as a measure of national level of religiosity we computed per country the 
average level of attendance of religious services (cf. Ruiter and De Graaf 2006) based 
on the issp 2001 and ess data sets, respectively. 6 7
Individual level variables: issp
In our analysis we need to control for individual level explanations of social partici-
pation, as country level differences in social participation may be the product of com-
position effects. For the issp we take income, work status, age (or rather, log-age to 
capture non-linear tendencies), sex, education, length of residence in a community, 
marital status, religious denomination and church attendance into account. Given 
our hypotheses, income and work status/income source are central to our study. 
Income is measured by the actual amount of money available to the household. As 
we could not construct a single cross-national measure of individual level income, 
we had to standardize income within each country for reasons of comparability. 
Consequently, our measure of individual level income cannot explain country level 
differences in participation rates, as the average income is zero for all countries. This 
is partially solved by the inclusion of economic development as a contextual determi-
nant. Work status distinguishes between those who do paid work and those who do 
not: the unemployed, students, housemen and –wives, pensioned, and the disabled.
Individual level variables: ess
Similarly, in the ess we control for income, income source, age (and age-squared), 
sex, education, length of residence in a community, marital status, religious denomi-
nation, church attendance, household size, level of urbanization and citizenship. 
Income was measured as the actual amount of money available to the household (net 
income), categorized into 12 groups (with 1 being the lowest income group and 12 
being the highest). Income source distinguishes between those who get money from 
salaries or profit (as the reference group) and those who do not: the pensioned, the 
6  External measures on religiosity were all lacking theoretically or methodologically for our purposes. 
Official data report church membership registration, but say little about de facto involvement. Formal 
registration of church membership would selectively overemphasize the level of religiosity, for instance 
for Scandinavian countries where most citizens are registered as member, but relatively few participate. 
Actual church involvement is cross-nationally measured in the World Churches Handbook (Brierly 
1997). Yet, that study only focuses on Christian religions and leaves out all others. Other measures of 
religiosity (religious pluralism, historically dominant denomination, percentage nominal Catholics, 
percentage nominal Protestants) suffered from theoretical and/or methodological flaws too. Moreover, 
neither added to the variance already explained by the institutional factors.
7  The distribution of the scores follow a similar pattern on several measures (see Appendix A). 
Generally, longstanding, western democracies score high on civil rights enforcement, absence of 
corruption, years of democratic rule and economic development. East-European countries score lowest, 
and South-European countries fall somewhat in the middle. However, we prove multicollinearity is not 
much of a problem in this study (see Appendix B), and can therefore raise the question which of these 
aforementioned factors explains social participation best.
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unemployed, those who depend on other social benefits, and those who depend on 
other sources of income.8
 
Intermediate factors: ess
To capture time constraints due to media consumption, we included separate 
measures for time people claimed to spend listening to the radio, reading a news-
paper and watching television. Besides these, we also included the total amount of 
time people claimed to spend watching the news on television. Lack of health was 
operationalized by the subjective report of respondents regarding his or her health. 
We knew to which extent respondents felt unsafe in the neighborhoods they lived 
in. Lack of social trust was measured by the broadly used single question of whether 
most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people. 
Lack of happiness was operationalized by the respondent’s claim to what extent he or 
she was happy, taking all things into consideration. A final subjective constraint was 
lack of income satisfaction: the extent to which respondents found it comfortable or 
difficult to live on their current household income.
2.4. AnAlyses
Both our hypotheses and our data are hierarchically structured: our hypotheses argue 
that social participation depends on both individual and contextual characteristics, 
while in our data set individuals (level 1) are nested in different countries (level 2). 
To deal with this nested structure, we employ hierarchical modeling (multi-level 
analysis) (Snijders and Bosker 1999) using the ml-win 2.0 package (Goldstein 1995). 
The scores on most of our dependent variables are quasi-metric. For the measures 
of participation along primordial ties in the issp, contact with the nuclear family has 
43 categories, contact with one’s best friend 8, and contact with the extended family 
5. For the measures of participation along secondary ties in the ess, having meetings 
and help provision have 7 categories, while having intimate discussions has only 2. 
However, cross-national variance on the latter measure is rather small (below), so no 
hierarchical analysis is done.
8  Besides income source, we also constructed a broader classification based on the EGP-scheme, 
developed by Erikson et al. (1983). In effect, we made a further distinction within the group of people 
who live of salaries or profit: higher professionals (as the reference group), lower professionals, routine 
non-manual workers, self-employed, manual supervisors/skilled manual workers, semi-unskilled manual 
workers. Other categories in this distinction were students, unemployed, pensioned/permanently sick 
or disabled, housework and others. This classification could be created for all countries, except for 
France. 
We tested whether the EGP-classification would perform better in our models and present additional 
information than the variable of income source. The gain in information at the first level was, however, 
very small. We therefore preferred the variable income source over the EGP-classification, mainly to 
maximize the number of countries in the analysis.
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For the other five (quasi-metric) measures, ordered logit hierarchical regression 
is formally the most appropriate method, whereas linear hierarchical regression 
analysis is more commonly applied. Although we attempted to estimate ordered logit 
hierarchical models, our complicated models would not converge in several software 
packages. Therefore, we tested indirectly whether linear regression would come to the 
same conclusions as ordered logit regression. Building on a low intraclass correlation 
(see below), we temporarily ignored the hierarchical structure of the data to apply 
ordinal regression via plum (PoLytomous Universal Models). We found that the effect 
sizes in the plum-models are similar to those of linear hierarchical analysis, although 
of course the standard errors of the country level determinants were uncorrected. 
This proved we could safely apply linear hierarchical analysis to our study, which we 
did. We used the Maximum likelihood procedure as our estimation method, and the 
–2 Log-likelihood (–2LL) to estimate the model fit. To compare between models, we 
calculated the difference between the –2LL, which is Chi-square distributed.9 10
Before we estimated the effects of level 1 and level 2 determinants, we estimated 
a baseline model to establish whether there is significant variance at the individual 
(σ2e
0ij
) and at the contextual level (σ2u
0j
). Respondents with one or more missing 
values on any of the variables were left out of the analyses; subsequent models are all 
based on the same set of respondents. Next we calculated the ratio of the contextual 
level variance to the total variance (σ2e
0ij
 + σ2u
0j
), the intra-class correlation. For all 
modes of social participation, the variance turned out to be significant at both levels. 
Subsequently, we took composition effects into account by including individual 
level determinants. In a third step we included all contextual characteristics to 
measure the net impact of the state institutions on social participation as described 
in hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3, and H4.11 Additionally, on the ess-data we included 
9  We tested the assumption of homoscedasticity, according to which the variance of error is distributed 
equally across categories of x-variables. Although the model fit improved when we allowed for heterosce-
dasticity, the parameters remained substantially the same: neither in the effect size, nor in the standard 
errors did we come to find any substantial difference.
10  We checked the assumption of normality by analysis of the residuals. We considered the statistical 
tests of normality to be inappropriate here: we found significant, but irrelevant violations of the 
normality assumption for individual level variables, whereas the test turned out insignificant for our 
country level variables due to the low number of countries. Therefore, we focused on the normality 
plots. These showed no harmful violation of the assumption of normality.
11  High correlations amongst the level 2 determinants (in addition to the relatively small N at level 
2) in our multi-level analyses might lead to incorrect conclusions, as the effects may overlap and the 
coefficients might be the result of chance. To test whether this is the case or that the found coefficients 
on the level 2 determinants are stable, we performed perturbation analyses (Belsley 1991). If the 
coefficients found in Tables 4, 7 and 8 are not stable but caused by multi-collinearity, we would expect 
that they would be affected by small, random errors on these determinants. In perturbation analyses 
we introduced – within theoretically reasonable margins – random errors on our level 2 determinants 
and retested our models one hundred times. We conclude that the perturbation analyses show that the 
effects found in models B are stable, both in significance and in direction (for a detailed overview of the 
perturbation analyses and the findings, see Appendix B).
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Figure 2.1c. Meetings with uncles, aunts, cousins (percentages), by country
Figure 2.1a. Meetings with the nuclear family (percentages), by country
Figure 2.1b. Meetings with best friend (percentages), by country
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a range of intermediate variables. Finally we tested whether this impact varied with 
income and work status (hypotheses H1b and H2b) in random slope models. 
2.5. results: primordiAl ties (issp)
Figures 2.1a–2.1c describe the country level differences in social participation along 
primordial ties. There are vast differences between countries: social participation is 
about twice as high in Southern Europe compared to most of Northern Europe. The 
former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe fall somewhat in-be-
tween. These differences are similar to the study by Pichler and Wallace (2007). The 
next question is, whether these variations across countries are significant, and – if so 
– whether they remain significant when we control for composition effects (i.e., after 
taking all individual level variables into account).
Variance estimates
These questions are answered in Table 2.3, that displays the variance estimates for all 
models. In both the baseline and the composition model, the individual and country 
level variances are significant. To find out whether hierarchical analysis is not merely 
appropriate but also sensible, intraclass-correlations were computed. In the baseline 
models, the percentage of variance at the contextual level amounts to 14% (nuclear 
family), 9% (friends) and 5% (extended family). These are quite considerable per-
centages given that the dependent variable is measured at the individual level, and 
most variance is to be expected at the individual level (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; 
Rahn and Rudolph 2005). In other words, there are quite large country level differ-
ences in the average level of social participation along primordial ties. The question 
is, whether these remain significant when we control for all individual level variables. 
The second model takes these composition effects into account. As a consequence 
the variance at the contextual level drops with 20 to 25%, but remains significant. 
Moreover, the intra-class correlations are hardly affected. These results indicate that 
it is worthwhile to investigate the impact of state institutions on social participation 
using a hierarchical model.
The third row in Table 2.3 shows that contextual determinants significantly con-
tribute to the explanation of social participation as the decline of the –2log-likelihood 
(–2LL) between models is significant. In all full models variance at the contextual 
level is strongly reduced (by 60% to 80%) by the inclusion of direct effects of contex-
tual determinants. Inclusion of interaction effects improves the models even further 
for the nuclear and extended family. Table 2.4 gives insight in the direct effects of the 
individual and contextual level determinants. 
Country level effects
The results displayed in Table 2.4 offer no evidence for a general crowding out effect 
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of primordial ties. Social security expenditure does not have a significant effect on 
participation with the nuclear family, nor on participation with friends. This refutes 
H1a and H2a. However, we find that social security expenditure is inversely related 
to participation with the extended family, which supports H1a and refutes H2a. In 
absolute terms the effect is far from small: 5% gdp additional social security accounts 
for a decline of the country average participation with the extended family to 1 point 
on our 5-point scale.
Economic development has a positive effect on social participation: countries 
with a higher gdp/capita ppp have a higher level of social participation. This effect 
is, however, not significant for participation in the nuclear family. In other words, 
hypothesis H3a is supported for participation with one’s best friend and with the 
extended family.
Hypothesis H4 is supported by the results in Table 2.4: the more a state enforces 
Table 2.3. Variance analyses
Nuclear family Closest friend Uncle, aunt, cousin
Average 4.0 3.9 1.1
N 14242 15512 13080
Baseline model
σ2u0j 0.332 0.182 0.085
σ2e0ij 2.003 1.856 1.509
Intraclasscorrelation 0.141 0.089 0.053
-2LL 50400.13 53698.63 42569.96
Composition model
σ2u0j 0.205 0.128 0.058
σ2e0ij 1.627 1.776 1.392
intraclasscorrelation 0.112 0.067 0.040
-2LL 47432.93 53007.07 41515.74
Dev –2LL 2967.20 691.56 1054.22
df 25 19 19
Full model (model A)
σ2u0j 0.078 0.027 0.019
σ2e0ij 1.627 1.776 1.392
intraclasscorrelation 0.046 0.015 0.013
-2LL 47413.94 52977.30 41495.43
Dev –2LL 18.99 29.77 20.31
df 6 6 6
Full model including cross-level interactions (model B)
σ2u0j 0.078 0.028 0.020
σ2e0ij 1.622 1.775 1.389
intraclasscorrelation 0.046 0.016 0.014
-2LL 47392.69 52971.63 41466.71
Dev –2LL 22.25 5.67 28.72
df 8 8 8
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order. 
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civil rights, the lower the level of participation with the nuclear family and with one’s 
best friend. We find no support at all for hypothesis H5: the effect of corruption is 
insignificant in all models.
The age of a democracy is inversely related to all three modes of social participa-
tion which supports hypothesis H6: longstanding democracies have a lower level of 
social participation than newly developed democracies. Yet, although significant, the 
effects are effectively rather small in absolute terms: having 80 years of democracy 
(the maximum) accounts for an average decrease of less than three quarters of a 
point on our social participation scales.
Finally, the average level of religiosity does not have an effect on social participa-
tion.
In short, we only find support for the crowding out thesis with regard to the 
extended family. The refuge thesis is supported for civil rights enforcement and de-
mocracy, but not for corruption.12 Next, the question comes up whether these effects 
are equally strong for different social groups. We tested this with cross-level interac-
tion effects in random slope models, where the individual level effects of income and 
work status are allowed to vary across countries. 
Individual level effects
At the individual level, most effects are significant. Level of education is inversely re-
lated to social participation within the nuclear family and with the closest friend: the 
higher one’s education, the lower the level of participation. Income shows different 
effects for different modes of social participation: it is positively related to participa-
tion in the nuclear and the extended family, but inversely related to participation 
with one’s best friend. In line with our expectations we find that students, pen-
sioned, unemployed and disabled people have a higher level of social participation. 
Surprisingly, controlled for other determinants, housekeepers do not have higher 
rates of social participation compared to employed people. Age (log) is inversely 
related to social participation, implying that social participation decreases with age. 
Length of residence is positively related to social participation. Next, there are some 
significant differences between men and women: women have more contact with the 
extended family, but less with their best friend. Moreover, we find that all categories
12  These findings are, however, affected by two influential countries (c.f. Van der Meer et al. 2009), 
namely Poland and Russia. Poland is a very devout country, whereas Russia is very secular. Both are 
young democracies with a low gdp. In Russia, spending on social security is relatively low. The single 
exclusion of either country does not profoundly affect the outcomes. However, once we exclude both 
countries simultaneously from the analysis, the positive effect of average level of religiosity on contact 
with the nuclear family turns significant, while the effect of democratic rule turns non-significant 
(whereas the effect of civil rights enforcement increases significantly); the positive effect of average level 
of religiosity on contact with the best friend turns significant; and the effect of  the effect of social 
security expenditure on contact with the extended family drops to barely non-significance. Nevertheless, 
most contextual effects (as well as all individual level effects) remain unaffected. Especially the effect of 
average level of religiosity appears to be sensitive to these two influential cases.
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of people who are not (currently) married participate more with their nuclear family 
and friends than married people do. The unmarried also have more contact with the 
extended family, while the widowed and divorced have less. In line with our expecta-
tions, people who attend to religious services regularly, participate more than less 
devout people. Moreover, compared to the non-religious, Catholics participate most 
with their nuclear family members and closest friends, closely followed by Protes-
Table 2.4. Results: Hierarchical random intercept models, direct effects
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Nuclear family Closest friend Uncle, aunt, cousin
Individual level determinants  
Years of education (effect *10)  -0.19 (0.02) -0.25 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Income 0.10 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Work status (employed)
∙ unemployed 0.16 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05)
∙ student 0.20 (0.07) 0.11 (0.06) 0.18 (0.06)
∙ houseman/-wife -0.03 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
∙ pensioned -0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.13 (0.04)
∙ disabled 0.06 (0.06) 0.24 (0.07) 0.23 (0.07)
Age (log) -4.13 (0.14) -1.57 (0.11) -2.16 (0.11)
Length of residence 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ widowed 0.24 (0.04) 0.33 (0.05) -0.11 (0.06)
∙ divorced 0.13 (0.04) 0.20 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04)
∙ separated 0.16 (0.08) 0.26 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08)
∙ unmarried 0.56 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.15 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.25 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04) 0.16 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.16 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.16 (0.04)
∙ Orthodox -0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07) -0.15 (0.07)
∙ Other 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05)
Attendance of religious services 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
Has a father -0.30 (0.03)  -  -
Has a mother 0.13 (0.03) - -
Has a sibling -0.64 (0.04) - -
Number of siblings 0.01 (0.01) - -
Has a child 0.59 (0.04) - -
Number of children 0.04 (0.01) - -
State level determinants
Social security expenditure 0.48 (1.72) -0.05 (1.04) -1.90 (0.90) 
GPD/capita ppp (effect *1000) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Civil rights -0.22 (0.12) -0.23 (0.07) -0.09 (0.06)
Corruption 0.03 (0.08) -0.02 (0.05) -0.03 (0.04) 
Years of democracy -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Average church attendance 0.01 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
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Table 2.5. Results: Hierarchical random slope models, cross-level interaction effects
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
Nuclear family Closest friend Uncle, aunt, cousin
Individual level determinants
Years of education (effect *10)  -0.19 (0.02) -0.25 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Income 0.02 (0.09) -0.07 (0.06) -0.22 (0.06)
Work status (employed)
∙ unemployed 0.45 (0.20) 0.12 (0.22) 0.14 (0.19)
∙ student -0.05 (0.31) 0.16 (0.32) 0.55 (0.29)
∙ houseman/-wife 0.03 (0.19) 0.05 (0.19) -0.18 (0.18)
∙ pensioned 0.00 (0.12) 0.16 (0.12) -0.08 (0.16)
∙ disabled -0.44 (0.27) -0.07 (0.31) -0.32 (0.30)
Age (log) -4.11 (0.14) -1.58 (0.11) -2.16 (0.11)
Length of residence 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ widowed 0.24 (0.05) 0.33 (0.05) -0.11 (0.06)
∙ divorced 0.13 (0.04) 0.21 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04)
∙ separated 0.17 (0.08) 0.26 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08)
∙ unmarried 0.56 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.15 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.26 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04) 0.16 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.16 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.17 (0.04)
∙ Orthodox -0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07) -0.15 (0.07)
∙ Other 0.02 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
Attendance of religious services 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
Has a father -0.30 (0.03)  -  -
Has a mother 0.13 (0.03) - -
Has a sibling -0.64 (0.04) - -
Number of siblings 0.01 (0.01) - -
Has a child 0.59 (0.04) - -
Number of children 0.04 (0.01) - -
State level determinants
Social security expenditure 0.54 (1.73) -0.22 (1.05) -2.03 (0.91) 
GPD/capita ppp (effect *1000) 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Civil rights -0.22 (0.12) -0.19 (0.07) -0.09 (0.06)
Corruption -0.03 (0.08) -0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 
Years of democracy -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Average church attendance 0.01 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Cross-level interaction
Soc.sec. * Income 0.33 (0.39) 0.18 (0.26) 1.14 (0.28)
Soc.sec. * Work status(employed)
               * unemployed -1.45 (0.96) -0.03 (1.04) -0.14 (0.91)
               * student 1.15 (1.39) 1.19 (1.43) -1.69 (1.29)
               * houseman/-wife 0.01 (0.88) -0.13 (0.91) 0.60 (0.86)
               * pensioned -0.16 (0.54) -0.49 (0.57) 1.04 (0.72)
               * disabled 2.38 (1.26) 1.52 (1.41) 2.58 (1.38)
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
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Figure 2.2c.  Cross-level interaction effect: social security, in 
  come and contact with the extended family 
Figure 2.2a.  Cross-level interaction effect: social security,   
  work status and contact with the nuclear family
Figure 2.2b.  Cross-level interaction effect: social security,   
  work status and contact with the extended family
tants. Orthodox people have significantly less contact with their extended family 
than non-religious people. Otherwise, there are no significant differences between 
the non-religious and religious people.
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Cross-level interaction effects
Table 2.5 shows that several cross-level interaction effects are significant. The inter-
action between social security expenditure and income is in line with hypothesis 
H1b, which stated that the impact of social security is stronger for people with a low 
income than for people with a high income. The negative effect of social security on 
participation with the extended family is strong and significant for the 5% of the 
people with the lowest income (i.e., –3.91),13 but nearly absent for the 5% wealthiest 
people (i.e., –0.15 and non-significant) – see Figure 2.2a. For the nuclear family and 
friends, however, we do not find support for hypothesis H1b. 
We do not find any evidence that the effect of social security expenditure is more 
strongly negative for recipients of social security than for people with a job (hypoth-
esis H1b). All interaction effects are non-significant, save for one group. For disabled 
people, we find a positive effect of social security expenditure on participation within 
the nuclear and extended family. Rather than crowding out their need for family, 
we must conclude that social security enables disabled people to keep in contact 
with their nuclear and extended family – possibly through health care provision and 
public transport. These two significant interaction effects are graphically displayed in 
Figures 2.2b and 2.2c.
The significant cross-level interaction effects are not only relevant for research 
on state institutions, but also for those who study the individual level association 
of income or work status with family relations. From a different, but equally valid, 
point of view, they imply that the strength and even the direction of the individual 
level association between income/work status and social participation is conditioned 
by the institutional environment.
2.6. results: secondAry ties (ess)
Next, we turn to the test of the same hypotheses on social participation along second-
ary ties. Figures 2.3a–2.3c display the cross-national differences in social participa-
tion graphically. On two out of the three measures there are vast differences between 
countries. Countries strongly differ in the level of social contacts between their 
citizens and on the amount of help provided to others. The frequency of meeting 
socially with friends, relatives and colleagues is circa 80% in Norway and Denmark, 
which is nearly twice as high as in Poland, Greece and Hungary. Generally, the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe score relatively low, including former 
East Germany. Help is provided regularly by over 40% of the citizens in Austria, Swit-
zerland, the Netherlands and Germany, which is over twice as high as in Greece and 
13  The net effect of social security on participation with the extended family is calculated as follows: 
–2.03 (the main effect of social security) – 1.65 (the Z-score of income for the poorest 5%) * 1.14 (the 
interaction effect of social security and income) = –3.91. Calculations for the other total effects follow 
the same procedure.
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Figure 2.3c. Helping people outside work/voluntary organizations (percentages), by country
Figure 2.3a. Anyone to discuss intimate matters with (percentages), by country
Figure 2.3b. Meeting socially with friends (percentages), by country
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the Czech Republic. The German-speaking countries are all at the high end of the 
spectrum of providing help, whereas the Latin Rim countries (like Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) are all at the low end. However, with regard to the third measure at least 
80% of the citizens in each country claims to have someone to discuss intimate mat-
ters with. Italy (80%) and the Czech Republic (84%) are downward outliers, but are 
still rather high. Due to the small differences between countries, and considering the 
rather skewed distribution in all countries, we will refrain from testing for the impact 
of state institutions on having anyone to discuss intimate matters with. 
Note, that the distributions of the three modes of participation along secondary 
ties are strikingly different from the primordial ties described in the previous para-
graph. This supports the distinction between primordial and secondary ties.
Variance estimates
Table 2.6 confirms that – both in the baseline and in the composition model – the 
individual and country level variances are significant. Variance is to be explained 
at both levels; hence, hierarchical analysis is the appropriate tool. The percentage 
of variance at the contextual level amounts to 9.3 percent for frequency of social 
contacts and 7.5 percent for providing help to others. Controlled for composition 
effects, the variance at the contextual level hardly diminishes. Rather, contextual vari-
ance increased for providing help (to 0.254). In other words, composition effects do 
not explain social participation. The intraclass-correlations, therefore, hardly dimin-
ished. In the composition models, respectively, 9 and 8 percent of the variance was at 
the contextual level. This percentage is sufficiently high to look for contextual level 
determinants in a hierarchical model. 
Next, we specified a model including all independent determinants, both at the 
individual and the contextual level (Model A). The decline of the log-likelihood 
(–2LL) between models was significant, which shows that contextual determinant sig-
nificantly explain social participation. Variation at the contextual level was reduced 
(by 50 to 60 percent) because of the inclusion of direct effects of contextual determi-
nants. When we added the intermediate determinants to this model (Model B), the 
log-likelihood (–2LL) declined significantly once more. The intermediate determi-
nants mainly contributed to the explanation of individual level variance. Finally, the 
inclusion of the cross-level interactions additionally decreased the log-likelihood of 
the models. We therefore should not speak of ‘the’ impact of state institutions, but 
rather claim that their effects are stronger for some social groups than for others.
Country level effects
Now, let us turn to the results of the multiple hierarchical analyses. Tables 2.7 and 
2.8 provide insights in the direct as well as in the interaction effects of the individual 
and contextual level determinants on frequency of social contacts and on providing 
help to others. We are most interested in the direct effects of the state institutional 
determinants in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Although Model C offers most information, we 
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Table 2.6. Variance analyses
Frequency of 
social contacts
Informal help 
provision
Average 5.0 3.8
N 26860 26860
Baseline model
σ2u0j 0.227 0.246
σ2e0ij 2.193 3.026
Intraclasscorrelation 0.093 0.075
-2LL 97415.48 106064.30
Composition model
σ2u0j 0.200 0.254
σ2e0ij 2.014 2.930
intraclasscorrelation 0.090 0.080
-2LL 95133.93 105197.50
Dev -2LL 2281.55 866.80
df 23 23
Full model (model A)
σ2u0j 0.075 0.128
σ2e0ij 2.014 2.930
intraclasscorrelation 0.035 0.042
-2LL 95113.34 105182.80
Dev -2LL 20.59 14.70
df 5 5
Full model including controls (model B)
σ2u0j 0.078 0.124
σ2e0ij 1.955 2.904
intraclasscorrelation 0.038 0.041
-2LL 94317.38 104940.30
Dev -2LL 795.96 242.50
df 9 9
Full model including controls and cross-level interactions (model C)
σ2u0j 0.081 0.180
σ2e0ij 1.951 2.901
intraclasscorrelation 0.040 0.058
-2LL 94284.00 104918.41
Dev -2LL 33.38 21.89
df 3 3
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order. 
will go through the models from the least to the most elaborate. First, we focus on 
the overall effects in Model A that we nuance and specify below in our description 
of Model C. In Models 7A and 8A (Tables 2.7 and 2.8), we find (some) state insti-
tutions to be significant determinants for both modes of social participation, after 
taking into account the individual level effects.
We formulated contradictory hypotheses (H1a versus H2a) on the effects of social 
security expenditure. Models 7a and 8a show that the effects of social security expen-
stAtes of freely AssociAting citizens
70
ditures are not significant for both the quantity (meeting) and the quality (helping) of 
social participation, consequently refuting both hypotheses, the crowding out thesis 
(H1a) as well as the hypothesis on the economic safety (H2a). Yet, the effect of social 
security on meeting reaches significance at the .10 level, indicating some rather weak 
evidence in favor of the crowding out hypothesis (H1a). 
Economic development is not significantly related to frequency of meetings, but 
is significantly related to providing help to others. The higher the state level of eco-
nomic development, the more people are inclined to provide help to each other in 
the intimate sphere. This finding supports, at least partially, hypothesis H3a.
Hypothesis H4 focused on the state level enforcement of civil rights. We find that 
the respective parameters do not reach significance; state level enforcement of civil 
rights does not significantly determine frequency of social meetings nor the extent of 
providing help to others. These findings clearly refute this hypothesis.
Next, we find that the state level of corruption is a significant determinant of help 
provision; in countries characterized by a high level of corruption, people tend to 
provide help to others less often. Although not significant at the .05-level, the state 
level of corruption is a significant determinant of social meetings at the .10-level. The 
effect is in the same direction; in countries characterized by a high level of corrup-
tion, people tend to have fewer meetings with others. Both findings clearly refute 
hypothesis H5. Apparently, people in such countries perceived to be corrupt are not 
only likely to distrust their state, but moreover, are also less likely to seek refuge in 
the intimate sphere, as captured by this measure. 
Finally, we take a look at the effects of the age of a democracy, referred to in 
hypothesis H6. It appears to be unrelated to having social meetings, but is inversely 
related to providing help to others. This supports this hypothesis; people in long-
standing democracies provide less informal help to others than newly developed 
democracies. Yet, although significant at the .01-level, effectively the impact of 
democracy on help provision takes a lot of time to prove. On estimate, having eighty 
years of democracy accounts for an average decrease of approximately one point on 
our informal help provision scale.
In short, hypotheses H1a, H2a and H4 are refuted, as there are no significant 
effects. Hypothesis H5 is refuted as well, because the (perceived) state level corrup-
tion has a negative, instead of a positive effect on providing help in the larger social 
network. Hypothesis H3a, is partially corroborated, as we find evidence for the rela-
tionship between economic development and providing help to others. Hypothesis 
H6 on the length of democratic rule is also partially supported, as far as it concerns 
providing help to others. 
Individual level effects
Table 2.7 shows that the level of education and income are positively related to 
meeting others socially; the higher people’s income or education, the higher the 
frequency of social contacts. Table 2.8 shows that for providing help to others, only 
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Table 2.7. Results: Hierarchical regression models, frequency of social meetings
Model A Model B Model C
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Income 0.03 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.06 (0.05)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.06 (0.03) 0.10 (0.03) 0.10 (0.03)
∙ unemployed -0.02 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
∙ other social benefit 0.14 (0.05) 0.25 (0.05) 0.23 (0.05)
∙ other 0.40 (0.08) 0.41 (0.08) 0.40 (0.08)
Age -0.06 (0.00) -0.05 (0.00) -0.05 (0.00)
Age-squared (effect *100) 0.04 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00)
Length of residence (effect *10) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.26 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04)
∙ separated 0.20 (0.07) 0.28 (0.07) 0.27 (0.07)
∙ widowed 0.28 (0.04) 0.37 (0.04) 0.38 (0.04)
∙ unmarried 0.19 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03) 0.23 (0.03)
Household size -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Children at home -0.13 (0.03) -0.12 (0.03) -0.12 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
∙ Protestant 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox -0.01 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10)
∙ Other -0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
Attendance of religious services 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.10 (0.06) 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05)
Lack of health -0.09 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01)
Lack of social trust -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
Time spent on watching TV -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00)
Time spent on watching politics on TV -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Time spent on listening to radio 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Time spent on reading newspaper 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
Lack of satisfaction with income -0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Lack of happiness -0.09 (0.00) -0.09 (0.00)
Lack of feeling safe in neighborhood -0.09 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01)
State level determinants
Social security expenditure -2.28 (1.69) -2.53 (1.71) -2.14 (1.91)
GPD/capita ppp (effect *1000) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Civil rights 0.11 (0.15) 0.15 (0.15) 0.21 (0.15)
Corruption -0.10 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) 
Years of democracy 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Average church attendance 0.03 (0.13) 0.03 (0.13) -0.00 (0.13)
Cross-level interactions
Social security * Income -0.11 (0.21)
GNI/capita ppp * Income (effect *10000) 0.01 (0.01)
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
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Table 2.8. Results: Hierarchical regression models, providing help to others
Model A Model B Model C
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Income 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.13 (0.04)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.04 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)
∙ unemployed 0.09 (0.08) 0.14 (0.08) 0.14 (0.08)
∙ other social benefit 0.12 (0.06) 0.16 (0.06) 0.15 (0.06)
∙ other 0.10 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09)
Age 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00)
Age-squared (effect *100) -0.06 (0.00) -0.06 (0.00) -0.06 (0.00)
Length of residence (effect *10) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman 0.08 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.17 (0.04) 0.18 (0.04) 0.17 (0.04)
∙ separated 0.07 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09)
∙ widowed 0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04)
∙ unmarried 0.06 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04)
Household size 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Children at home -0.06 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.16 (0.03) -0.15 (0.03) -0.15 (0.03)
∙ Protestant -0.06 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox 0.09 (0.12) 0.13 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12)
∙ Other -0.11 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
Attendance of religious services 0.16 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.10 (0.06) 0.14 (0.07) 0.13 (0.07)
Lack of health -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Lack of social trust -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Time spent on watching TV -0.05 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01)
Time spent on watching politics on TV 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Time spent on listening to radio 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Time spent on reading newspaper 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
Lack of satisfaction with income 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Lack of happiness -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Lack of feeling safe in neighborhood -0.06 (0.01 -0.06 (0.02)
State level determinants
Social security expenditure 0.92 (2.20) 0.69 (2.17) 1.40 (2.71)
GPD/capita ppp (effect *1000) 0.06 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.08 (0.03)
Civil rights -0.13 (0.20) -0.10 (0.19) -0.07 (0.18)
Corruption -0.18 (0.08) -0.16 (0.08) -0.12 (0.08) 
Years of democracy -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Average church attendance -0.05 (0.17) -0.05 (0.17) -0.07 (0.17)
Cross-level interactions
Social security * Income -0.15 (0.17)
GNI/capita ppp * Income (effect *10000)  -0.04 (0.01)
Linear hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
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education has a positive effect. Next, we find that people who depend on social 
benefits generally have more social contacts than working people. Yet, when it comes 
to providing help, only those with ‘other social benefits’, significantly and positively 
differ from people with wages or profit. As the accompanying parameters show, age 
generally has a downward slope for meeting others; young people participate most 
strongly, and the older one gets the less one participates. After a certain age (around 
retirement, due to less constraints), people are likely to meet others more frequently. 
We find the opposite pattern on providing help to others; the older people get, the 
more help they provide, which decreases after the age of approximately 42 years 
(probably due to more constraints related to age). 
Table 2.7 shows that there are no significant differences between men and 
women for frequency of meetings. Yet, according to our results in Table 2.8, women 
do provide significantly more help to others than men. We find that non-married 
people have more meetings with others and provide more help than married people 
do (although differences between married versus separated and widowed people 
are not significant for providing help). Moreover, having children has an additional 
negative effect on social participation. Surprisingly, household size has a negative 
effect on meetings, but a positive effect on providing help to others: people in large 
households probably have less time or needs to meet with others, but more means to 
provide help to others informally.
Those who attend religious services more often have more social meetings and 
provide more help to others. This rather strong effect of church attendance re-
duces differences between non-religious people and those who consider themselves 
belonging to a religious denomination, when it comes to social meetings, to non-
significance; and moreover, this rather strong effect creates the image that Catholics, 
Protestants or people belonging to other religions provide less help. Finally, citizen-
ship is positively related to having social meetings and to providing help. 
Intermediate determinants
In Models B of both Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we add some extra complexity to our 
models. We include so-called intermediate determinants referring to individual 
constraints regarding both measures of social participation. In line with expectations, 
lack of health, happiness, and feelings of safety, all have negative effects on social 
participation. Lack of social trust and income satisfaction has a negative effect on the 
frequency of meeting with others, but do not reach significance regarding provid-
ing help. As for media use, listening to the radio or reading the newspaper have 
a positive, rather than a negative effect on either measure of social participation. 
Most likely, instead of the expected (negative) time constraint effect, there are (posi-
tive) pro-social selection effects at play. Watching television negatively impacts help 
provision, but does not affect having meetings in this context. Watching politics on 
the television positively impacts help provision, but does not affect having meetings 
either. 
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We are also curious whether these effects presented in Model B actually explain 
some of the effects found in Model A of Tables 2.7 and 2.8. At the individual level, 
these intermediate determinants reduce or explain effects of education, income and 
citizenship on social meetings, and of having children on providing help. At the con-
textual level, the negative effect of corruption on social meetings (significant at the 
.10 level) becomes insignificant when we include these determinants. This implies 
that citizens in corrupt societies have more social or psychological constraints (lack of 
feelings of safety, social trust, happiness) than citizens in non-corrupt societies. The 
state level effects on providing help, on the other hand, are hardly diminished by the 
introduction of these determinants. 
Cross-level interaction effects
Finally, building on our previous findings we set out to answer our third research 
question in Model C of Tables 2.7 and 2.8: to what extent is the impact of state 
institutions similar across social categories? We introduce the cross-level interaction 
effects to the models to test hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b. We insert all cross-level 
interaction terms simultaneously into the models.14 Model C of Tables 2.7 and 2.8 
tell us that the effects of state institutions on either mode of social participation are 
not similar across social categories.
We do not find any evidence that the effect of social security expenditure is either 
more strongly negative or more strongly positive for people with a low income than 
for people with a high income; the interaction term is insignificant. This refutes 
both hypothesis H1b and hypothesis H2b. We do find, in Model C of Table 2.8, that 
the interaction effect of state level economic development and individual income 
is significant and negative for providing help to others, supporting hypothesis H3b. 
In other words, the positive impact of economic development at the national level 
on providing help to others is stronger for poor people (0.076 for the lowest income 
group) than for rich people (0.032 for the highest income group).15 This is graphical-
ly displayed in Figure 2.4. At the same time, the interaction effect might be interpret-
ed in another way; differences between income categories in terms of help provision 
vary across societies with different state levels of economic development. The higher 
a state’s level of economic development, the smaller the differences between income 
categories in terms of providing help. Vice versa, the lower a state’s level of economic 
development, the bigger the differences between income categories. 
14  If we do not include all other interaction terms simultaneously, but rather in a step-wise fashion, we 
would find that the interaction effect of civil rights and individual income is significant for providing 
help to others. Likewise, the interaction effect of economic development and individual income is 
significant for having social meetings. However, when rigorously controlling for the other interaction 
terms, these effects loose significance.
15  The net effect of economic development on help provision is 0.080 (the main effect) – 0.004 (the 
interaction effect of social security and income) * 1 (the score for the lowest income group) = 0.076 for 
the lowest income group. It is 0.080 – 0.004 * 12 = 0.032 for the highest income group.
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In general, we find that state institutions matter a lot. A brief example resulting from 
our tables would make this claim clearer. Let us compare the estimated level of help 
provision by two socially identical women. Both women are 40 years old, married, 
employed with a medium income (6) and are devout Protestants who go to church 
at least once a week. Yet, they live in different countries, namely Denmark and the 
Czech Republic. Based on Model C in Table 2.8, we can estimate their level of help 
provision. For the woman from Denmark, we estimate a score of 5.06 (which is in 
the range of once a week). For the woman from the Czech Republic, the score is 
substantially lower, namely 3.73 (which is somewhat less than several times a month). 
These differences between socially identical women underpin the importance of state 
institutions in explaining help provision.
2.7. summAry And discussion
This chapter started out from theoretical explorations that claimed a large role for 
states as a determinant of informal relations. To test these claims, we formulated 
three research questions in this chapter. The first question was related to the differ-
ences in social participation across countries. There are significant and rather large 
differences across countries, as was signaled by the significant country level variance 
and the high intra-class correlations. To answer the second and third question, we 
estimated the influence of several state institutions on social participation simultane-
ously and tested whether this impact was equal across social categories. We demon-
strated that state institutions indeed have a significant impact on social participation, 
even when we control for other individual level and other contextual determinants. 
In short: States matter. But they matter more for the poor than for the rich. 
We distinguished between several modes of social participation. A first distinc-
tion was made between primordial ties – i.e., a very close and secure social network 
of family and best friends – and secondary ties – i.e., a broad, informal network. 
0
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Figure 2.4. Cross-level interaction effect: economic development,  
  income and providing help to others
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Within the latter category we distinguished between associational solidarity (fre-
quency of informal contact) and functional solidarity (frequency of informal help 
provision). On these modes of participation we formulated three theories, next to 
the cultural approach for which we found no support.
The crowding out thesis was only supported for a specific group (i.e., the poor) 
and for specific ties (i.e., the extended family). Contact with the extended family 
relies at least partly on economic necessity: in less extensive social security states, 
poor people build an economic safety net by intensifying contacts with the extended 
family.16 Despite dominant thought (cf. Scheepers et al. 2002; Kääriäinen and Leh-
tonen 2006), social security does not unilaterally crowd out functions of the family 
and other informal relations, but only those of the extended family. This implies 
that breaking down social security programs may not stimulate participation with the 
nuclear family or with close friends, nor help contact in a broader network or even 
informal help provision. Apparently, these modes of social participation are not mo-
tivated by economic needs. Rather, these ties are more exclusively motivated by needs 
that are overlooked by the crowding out thesis – emotional support, recreation, or 
simply routine. 
Otherwise, the crowding out thesis might be counteracted by the opposite theory 
of collective resources. According to this thesis, collective resources (like social 
security and economic development) would enable – and thus stimulate – citizens 
to participate. Social security expenditure did not have a positive effect on any mode 
of social participation. However, economic development was a rather consistent 
determinant of social participation. Although participation with one’s best friend 
and with the extended family, and help provision were significantly stimulated by 
economic development, the other two modes of social participation were non-signifi-
cantly, but positively, related to it.
This chapter offers some intriguing results for the public sphere thesis. Here, the 
distinction between primordial and secondary ties seems most relevant. On the one 
hand, we find support for the public sphere thesis for primordial ties: in newly estab-
lished democracies and in countries that do not enforce civil rights, citizens are more 
likely to use their secure informal ties. On the other hand, the public sphere thesis 
does not find support for secondary ties. Theoretically, this implies that citizens in 
corrupt societies seek their safe refuge only in the most secure ties, that is, within the 
nuclear family and among the very best friends whom they can trust blindly, rather 
than in broader circles. Broad networks – even though they are informal – are appar-
ently less trustworthy. 
We found several indications that state institutions affect different social groups 
differently. Parallel to this interpretation of the cross-level interaction effects, we can 
16  This might explain why Scheepers et al. (2002) find a negative effect of welfare state expenditure on 
social participation among the elderly, while Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) find no effect among the 
general population. There is a significant, negative effect on contact with the extended family for the 
poor subset (which includes a large share of old people), but not for the general population.
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also look at them from a different, but equally valid, point of view. The cross-level 
interaction effects simultaneously show that the effect of individual level income on 
social participation is conditioned by state level characteristics. From this perspective, 
this association is significantly less strong in societies with more economic prosperity 
at the national level, and in societies where civil rights are more strongly protected. 
These findings imply that even those who are not interested in the impact of state 
level characteristics, as such, should take the following into account; the strength and 
possibly even the direction of the individual level association between income and so-
cial participation is partly determined by the institutional environment. Especially in 
non-comparative analyses, it would therefore be improper to look at this association 
without taking the conditioning role of state institutions into account.
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3.1. introduction1
More than any other form of participation, involvement in voluntary associations 
has been put forward as an ‘all-purposive elixir for the ills of society’ (Uslaner and 
Dekker 2001). Amongst other beneficial side-effects (cf. Putnam 2000; Halpern 
2005), voluntary associations would function as schools of democracy in which citi-
zens are socialized to participate politically (Morales and Geurts 2007; for an empiri-
cal test see Chapter 6) and as career boosters that provide members with jobs, status 
and income (Ruiter 2008). Although the beneficial connotation of civic participa-
tion is heavily contested, it has triggered the question what, in turn, determines civic 
participation. 
It has been long noted that average levels of civic participation strongly differ 
between countries and regions (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Curtis et al. 1992; 
Dekker and Van den Broek 2005; Pichler and Wallace 2007). Yet, research on civic 
participation is dominated by studies on its individual level determinants (Schofer 
and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Over the last few years the number of studies on 
the impact of contextual factors on civic participation has steadily increased with the 
availability of cross-national data sets. Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama, two of 
the most-read and influential scholars in the field, focused on cultural and historical 
explanations, according to which ‘the ability to co-operate socially is dependent on 
prior habits, traditions, and norms’ (Fukuyama 1995). 
Exemplary is Putnam’s study of Italian regions since the 1970s (Putnam 1993). 
Putnam found large cross-regional differences in civic participation rates, which 
he relates to cultural differences. Supposedly, these regional civic cultures started 
diverging between the 11th and the 14th centuries, when republics were common in 
Northern Italy and Southern Italy was reigned by a feudal autocracy. Ultimately, cur-
rently differing civic participation rates are thus explained by historical institutional 
arrangements. However, if the institutional setting of the far past is considered to af-
fect civic participation nowadays, is it not likely that contemporary state institutions 
might do the same? Admittedly, state institutions could not explain differing partici-
pation rates in Italian regions: in his ingenious research design Putnam eliminated 
this explanation as the Italian regions started out with (formally) similar regional 
1  A different version of this chapter is currently under editorial review. Previous drafts of this chapter 
have been presented as T. van der Meer, M. te Grotenhuis and P. Scheepers (2007) Patterns of associa-
tional involvement in 21 European countries: Towards a cross-national measure of civic participation. 
Paper presented at the cinefogo workshop, Vienna (September 20–21, 2007); T. van der Meer, 
P. Scheepers, M. te Grotenhuis and H. Flap (2007) States of freely associating citizens: A multi-level 
study into the impact of state institutions on civic participation. Paper presented at the panel ‘On the 
quality of democracy’, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (April 
12–15, 2007); T. van der Meer (2006) States of freely associating citizens: a multilevel study into civic 
participation in 20 countries. Paper presented at the cinefogo Conference Plovdiv (December 15, 
2006); T. van der Meer (2006) Together we stand, divided we fall: a new institutionalist approach to 
association membership. Paper presented at the rAtio congress, Stockholm (August 24–26, 2006).
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state institutions in the 1970s. However, although they were ruled out as a factor in 
his study, the question remains unanswered to what extent contemporary state insti-
tutions affect civic participation. 
Several authors have argued that the important role of contemporary state institu-
tions in facilitating civic participation has been overlooked (Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996; 
Foley and Edwards 1996; Roßteutscher 2005). States play a ‘critical facilitating role’ 
(Szreter 2002) as determinants of civic participation by providing the formal institu-
tional framework within which it takes place (Onyx and Bullen 2001). State and civil 
society might have an antagonistic relationship (if extensive or repressive states crowd 
out civic participation), or rather a complementary relationship (if civic participation 
requires state support). Yet, despite theoretical instigations, surprisingly little empiri-
cal research has been done to actually test the relationship between state institutions 
and civic participation systematically (Parboteeah et al. 2004; Freitag 2006), often 
focusing on a single country or a single state institution. We aim to fill this theoreti-
cal and empirical gap by studying the role of a range of state institutions not as the 
outcome of civic participation, but as its determinants. 
This chapter sets out to answer the following questions:
1. To what extent do levels of civic participation differ cross-nationally?
2. To what extent do state institutions determine civic participation, taking individual 
 characteristics into account?
3. To what extent is the impact of state institutions on civic participation similar across 
 social categories?
By answering these questions, this chapter aims to determine the effect of state insti-
tutions on civic participation, building and elaborating on theoretical explorations 
mentioned above. We aim to cover this topic in a systematic fashion: we will analyze 
the effects of a large set of state institutions, and differentiate between various aspects 
of the container concept of civic participation. 
We contribute to the literature on civic participation in two ways. First, this chap-
ter disaggregates the concept of civic participation to several modes of participation in 
several types of voluntary associations. After deconstructing the concept of civic par-
ticipation theoretically, we reconstruct it empirically to create three measures of civic 
participation, namely in (i) leisure, (ii) interest and (iii) activist organizations. Empiri-
cally, this distinction illuminates various effects that would otherwise be obscured. 
Second, we take a range of state institutions into account, whereas other research has 
limited itself to one such institution (most notably the welfare state, the state bureaucracy or 
the level of democracy). By not including other state institutions in the analysis, one might 
erroneously conclude that bivariate correlations constitute ‘real’ causal relations. Through 
three different lines of reasoning, rivaling and complementary hypotheses are tested on a 
broad set of state institutions simultaneously to find decisive determinants. A cross-sectional 
study of twenty European countries provides a sufficiently large data set for this purpose.
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3.2. types of orgAnizAtion, modes of civic pArticipAtion
Civic participation takes place in the sphere of civil society. It encompasses all 
activity in any voluntary association. Citizens may be active in vastly different types 
of organizations, from sports clubs, fan clubs, theatre groups and village green 
preservation societies to PTO’s, trade unions and Amnesty International. Scholars 
have applied different strategies to cope with this plethora of organizations. Some 
simply lumped all these organizations together (cf. Curtis et al. 2001; Parboteeah 
et al. 2004; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Gesthuizen 
et al. 2008), while others differentiated between types (cf. Morales 2001a; Gabriel 
et al. 2002; Wessels 2007; Meulemann 2008b). These types are based on different 
approaches: (i) a-priori distinctions, (ii) data reduction techniques on membership 
data, and (iii) data reduction techniques on organization data (Roßteutscher and 
Van Deth 2002). In the first approach, typologies are based on theoretical argumen-
tation. However, the question remains to what extent the typology is reflected in 
empirics. In the second approach, scholars have used individual survey data – like 
the ones used in this dissertation – to find patterns (correlations) of membership 
through factor analysis. However, it is questionable whether this approach is appro-
priate (Roßteutscher and Van Deth 2002). The technique assumes that members of 
a type of organization are more likely to become member of a similar organization. 
However, one could also argue that citizens who participate in a certain voluntary 
association refrain from joining a similar organization, because their needs are 
already fulfilled.2 Recently, the cid-project came up with a third type of typology: 
based on survey data on organizations, voluntary associations were clustered by their 
characteristics, for instance their aim (Lelieveldt et al. 2007; Maloney and Roß-
teutscher 2007) or their structure.
This dissertation combines a-priori theoretical reasoning with the findings from 
cid-project. Theoretically, we draw back to the societal triangle introduced in Chap-
ter 1, distinguishing between three types of associations based on areas that voluntary 
associations may be concerned with. Empirically, the distinction is supported by 
the primary aims and concerns of these types of voluntary association, as reported 
2  Let me illustrate this point by personal experience. At age 10, I was one of the very few in the region 
– if not the only one – who was both member of a chess club as well as member of a checkers club. 
Once a year the chess and checkers associations of my home town would organize a ‘match of the mind 
game clubs’, in which participants would play one game of chess and one game of checkers against an 
opponent of the other association. Apparently, many chess players could play checkers and vice versa. 
Moreover, chess nights were on Monday, checkers on Tuesday, so association membership could be 
combined. Yet, overlap in members was very rare.
Apparently, because they are already a member of a ‘mind game club’, the chess players are less likely to 
join a checkers club and vice versa. Yet, despite the low overlap in membership – and as a consequence 
a low correlation between the two types of association – we would not hesitate to label both of these 
organisations ‘mind game associations’ (in Dutch: denksportverenigingen) based on their types of 
concern.
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by Lelieveldt et al. (2007). First, leisure organizations are voluntary associations that 
are near to the intimate sphere of informal social relations. The primary function 
of leisure organizations – like sport clubs – is offering socializing and recreational 
activities. Second, interest organizations revolve around socio-economic interests 
and are therefore located near the market sphere. Interest organizations – like trade 
unions and consumer organizations – aim to defend their members’ socio-economic 
interests, who are often a specific target group. Third, activist organizations aim to 
influence the political process and policy outcomes, which locates them near the 
sphere of the state. These activist organizations – like environmental organizations 
– advocate broader societal interests and primarily aim to persuade and to mobilize 
individuals and societies to change their conduct based on a broad ideology (Aarts 
1995).
Besides different types of organization, we distinguish different modes of civic 
participation – i.e., activities within voluntary associations. The most intensely stud-
ied aspect in cross-national research on civic participation is association membership 
(cf. Curtis et al. 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van Oorschot and 
Arts 2005). Three other modes of civic participation may be distinguished: doing 
voluntary work for a voluntary association (Parboteeah et al. 2004; Ruiter and De 
Graaf 2006), active participation in activities deployed by a voluntary association, 
and money donations to a voluntary association. We expect that the various modes 
are strongly and hierarchically related: people who are a member of a voluntary asso-
ciation are more likely to participate actively, to volunteer or to donate extra money. 
Therefore, we set out to test whether these modes are sufficiently strongly related to 
justify a single measure of civic participation.
3.3. theory And hypotheses
In line with the previous chapter on social participation, we distinguish three mecha-
nisms that might explain how state institutions affect civic participation. Compared 
to the previous chapter, the crowding out thesis (which claims that states take over 
tasks of social life) is extended with a second strand. The collective resources explana-
tion of civic participation is highly similar to its equivalent in the previous chapter. 
The public sphere thesis comes to opposite expectations for civic participation than 
it did for social participation in the previous chapter. 
We study these rival theories simultaneously to ascertain possible spurious rela-
tions and evaluate the validity of the three mechanisms in a more authoritative test.
Crowding out
The traditional line of reasoning originates from the writings of Tocqueville and Nis-
bet, who warned that extensive states may take over societal tasks that once were and 
still could be performed by voluntary associations. When these societal tasks are per-
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formed by the state, voluntary associations are made redundant, and fewer citizens 
will find a need to become active in these associations. In the end, civic participation 
is crowded out by an extensive state. Vice versa, ‘the lower the government produc-
tion, the more room for private voluntary action’ (Salomon and Sokolowski 2001).
From this theoretical core stem two sets of hypotheses on the impact of the 
state on civic participation. The first focuses on the potential of a centralized state 
bureaucracy to crowd out civic participation. As a ‘separate and superior’ source of 
sovereignty (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001), a vast and centralized state bu-
reaucracy frustrates initiatives towards civic participation (Foley and Edwards 1996) 
as it does not need to depend on voluntary associations to implement state policy 
(Curtis et al. 1992). A centralized state bureaucracy aims ‘to be the sole agent and 
the only arbiter of that happiness [of its citizens]’ and ‘covers the surface of society 
with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which 
the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise 
above the crowd’ (Tocqueville 2000 [1835–1840]. In countries with extensive state 
bureaucracies, voluntary associations are less likely to take part in the formulation 
and implementation of collective policy. When voluntary associations are no longer 
needed to perform societal tasks and private initiative is discouraged, citizens will be 
less inclined to become participate civically. The general theoretical propositions boil 
down to the following hypothesis. 
H1 In states with a large central bureaucracy, citizens are less likely to participate 
 civically than citizens in states with a small central bureaucracy. 
The second strand of the crowding out thesis considers social security expenditure 
as an obstruction to a blossoming civil society (Scheepers and Te Grotenhuis 2005), 
similarly to other forms of social life (see Chapter 2). According to this strand ‘social 
expenditures and comprehensive social programs ‘crowd out’ informal caring rela-
tions and social networks, as well as familial, communal and occupational systems 
of self-help and reciprocity’ (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). As states took up welfare 
provision, voluntary associations lost their function of providing welfare through soli-
darity. At its core, this explanation, too, focuses on citizens’ incentives and the way 
they are affected by state institutions.
As a starting point the crowding out thesis assumes that citizens participate civi-
cally, because social network ties function as a safeguard against economic hardship 
for members of the network. If need be, citizens are able to rely on peers in their 
networks and profit from civic solidarity. However, states may take over the function 
of an economic safety net by offering social security against unemployment, disability 
and disease, and by offering state pensions for the old. These provisions are not of-
fered as charity, but as an individual right: citizens do not need to invest in building 
and maintaining network ties to profit from social benefits. Thereby, the extensive 
welfare state crowds out the role of voluntary associations: people depend on the wel-
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fare state, not on their civic network, and have less incentives to participate civically. 
From a demand side perspective, those with the means to offer financial help will be 
less likely to participate civically, as their help is less needed. We formulate hypoth-
esis H2a as follows: 
H2a In welfare states with a high level of social security, citizens are less likely to 
 participate civically. 
We expect that the negative impact of social security expenditure on civic participa-
tion is stronger for people with a low income than for people with a high income. 
For the latter, using network ties as an economic safety net is less of an incentive to 
begin with, as they are less likely to suffer from basic economic risks. Moreover, as 
people with a low rather than a high income benefit most from social security3 (or 
alternatively: are most likely to suffer from its absence), the effect of social security on 
civic participation is likely strongest for them. 
H2b  There is a stronger effect of social security on civic participation for the economically  
 weak than for the economically strong – i.e., for the poor than for the rich.
Collective resources
Whereas the crowding out thesis focuses on incentives, the resource approach em-
phasizes individual or collective resources to become civically involved: those with 
more resources have more means, and are therefore more likely to participate civical-
ly (Brady et al. 1995). Scholars have long emphasized the role of individual resources, 
like time, money, and skills in civic participation (Pattie et al. 2004). However, not 
all resources are at the individual level. Some resources are collectively provided, like 
social security, economic development and state subsidies.4 
Social security is an economic safety net for its citizens. In times of hardship 
they can rely on social security to fulfill at least their basic needs. A state that 
offers a high level of social security satisfies the need of its citizens for socio-eco-
nomic security, and indirectly stimulates them to participate civically. This effect 
3  For instance, a study of public services in the Netherlands shows that the poor benefit most from 
the state’s social security policy on several measures (basic social security transfers; subsidies on health 
insurance costs; home care), although they do profit relatively less from cultural and housing policy (scp 
2006).
4  Concurrently, we come to the same hypotheses from a wholly different starting point, namely 
Maslow’s theory on the hierarchy of human needs. Whereas the crowding out thesis considers civic 
participation to be motivated by (economic) safety needs, Maslow (1970) claims it is instrumental in 
satisfying the higher needs for belonging and status. The lower ranking need of economic safety is 
not a goal of civic participation, but a precondition for it. Individuals who feel safe and secure – be it 
economically or physically – will look for ways to obtain belonging and status through participation in 
voluntary associations. Once people feel economically secure (and that more basic need is satisfied) they 
will aim to meet their higher needs through civic participation.
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would be most apparent for citizens with a low gross income, who benefit most 
from social security to obtain a relatively high net income. However, all citizens 
will find that a minimum income level is guaranteed by the state. Contrary to 
the crowding out hypothesis H2a, the resource thesis leads us to expect a positive 
relationship. 
H3a In welfare states with a high level of social security, citizens are more likely to 
 participate civically. 
H3b  There is a stronger effect of social security on civic participation for the economically 
 weak than for the economically strong – i.e., for the poor than for the rich.
In addition to individual income, national income also has a positive effect on the 
economic and physical safety of citizens. Economic development at the national level 
increases the resources in a society. Wealthy countries offer more economic means 
(money, infrastructure, and even leisure time through labor division) to participate 
extensively (Halman 2003). Moreover, it also has a positive impact on trust, pro-social 
attitudes and general feelings of reciprocity (Knack and Keefer 1997). Therefore, we 
expect countries with a high level of economic development to show higher rates of 
civic participation. Although economic development is not a state institution, and 
although governments have only a limited influence on economic development, 
we incorporate it in this chapter both as an important control, and as part of the 
resource thesis. Moreover, lacking individual level resources, the economically weak 
are more likely to benefit from a generally high level of economic development than 
the economically strong. 
H4a  In states with a high level of economic development, citizens are more likely to 
 participate civically. 
H4b  There is a stronger effect of economic development on civic participation for the 
 economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e., for the poor than for the rich.
Public sphere
The third line of reasoning focuses on the supposedly positive impact of a safe and 
neutral public sphere on citizens’ choice to participate civically. Our public sphere 
thesis claims the following: the more institutional settings make individuals feel 
secure about reaching their expressive and instrumental goals (Lin 2001) in the 
public sphere, the more they use civic ties. Security and trust in the public sphere 
are important preconditions for citizens before they opt for civic participation (Rose 
1994). Individuals feel more secure in the public sphere, when their civic autonomy 
is guaranteed by the state. 
States have great powers safeguarding the autonomy of its citizens in the public 
sphere, as they create the institutional setting of laws and norms in which citizens 
may participate. Alternatively, an institutional setting that does not support civic 
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autonomy inhibits the use of weak ties formed by civic participation (Bian 1997). 
Völker and Flap (2001) conclude the same, based on a network study with three time 
points on strong and weak ties in the former German Democratic Republic (gdr). 
They expected that citizens in the gdr would have tried to ‘escape the ‘collectivism 
and communism by design’ and [search] for more individuality, freedom, or areas of 
life that were not contaminated by the encompassing ideology of communist lifestyle 
and norms.’ In non-democratic societies, weak ties (like those in voluntary associa-
tions) would be a liability due to ‘uncertainty about the intentions of the person, as 
well as about the circles in which he or she might be involved. Furthermore, a weak 
tie provided little leverage for influencing the decisions of the other person.’ Thus, 
Völker and Flap expect that few citizens have weak ties in the former gdr. They find 
empirical support for this hypothesis. They therefore conclude that the dominance of 
states in the communist public sphere proved to have a longstanding negative impact 
on weak ties, i.e., on voluntary associations. Their conclusions are echoed by others: 
participation in voluntary associations is considerably less widespread in communist 
countries (Howard 2003a; Uslaner and Badescu 2003). 
The mechanisms of repression may also apply in democratic regimes. In some 
post-communist democracies citizens have grown more likely to participate civically 
– particularly due to increased safety and freedom in the public sphere – whereas in 
other post-communist democracies they do not (Howard 2003b). Even in established 
democracies, the same mechanisms are claimed to occur. Eliasoph (1998) finds that 
citizens cope with their distrust in public institutions by retreating from civic life. 
In short, a repressive state limits the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere, 
undermines civic autonomy, and breeds insecurity about public networks. We distin-
guish some institutional differences that are considered to affect civic autonomy in 
the public sphere, and thereby determine civic participation. 
Citizens’ autonomy in the public sphere might be affected by the extent to which 
civil rights are enforced. Enforced civil rights are a warrant for undisturbed access 
to the public sphere. Freedom of association and freedom of speech, in particular, 
are important rights enabling citizens to join associations (Parboteeah et al. 2004). 
However, when states choose not to enforce these civil rights or limit them in times 
of war or civic disturbance, citizens will be less likely to participate civically, as they 
are physically or politically at risk. 
H5  In states that enforce civil rights more strongly, citizens are more likely to participate 
 civically. 
Corruption in the state bureaucracy is considered to have similar effects on citizens’ 
autonomy in the public sphere as lack of civil rights enforcement. Corruption ham-
pers the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere, with voluntary associations as 
its major victim (Transparency International 2000). Moreover, people who think of 
the public sphere as being corrupt and politicized will opt to participate in secluded, 
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private networks instead of in the broader public sphere (Eliasoph 1998). The effect 
should be most apparent for interest and activist organizations. 
H6  In states that are perceived to be corrupt, citizens are less likely to participate civically. 
More generally, in longstanding democracies civic autonomy is protected by the 
state. However, in young democracies political life needs to stabilize before the public 
sphere functions as well and – more importantly – is perceived to be as safe as in 
longstanding democracies (Rose 1994). Moreover, in the competitive environment 
of a liberal democracy, citizens derive more utility from participating in a voluntary 
association to ensure representation of their economic interest or political cause. 
Because in young democracies there is a less developed sense of security in the public 
sphere, we expect civic participation to be low in new democracies compared to long-
standing democracies.5 
H7  In older democratic regimes, citizens are more likely to participate civically. 
National level of  religiosity as a contextual control
Besides these seven determinants, we include a single measure of religiosity as a 
cultural determinant of civic participation to assess whether state institutions offer 
an additional explanation. In the cultural approach the effect of religiosity at the 
national level has repeatedly been emphasized. Next to the religiosity of individual 
citizens, the national level of religiosity is considered to stimulate involvement in vol-
5  Likewise, we also expect differences between democratic, (former) authoritarian and (former) 
totalitarian regimes. Liberal democracies generally protect the public sphere, whereas authoritarian 
and especially totalitarian regimes tend to invade and control the public sphere. People will therefore 
participate more freely in voluntary associations in liberal democracies than in authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes (Tong 1994; Paxton 2002).
This hypothesis cannot be tested, however. A distinction to former regime type is possible, but there are 
too few regimes in the data set that had been authoritarian after the Second World War. Furthermore, 
the measure is strongly related to years of democratic rule. This makes it impossible to disentangle the 
effects. Fortunately, the direction of the effects is expected to go in the same direction.
Line of reasoning Hypothesis State level characteristic
Expected 
effect
Effect expected to 
be strongest for
Crowding out H1H2a/H2b
Size/centralization of bureaucracy
Social security expenditure
-
-
None expected 
The poor
Collective 
resources
H3a/H3b
H4a/H4b
Social security expenditure
Economic development
+
+
The poor
The poor
Public sphere
H5
H6
H7
Civil rights enforcement
Level of corruption
Years of democracy
+
-
+
None expected
None expected
None expected
Table 3.1. Country level hypotheses: an overview
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untary associations as well through network effects (Kelley and De Graaf 1997), both 
for religious and especially for non-religious citizens (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). 
This network explanation starts with two assertions. First, religious citizens are 
more likely to participate than non-religious citizens (cf. Reitsma 2007). Second, in 
devout countries there is a higher share of religious citizens in social networks than 
in secular countries (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Because they are more likely to have 
civically active persons in their networks, citizens would be more likely to participate 
in devout societies than in secular societies, since ‘the norm to volunteer could be 
stronger’ (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006) and ‘they are more likely to be recruited and 
motivated by the large number of religious fellow citizens’ (Ruiter and De Graaf 
2006). Consequently, civic participation would be stimulated by a highly religious 
context, beyond a composition effect. We therefore expect the national level of religi-
osity to be positively related to civic participation.6
Individual level determinants
To control for composition effects that may partly explain country level differences in 
different modes of civic participation, we incorporate individual level determinants in 
our models. Based on findings of previous studies (a.o. Putnam 2000; Halpern 2005; 
Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Badescu and Neller 2007) we expect education, income, 
marriage, length of residence in a community and citizenship to have a positive impact 
on civic participation. On the one hand, household size, and having children takes time 
and money, and therefore may be negatively related to civic participation. On the other 
hand, people with large families may be more likely to volunteer or donate money to 
an association of which they themselves are not a member, because they have a larger 
network and are more likely to be asked. Associations flourish dominantly in rural com-
munities, rather than in urbanized communities. Men have a higher chance to volunteer 
and donate money than women. For age we expect a curvilinear effect: the middle cate-
gories participate most, followed by the old and finally by the young. We expect religious 
people to participate civically more intensively than non-religious people, and people 
who regularly attend to religious services more than those who do not. Finally, people 
who watch a lot of television are expected to participate less, although people who watch 
a lot of news on television are expected to participate more in voluntary associations.
3.4. dAtA And meAsurements
The research questions and hypotheses in this chapter call for a hierarchical design. 
We distinguish two levels: the individual level (level 1) and the state level (level 2). 
6  Besides level of religiosity, type of religion has been put forward as a cultural explanation for country 
level differences in civic participation. We do not include a (theoretically) crude typology based on 
historically dominant religions, as we would need to distinguish at least four categories (Catholic, 
Protestant, Mixed, and Orthodox), which would put our models under even greater strain.
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Individual level data are derived from the first wave of the European Social Survey 
(ess), collected in 2002 and 2003. The ess presents high quality data: it has a mean 
response rate of over 70 per cent and the data collection has been uniform over the 
countries, based on strict procedures of sampling, questioning and coding. The ess 
data set contains an extensive battery of questions on civic participation in different 
modes: membership of, activity in, volunteering for and donating to twelve different 
types of voluntary associations. 
These questions were asked in twenty countries that participated in ess 2002: 
sixteen Western European countries (including the unified Germany), three former 
communist countries from Central Europe, and Israel. We decided to split the Ger-
man sample into the former West-Germany and the former East-Germany, in order 
to test the effect of democratic rule. Luxembourg is left out of the analysis, as it is an 
outlier on several of the independent variables, both at the state level (e.g. national 
income – see Appendix A, Table Aiii) and the individual level (nearly a third of the 
respondents in the sample are not citizens of Luxembourg). This is due to the large 
amount of foreign employees active in that country. 
This leaves twenty societies, containing a total of 35.203 respondents of 18 years 
and older. To a large extent these twenty societies are similar on general cultural and 
political characteristics, as they are all Western or Western-oriented liberal democra-
cies and – with the exception of Israel – dominantly Christian. Our focus is strictly 
on (established and new) democratic societies, in which citizens also have the free-
dom not to participate in these societies.
Dependent variables: Civic participation
Respondents were shown twelve types of voluntary associations, ranging from sport 
clubs to environmental and human rights organizations. For each of these types of 
association, respondents are asked whether they are a member of at least one orga-
nization, and – regardless of membership – whether the respondent joins in with 
the association’s activities, does voluntary work or donates money. The ess data set 
captures the concept of civic participation in great detail, resulting in twelve types 
and four modes, or effectively 48 measures.
To cope with this overload of information, we performed data reduction. The 
first reduction is in the number of types of association. As we proposed in paragraph 
2, we distinguish three types of associations: leisure organizations, interest organiza-
tions, and activist organizations.7 Leisure organizations consist of ‘sports’, ‘culture’ 
7  From the twelve types of voluntary associations we leave out political parties and religious/church 
organisations. We consider participation in a political party as political rather than civic participation, 
as it falls under the label of ‘legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take’ (Verba et al. 1978). 
In recent years political parties have focused more and more on their selection function. In other words, 
they have become professionalized campaigning parties or ´cartel parties´, rather than the mass parties 
or catch-all parties of before (Katz and Mair 1994). Participation in religious and church organisations 
is left out as ‘church membership [...] may be somewhat less ‘voluntary’ than other types of association 
stAtes of freely AssociAting citizens
92
and ‘social’ associations. Interest organizations consist of ‘trade unions’, ‘profession-
al/business’ and ‘consumer’ organizations. Finally, activist organizations consist of 
‘environmental’ and ‘humanitarian/peace’ organizations.8 We calculated for leisure, 
interest and activist organizations separately whether respondents (i) are members 
of at least one such voluntary association, (ii) participate actively in at least one such 
voluntary association, (iii) volunteer for at least one such voluntary association, and 
(iv) donate money to at least one such voluntary association. In other words, we now 
have four dichotomous variables for each type of organization (leisure, interest, activ-
ist). These dichotomized variables (cf. Curtis et al. 1992; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006) 
are preferable over the sum scores (cf. Curtis et al. 2001; Parboteeah et al. 2004; 
Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Morales and Geurts 2007; Gesthuizen et al. 2008) for 
several reasons. First, the sum score does not measure intensity of participation, but 
diversity of organizations. Second, most variance in civic participation is in the step 
from doing nothing to doing something. Third, this step is most relevant in explain-
ing (i.e., has most predictive power) on pro-social attitudes (Van Deth 2006) and 
political participation (see Chapter 6).
After reducing the number of types of association from twelve to three, the 
number of modes of civic participation was reduced. Mokken scale analysis (Van 
Schuur 2003) shows – for each type of voluntary association separately – that the 
four modes of civic participation are hierarchically related to the extent that they can 
be combined in a single scale. All three scales are strong, as the scalability coefficient 
is 0.58 for leisure organizations, 0.60 for interest organizations, and 0.40 for activist 
organizations.9 Yet, these scales do not hold up in each of the participating countries: 
in Italy, Israel and Finland the scalability coefficients were too low. We left these 
countries out of the analysis and focus on the seventeen remaining societies (see Ap-
pendix D for an extensive description of the scaling procedure).
This resulted in three measures for civic participation – in leisure, interest and 
activist organizations – that range from 0 to 4. The score of 0 represents no civic 
involvement, even though most adults are formally free to change church memberships and sometimes 
do’ (Curtis et al. 1992).
8  This typology is based on the primary concern of these voluntary associations. We do not aim to 
support this form of data reduction with factor analysis, as two types of voluntary associations do not 
need to have a strong overlap of members (i.e., to be highly correlated) to share similar concerns. 
9  As expected, the ordering of the items differs across type of organisation. Voluntary work, for 
instance, is more common amongst leisure organisations (especially sports clubs) than amongst other 
organisations. Likewise, in many countries the donation rate of activist organisations outnumbers the 
membership rates of these organisations, whereas donating money is a less common activity for leisure 
and interest organisations (Morales and Geurts 2007).
In our Mokken scale analysis, the ordering from least to most difficult items on the pooled data set is 
‘membership – active participation – voluntary work – donation of money’ for leisure organisations, 
‘membership – active participation – donation of money – voluntary work’ for interest organisations, 
and ‘donation of money – membership – active participation – voluntary work’ for activist organisati-
ons. The orderings differ somewhat between individual countries (see Appendix D).
3. stAtes And civil society, stAtes or civil society?
93
participation, the score of 4 represents the most intense form of civic participation. 
The frequency distribution of these three scales is displayed in Table 3.2.
Country level determinants10
Bureaucratic decentralization is measured as the extent to which local governments 
do their own independent taxation as a percentage of the total level of taxes (Sch-
neider 2003). We made use of the imf-statistics on social security from the annual 
Government Finance Statistics. We calculated for each country which percentage of 
all taxation was done by local governments. Although they are self-reported by the 
individual member states, these imf-statistics are internationally comparable because 
of the strict definitions the imf applies.
For size of the bureaucracy we calculated the total state expenditure on salaries 
for social servants as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (gdp), based on the 
annual imf-data.
Although most hypotheses on welfare state effects are implicitly concerned with 
the level of social security, scholars tend to use the wider historical classification of 
welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999). These ideal 
types encompass a multitude of elements besides social security expenditures, are 
hard to apply to Southern and Eastern Europe, and cause a loss in empirical data 
(scp 2001; Gelissen 2001). We therefore prefer the imf-statistics on social security. We 
standardized these expenditures as a percentage of the gdp. The imf-measure corre-
lates strongly (>0.9) with both oecd and ilo data. 
As a measure of economic development we used gdp/capita pps, the national 
income per head of the population corrected for differences in price levels. We used 
the measure provided by EuroStat, which is strongly correlated (>.99) to kindred 
measures of the World Bank, oecd and the imf. The measure is an index, where the 
score of 100 represents the eu average. To reduce the number of decimals in the 
models, we corrected this measure by dividing the scores by 10.
Our measure of civil rights enforcement is based on the annual index from the 
Freedom House. Freedom House (2002) defines civil liberties ‘to include the free-
10  For an overview of the scores on these measures, see Appendix A.
Extent of 
involvement
Leisure 
organizations
Interest 
organizations
Activist 
organizations
0 55,3% 60,7% 77,2%
1 23,9% 31,3% 16,2%
2 10,6% 5,4% 4,6%
3 6,4% 2,0% 1,2%
4 3,7% 0,6% 0,8%
Table 3.2. Civic participation: frequency table
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doms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state’. 
Countries are ranked on a scale that ranges from 1 (no civil liberties) to 7 (high level 
of enforced civil liberties). Although the index has been criticized as subjective, it is 
the best cross-national measure at our disposal (Bollen and Paxton 2000). 
By absence of a cross-country measure of corruption, we made use of a measure of 
perceived corruption, namely the Corruption Perception Index (cpi ) 2002, issued by 
Transparency International. The cpi is based on multiple surveys in which experts are 
asked to rate countries’ level of corruption. The measure of corruption ranges from 
0 (no corruption) to 10 (highly corrupt). The cpi correlates strongly (>.99) with the 
World Bank’s Control Corruption Index (cci ). 
The widely used measure of length of democratic rule indicates how long a coun-
try has been democratic without disruption, topping off in 1920 (Inglehart 1997). In 
other words, the maximum age of a democracy in 2002 is 82. The youngest democ-
racy in our data set is Slovenia (11 years). To reduce the number of decimals in the 
models, we corrected this measure by dividing the scores by 10.
The national level of religiosity was measured by calculating the mean score of at-
tendance of religious services, which was reported by the respondents in the ess 2002 
data set.11
Individual level control variables
For education we use a cross-national measure on the level of education. Income is 
measured as the actual amount of money available to the household (i.e., net in-
come), ranked into 12 groups (with 1 being the lowest income group and 12 being 
the highest). Next to the sum of the income, the income source was measured. We 
distinguish between those who get money from salaries or profit (as the reference 
group) and those who do not: the pensioned, the unemployed, those who depend on 
other social benefits and those who depend on other sources of income. 
We include both age and age-squared, as previous studies showed topping off 
effects for age. Length of residence in a community is measured in decades. Level of 
urbanization ranges from rural to urbanized. Sex is dichotomized, with males as the 
reference group.
Our measure of marital status distinguishes between those who are married (the 
reference group) and the divorced, the separated, the widowed and those who never 
married (yet). Household size is measured as the number of people (including chil-
dren) living in a household. We also know whether the respondent has or has had 
children living in his household.
We introduce two individual level measures of religiosity: denomination and at-
tendance to religious services. For denomination we take the non-religious as our ref-
11  We have also tested our models for other measures of religiosity (religious pluralism, percentage 
nominal Catholics, percentage nominal Protestants). All suffered, however, from theoretical and/or 
methodological flaws. Moreover, they did not add to the variance already explained by the institutional 
factors.
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erence group, to which we compare the Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and people 
from other religions. Attendance is measured by an ordinal scale ranging from never 
to daily.
In the survey respondents were asked to report whether they are citizen of the 
country they live in. Consumption of television programs was measured as the total 
amount of time people claim to spend on watching television in general, and on 
watching politics on tv.
3.5. AnAlyses
Before we proceed with the tests of the theoretically expected relationships, we show 
the extent to which countries differ in levels of civic participation. Figures 3.1a to 
3.1c describe the country level differences in participation rates for leisure, interest 
and activist organizations. 
The categories are represented in the stapled bars, with the score 1 representing 
one civic activity and 4 representing doing all activities. At first sight, the figures 
show clear differences between countries on the proportion of respondents that par-
ticipates at all. We find that the Northern European countries (Scandinavia, Finland 
and the Netherlands) score high on the three measures of civic participation, closely 
followed by longstanding, continental democracies (Luxembourg, Belgium, Aus-
tria, West Germany) and Great Britain. The Mediterranean countries and the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe can be found at the lower end. There 
are some notable exceptions to this overall pattern. France scores relatively high on 
participation in leisure organizations, and relatively low on participation in inter-
est organizations. The Netherlands score relatively low on participation in interest 
organizations, but – like Austria – relatively high on participation in activist organiza-
tions. All in all, we find large country level differences in the rate and intensity of 
civic participation. The question remains whether these differences are significant, 
especially once we control for composition effects. We performed tests for signifi-
cance in a hierarchical design.
As we aim to explain civic participation with individual level and state level deter-
minants, hierarchical analysis (a.k.a. hierarchical modeling) is appropriate (Snijders 
and Bosker 1999). Because the dependent variables have five categories and are 
count data (capturing the number of activities respondents do), we use hierarchical 
logistic regression:12 we estimate models (simultaneously at the individual and state 
12  PQL, 2nd Order, no extra-binominal variance assumed. Logistic regression is also used to estimate 
models with proportions, that may be considered to be based on a binary distribution. In this chapter 
and the next, the model effectively explains the proportion of activities respondents are engaged in, 
without any determinants at the level of activities. This model fits the data better than for instance 
Poisson regression, which is also applicable to count data. However, the distribution of the three scales 
of civic participation is hardly asymptotic.
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Figure 3.1a. Participation in leisure organizations (percentages), by country
Figure 3.1b. Participation in interest organizations (percentages), by country
Figure 3.1c. Participation in activist organizations (percentages), by country
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Figure 3.1b. Participation in interest organizations (percentages), by country
level) that report the logit of participating in the three types of organizations. Positive 
values indicate a higher likelihood of participating civically, negative values a lower 
likelihood. Respondents with one or more missing values on any of the variables 
were left out of the analyses; all models are based on the same set of respondents.
First we estimated a baseline model to establish whether there is significant vari-
ance at the state level (σ2u
0j
). Next, we tested whether the significant variance at the 
state level remains after controlling for possible composition effects (see Table 3.3). 
The first row of Table 3.3 shows that the country level variance is significant for 
each mode of civic participation. Because there is variance to be explained at both 
levels, hierarchical analysis is the appropriate tool. To see whether the exercise is 
not merely appropriate but also sensible, we look at the intraclass-correlation (ICC), 
which is the ratio of the state level variance to the total variance (σ2e
0ij
 + σ2u
0j
). In a 
model assuming no extra-binominal variance, the individual level variance σ2e
0ij
 is set 
at (p*p)/3 (Snijders and Bosker 1999). The ICC of the baseline model is 11 per cent 
for leisure organizations, 10 per cent for interest organizations and 11 per cent for 
activist organizations. In other words, one tenth to one ninth of all variance in civic 
participation is at the state level, which is rather high (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). As 
the dependent variable is measured at the individual level, it is to be expected that 
most variance is at the individual level (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
Controlled for composition effects, the variance at the contextual level (σ2u
0j
) 
diminishes with 21 to 43 per cent compared to the baseline models. Nevertheless, a 
lot of contextual variance remains; the intraclass-correlations are sufficiently high for 
cross-national analysis. In the composition models respectively 9 per cent (leisure or-
Table 3.3. Variance analyses
Leisure 
organizations
Interest 
organizations
Activist 
organizations
Baseline model
σ2u0j 0.42 (0.15) 0.37 (0.13) 0.41 (0.14)
intraclasscorrelation 0.113 0.101 0.111
Composition model 
σ2u0j 0.33 (0.12) 0.21 (0.08) 0.28 (0.10)
intraclasscorrelation 0.091 0.060 0.078
Composition model + religiosity (level 2)
σ2u0j 0.11 (0.04) 0.14 (0.05) 0.18 (0.06)
intraclasscorrelation 0.032 0.041 0.052
Full model
σ2u0j 0.02 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01)
intraclasscorrelation 0.006 0.015 0.012
Full model including cross-level interactions
σ2u0j 0.04 (0.02) 0.25 (0.09) 0.10 (0.05)
σ2uincome j 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
intraclasscorrelation 0.014 0.075 0.029
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
stAtes of freely AssociAting citizens
98
ganizations), 6 per cent (interest organizations) and 8 per cent (activist organizations) 
of all variance is at the state level. These percentages are sufficiently high to look for 
state level determinants in a hierarchical model.
The third and fourth row in Table 3.3 shows that contextual determinants signifi-
cantly contribute to the explanation of civic participation for all types of associations. 
Compared to the composition models, variation at the contextual level is strongly 
reduced (by approximately 75 to 95 percent) by the inclusion of direct effects of con-
textual determinants. Moreover, even when we include religiosity – inserted to reflect 
the cultural approach – in our models, state institutions significantly contribute to 
the explanation of civic participation in all types of organization.
Even though our hierarchical models are not saturated by the large number of 
level 2 predictors, we acknowledge that testing the impact of eight country level 
characteristics in eighteen countries simultaneously may lead to false conclusions. 
Therefore, we have tested the three lines of reasoning stepwise, both separately and 
simultaneously (see Appendix E).13 For reasons of parsimony we left those level 2 
predictors out of the models that were found to be non-significant in previous steps 
(see Appendix E). 
3.6. results
Table 3.4 gives insight in the direct effects of the individual and contextual level 
determinants for leisure, interest and activist organizations.14 We are most interested 
in the direct effects of the contextual level determinants.
Country level effects
First, we focus on the effect of the national level of religiosity on civic participation, 
to test whether state institutions offer an additional explanation of civic participation 
beyond this cultural determinant. Table 3.4 shows that the national level of religiosity 
is not a significant determinant of participation in interest or activist organizations. 
It does explain the differing levels of participation in leisure organizations, but rather 
than positive, the effect is negative. This means that participation in leisure organiza-
tions is less common when societies are more religious. Moreover, Appendix E shows 
that the impact of national level of religiosity was significant and negative for all types 
of organizations in the very first models (without any other state level determinants). 
13  Additionally, in the final models we assessed whether factors that were non-significant in previous 
steps would turn significant. This was not the case.
14  These results were tested for their stability by perturbation analyses (Belsley 1991). High correlations 
among the level 2 determinants and  the relatively small sample of countries  might lead to incorrect 
conclusions due to multicollinearity. In several perturbation analyses we introduced random errors on 
our level 2 determinants (within theoretically reasonable margins) and retested our models fifty times. 
These lead us to believe that there was no harmful multicollinearity in our models (see Appendix B). 
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In subsequent models the negative effect diminishes for leisure organizations and 
disappears for interest and activist organizations. In other words, the effect is largely 
explained away by introducing contemporary state institutions in the models.
Table 3.4. Results: Hierarchical random intercept models, direct effectsa
Leisure Interest Activist
organizations organizations organizations
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.16 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01)
Income 0.08 (0.00) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.16 (0.03) -0.43 (0.04) 0.08 (0.05)
∙ unemployed -0.42 (0.07) -0.49 (0.09) -0.17 (0.10)
∙ other social benefit -0.07 (0.06) -0.53 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07)
∙ other 0.31 (0.07) -0.32 (0.10) 0.45 (0.09)
Age 0.01 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.01 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
Length of residence 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization -0.07 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.28 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
∙ separated 0.12 (0.07) -0.19 (0.09) -0.07 (0.10)
∙ widowed 0.06 (0.04) -0.28 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
∙ unmarried 0.03 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04)
Household size 0.02 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.02)
Children at home -0.08 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.05 (0.03) -0.09 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.10 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox 0.09 (0.12) -0.18 (0.14) -0.46 (0.17)
∙ Other -0.27 (0.05) -0.21 (0.06) -0.04 (0.07)
Attendance of religious services 0.07 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.56 (0.06) 0.44 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08)
Time spent on watching tv -0.06 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01)
Time spent on watching politics on tv 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
State level determinants
Size of bureaucracy - - -
Decentralization - - -
Social security expenditure 2.57 (1.14) 4.27 (1.81) -
Economic development (/10) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05)
Civil rights enforcement 0.49 (0.17) - 0.73 (0.24)
Corruption - -0.20 (0.08) -0.13 (0.07)
Years of democracy (/10) 0.01 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.00)
National level of religiosity -0.41 (0.10) 0.06 (0.15) 0.15 (0.13)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Not all State level determinants are in the full models. Determinants that were not signifi-
cant in previous steps of the analysis were left out. In the table this is shown by the ‘-‘. These 
previous steps are presented in Appendix E.
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State institutions contribute a lot to the explanation of civic participation. 
Neither of the two strands of the crowding out thesis is supported by the models 
in Table 3.4. In hypothesis H1 we expected the size and centralization of the state 
bureaucracy to diminish civic participation. Yet, their effects are both not signifi-
cant – neither in separate testing (Appendix E) nor in the final model (Table 3.4) 
– thereby refuting hypothesis H1. Likewise, from the crowding out thesis we derived 
the expectation that social security expenditure negatively affects civic participation. 
Table 3.4 shows that there is no significant effect of social security on participation 
in activist organizations. It is a significant determinant of participation in leisure and 
interest organizations. However, the effects are positive (+2.57 for leisure organiza-
tions and +4.27 for interest organizations), which shows that social security stimu-
lates participation. Participation in a leisure and in an interest organization increases 
with the amount of social security expenditure by the state. This is opposed to the 
expectations formulated in hypothesis H2a. Both strands of the crowding out thesis 
are therefore refuted by the analyses.
The resource theory offers a better explanation for the effect of social security. 
The positive relationship between social security expenditure and participation in 
leisure and interest organizations supports hypothesis H3a. 
In hypothesis H4a we expected economic development to stimulate civic par-
ticipation. In Table 3.4 we find that the effect of economic development is only 
significant with regard to participation in activist organizations, not in other types 
of voluntary associations. The coefficient of +0.08 signals that citizens participate 
more intensively in activist organizations in countries with a higher level of economic 
development. Hypothesis H4a is thereby supported for activist organizations, but not 
for leisure and interest organizations. 
We find rather consistent support for the public sphere thesis. We expected civil 
rights enforcement to stimulate civic participation. The effect is indeed positive and 
significant for participation in leisure (+0.49) and activist (+0.73) organizations, but 
not for interest organizations. This largely supports hypothesis H5. 
In hypothesis H6 we formulated the expectation that corruption hampers civic 
participation. Indeed, we find that corruption is negatively related to participation 
in interest (–0.20) and activist (–0.13) organizations: in countries with a high level 
of corruption, citizens involvement in interest and activist organizations is relatively 
small. Yet, there is no significant effect for leisure organizations. These effects are 
much in line with the claim of Eliasoph (1998), that corruption chases citizens away 
from politicized associations (like interest and activist organizations) but not from 
smaller, community-based groups (like leisure organizations).
With hypothesis H7 we expect years of democratic rule to stimulate civic partici-
pation. In Table 3.4 we find that this determinant has a positive impact on partici-
pation in leisure organizations (+0.01), but no significant impact on participation 
in interest or activist organizations. Therefore, hypothesis H7 is supported for the 
former, but not for the latter. 
3. stAtes And civil society, stAtes or civil society?
101
In short, both strands of the crowding out thesis (H1, and H2a) are refuted by the 
analyses: neither the size nor the centralization of the state bureaucracy affects civic 
participation, and social security expenditure has a positive rather than a negative im-
pact on the participation in a leisure or an interest association. The resource theory 
finds more support in the models in Table 3.4: we find support for a positive impact 
of social security on participation in leisure and interest organizations (H3a) and of 
economic development on activist organizations (H4a). For the public sphere thesis 
we find the most consistent support. Civil rights enforcement stimulates participa-
tion in leisure and activist organizations (H5), perceived corruption reduces partici-
pation in interest and activist organizations (H6) and democratic rule stimulates 
participation in leisure organizations (H7).
Individual level effects
Although we are not primarily interested in these variables, we briefly look into the 
individual level determinants. At the individual level most effects are significant and 
in the expected direction. Interestingly, there are some differential effects between 
the types of organizations. If we summarize these differential, individual level effects, 
citizens are more likely to participate in a leisure organization when they are male, 
Catholic or Protestant, from a rural environment, live in their community for a long 
time and live in a large household. They are more likely to participate in interest 
organizations when they are male, Protestant, from a rural environment and from a 
small household. Finally, citizens are more likely to participate in an activist organiza-
tion when they are female, Protestant or non-religious, from an urban environment, 
live in their community only briefly and live in a small household. These differential 
effects would have largely cancelled each other out, if we had not made the threefold 
distinction between leisure, interest and activist organizations. The findings therefore 
provide additional support for our theoretical distinction.
Cross-level interaction effects
Table 3.5 shows the cross-level interaction effects hypothesized in hypotheses H2b, 
H3b and H4b. These cross-level hypotheses propose that the impact of some state 
institutions is not the similar for different social categories. We expected that the 
level of participation of the economically weak would be more strongly affected by 
the state institutions than the economically strong. To test whether the impact of 
state institutions differs across these groups, we simultaneously included cross-level 
interaction effects and there (significant or non-significant) main effects in Table 3.5.
The results in Table 3.5 are unequivocal and send an important message. Most cross-
level interaction effects are significant and all can be interpreted in the same manner. 
The effect of state institutions on civic participation is much stronger for people with a 
low income than for people with a high income. These differences in effect size are rath-
er strong. So strong, even, that in most cases we find no institutional effect whatsoever 
for the economically strong, and strong institutional effects for the economically weak.
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Table 3.5. Results: Hierarchical random slope models, cross-level interaction effectsa
Leisure Interest Activist
organizations organizations organizations
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.16 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01)
Income 0.29 (0.06) 0.54 (0.09) 0.42 (0.09)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.16 (0.03) -0.42 (0.04) 0.08 (0.05)
∙ unemployed -0.41 (0.07) -0.50 (0.09) -0.16 (0.10)
∙ other social benefit -0.09 (0.06) -0.52 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08)
∙ other 0.30 (0.07) -0.41 (0.11) 0.39 (0.09)
Age 0.01 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.01 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
Length of residence 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization -0.07 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.28 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.00 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
∙ separated 0.12 (0.07) -0.18 (0.09) -0.06 (0.10)
∙ widowed 0.07 (0.04) -0.26 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06)
∙ unmarried 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Household size 0.02 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.06 (0.02)
Children at home -0.08 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.05 (0.03) -0.09 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.10 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox 0.05 (0.12) -0.26 (0.13) -0.54 (0.17)
∙ Other -0.27 (0.05) -0.22 (0.06) -0.05 (0.07)
Attendance of religious services 0.07 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.55 (0.06) 0.43 (0.08) 0.14 (0.08)
Time spent on watching tv -0.06 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01)
Time spent on watching politics on tv 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
State level determinants
Size of bureaucracy - - -
Decentralization - - -
Social security expenditure 3.90 (1.77) 11.57 (3.73) 5.91 (2.72)
Economic development (/10) 0.10 (0.04) 0.13 (0.06) 0.17 (0.06)
Civil rights enforcement 0.36 (0.18) - 0.40 (0.23)
Corruption - -0.15 (0.06) -0.13 (0.06)
Years of democracy (/10) 0.08 (0.02) - 0.02 (0.03)
National level of religiosity -0.42 (0.10) 0.08 (0.12) 0.08 (0.13)
Cross-level interactions
Social security expenditure * Income -0.20 (0.24) -1.12 (0.38) -0.64 (0.34)
Economic development * Income (effect *10) -0.01 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.00)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Not all State level determinants are in the full models. Determinants that were not significant in 
previous steps of the analysis were left out. In the table this is shown by the ‘-‘. These previous 
steps are presented in Appendix E.
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First, let us focus on the interaction of social security expenditure (at the state 
level) and level of income (at the individual level). This interaction effect is signifi-
cant for interest and activist associations. The main effects show that social security 
expenditure significantly increases civic participation for people with a low level of 
income. This effect is especially strong for interest organizations (with an main effect 
Figure 3.2b. Cross-level interaction effect: social security expenditure, 
  income and participation in interest organizations
Figure 3.2a. Cross-level interaction effect: social security expenditure, 
  income and participation in leisure organizations
Figure 3.2c.  Cross-level interaction effect: social security expenditure, 
  income and participation in activist organizations
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size of +11.57, i.e., for the lowest income group an effect size of 11.57–1.12=10.45). 
Next, the negative cross-level interaction effect shows that the (positive) main effect 
of social security expenditure diminishes with higher levels of income to the extent 
that it approximates 0 for higher income groups. In other words, there is a strong, 
positive impact of social security expenditure on poor people’s participation, but a 
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Figure 3.3b. Cross-level interaction effect: economic development,
  income and participation in interest organizations
Figure 3.3a. Cross-level interaction effect: economic development,
  income and participation in leisure organizations
Figure 3.3c.  Cross-level interaction effect: economic development,
  income and participation in activist organizations
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significantly less strong and even non-existent impact on the rich (see Figures 3.2a–
3.2c).15 This does not only support hypothesis H3b, it goes beyond the claims of that 
hypothesis. Social security expenditure solely affects civic participation of low income 
groups.
A similar story can be told on the interaction of economic development (at 
the state level) and level of income (at the individual level) for leisure, interest and 
activist organizations. The main effects of economic development are significant 
and positive for the lowest income category with respect to participation in leisure 
organizations. The negative cross-level interaction effects show that the positive ef-
fects diminish with higher levels of income. The effect of economic development is 
strongest for the lowest income groups.16 We find no significant effects of economic 
development on civic participation in leisure associations for the rich, yet we do find 
positive effects of economic development for the poor (see Figures 3.3a.–3.3c.). This 
supports hypothesis H4b. 
3.7. summAry And discussion
In this chapter we studied the impact of a range of state institutions on civic partici-
pation from an actor-centered institutionalist approach. Our empirical analyses result 
in three major claims as answers to our three research questions. First, countries 
differ strongly on the degree to which their citizens are involved in voluntary associa-
tions. Second, these country level differences are to a large extent explained by the 
institutional settings: a high level of social security, and a free and neutral public 
sphere stimulate civic participation. These findings do not support the crowding out 
thesis at all, but are in line with the collective resources theory and the public sphere 
theory. Repressive regimes are harmful, whereas extensive social security systems 
stimulate civic participation. Third, and most importantly, not all citizens are equally 
affected by state institutional arrangements. On the one hand, participation rates 
among the poor are highly sensitive to state institutions. On the other hand, for the 
rich the choice to participate in voluntary associations is rather independent from 
state institutions. The state is mostly able to affect poor citizens’ involvement in 
voluntary associations.
Our findings contribute to the literature in different ways. First, they demonstrate 
that we should distinguish between types of associations, both with regards to the 
individual and contextual level determinants. Second, we further contributed to the 
15  The estimated impact of social security expenditure for the highest income category (12) is –1.87 for 
interest organisations (i.e., 11.57 – 1.12 * 12) and –1.77 for activist organisations.
16  Likewise we can estimate the impact of economic development. The estimated impact of economic 
development on participation in leisure organizations is 0.09 for the group with the lowest income, and 
–0.02 for the group with the highest income. For interest organizations the effects are respectively 0.11 
and –0.11; for activist organizations 0.15 and –0.07.
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literature by simultaneously testing the (net) effects of a broad set of state institu-
tions. Our conclusions shed new light on previous studies. Unlike Ruiter and De 
Graaf (2006) we find that the national level of religiosity in a country impacts civic 
participation negatively or non-significantly, at least in Europe. The state is able to 
stimulate civic participation, but not in accordance with the crowding out thesis that 
dominates scientific and political thought. The positive association between years 
of democratic rule and civic participation is in line with Halman (2003) and Parbo-
teeah et al. (2004), and opposes findings of Ruiter and De Graaf (2006). A follow-up 
study on the World Values Survey used by Ruiter and De Graaf shows these differing 
findings have two methodological causes: (i) this dissertation focuses on European 
countries, whereas Ruiter and De Graaf analyzed a broader set of countries, and (ii) 
a small group of influential cases at the country level strongly affects the findings of 
Ruiter and De Graaf (Van der Meer et al. 2009). The third, and possibly most im-
portant, contribution of this chapter is that state institutional effects are not undif-
ferentiated. The state is able to affect the behavior of poor citizens, but hardly able to 
affect the well-to-do. 
This interpretation of the cross-level interaction effects is equivalent to the 
interpretation that the individual level association between income and participa-
tion is reduced. From both interpretations it can be derived that inequality in the 
level of civic participation between the rich and the poor is reduced by social security 
expenditure, economic development and civil rights enforcement. This perspective 
is more extensively taken up in the next two chapters, where participatory inequality 
between social groups is explained by the institutional context, for civic and political 
participation respectively.
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4.1. introduction1
For centuries, voluntary associations have being connected to egalitarian democratic 
ideals by scientists, practitioners, and policymakers. According to Skocpol (1999), 
throughout the history of civic participation in the US, ‘a person of lesser occu-
pational status could work his or her way up an associational ladder all the way to 
the top’ (p. 67), thereby offering opportunities for learning and self-development 
to everybody. These democratic ideals are based on two interrelated and hoped-for 
premises. The first premise is that civic participation has beneficial side-effects – such 
as better health (Piliavin and Siegl 2007), income (Baer 2006), status attainment (Lin 
1999, 2001) and a stronger inclination to become politically active (see Chapter 6). 
The second premise is that voluntary associations mobilize and bring together all 
social groups. To meet that demand, citizens from different social groups should be 
equally likely to join and partake in associational life. The equal likelihood to partici-
pate civically is what this chapter labels as participatory equality.
Yet, despite the ideals of participatory equality, a good deal of empirical research 
shows that participation in voluntary associations is in fact selective with regard to 
many characteristics (for an overview see Wilson 2000); not all citizens are equally 
likely to participate. Many empirical studies have aimed to explain why some citizens 
participate and others do not by the characteristics of these citizens. According to 
Verba et al. (1995), the decision to become involved is dependent on three elements: 
motivation (i.e., incentives), capacity (i.e., resources), and networks. Civic participa-
tion is unequal along these elements.However, differing motivation should not be 
considered a problematic source of participatory inequality: ‘If some citizens do not 
participate because they freely choose not to be active [...] then participatory inequali-
ties do not compromise democracy’ (Verba et al. 1995). Participatory inequality that 
is induced by a lack of structural resources (like education and income) or ascribed 
characteristics (like gender), however, is a concern for the egalitarian, democratic 
ideal of voluntary associations. This form of participatory inequality is induced not 
by citizens that do not want to participate, but by citizens that can’t due to a lack of 
social resources. Empirical studies have reported structural participatory inequality 
along education, income and gender lines. ‘A substantial gap ... separates the existing 
reality of inequality-reinforcing associations and a hoped-for politics of equality-en-
hancing association’ (Fung 2003). Whereas all this is well-known, the logical follow-
up question has not yet been answered satisfactorily: how can participatory inequality 
be reduced by the institutional context? Up to this point, scholars have proposed the 
institutional context to explain differing levels of civic participation cross-nationally, 
1  A different version of this chapter is currently under editorial review. A previous draft of this chapter 
has been presented as E. van Ingen and T. van der Meer (2008) Inequalities in Voluntary Association 
Participation and the Social security expenditure. Paper presented at the panel ‘Contextual explanations 
of citizenship: citizen participation, political trust and norms of solidarity’, Politicologenetmaal 2008, 
Nijmegen (May 29–30, 2008).
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but not to systematically explain participatory inequality.
To explain participatory inequality, micro-level explanations need to be linked 
to macro-level explanations. The resource perspective offers an interesting starting 
point for the origins of participatory inequality (Schlozman et al. 1999; Verba et al. 
1995; Wilson and Musick 1998). This perspective asserts that – at the micro-level – 
lack of individual resources (like limited financial means, cognitive abilities, or social 
skills) function as a constraint for citizens to participate. This causes participatory 
inequality between those with and those without the relevant resources to partici-
pate. However, at the macro-level resources can be redistributed. In particular, social 
security expenditure aims to redistribute individual level resources (like financial 
resources and care tasks) from the haves to the have-nots. Consequently, individual 
level resources matter less, and participatory inequality would be lower in countries 
with high levels of social security expenditure. 
This chapter aims to explain participatory equality by social security expenditure 
through an ‘analysis of individual-level behavior that is informed by and linked to 
aggregate-level, institutional, and policy developments’ (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005: 
218).
 
In the course of this chapter we will answer three research questions (see Figure 4.1):
1. To what extent do the effects of education, income and gender differ across types of 
 association?
2. To what extent do the effects of education, income and gender differ across countries?
3. To what extent does social security expenditure diminish participatory inequality 
 across education, income and gender lines?
Figure 4.1. Graphical display of research questions 
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To answer these research questions, this chapter performs analyses on the European 
Social Survey 2002 (a focused comparison of 17 European countries with detailed 
and uniform measures). The results of this analysis are then compared to the Citizen-
ship Survey 2004 of the International Social Survey Programme (a large and diverse 
set of 38 countries from various continents with more crude measures). This com-
bination allows us to robustness of the findings to non-European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries.
In analytical terms, this chapter builds strongly on the previous one. Methodologi-
cally, this chapter re-analyzes the extensive models of Chapter 3 and deepens the 
analysis only slightly by additional cross-level interaction effects. However, although 
methodologically this chapter analyzes the same set of measures in rather similar 
models, theoretically they are interpreted from a different perspective to test a differ-
ent theory. Chapter 3 primarily focused on the impact of state institutions on differ-
ing participation rates between countries (represented with an asterisk in Figure 4.1). 
Additionally, it showed that state institutions have a stronger impact on some social 
groups than on others. This chapter, however, primarily focuses on unequal levels of 
participation between social groups within countries, and the way the institutional 
environment affects it. In other words, the top-down perspective of the previous 
chapter is traded for a more horizontal perspective in this chapter. Consequently, 
this chapter tests the resource perspective to explain why social groups are not equally 
likely to participate civically, and to explain why the degree of participatory inequal-
ity differs cross-nationally. In short, the rather strong empirical-analytical overlap of 
this chapter with the previous chapter is needed to test different hypotheses. The 
similar models are therefore approached from a vastly different perspective than in 
the previous chapter.
4.2. the resource theory
The resource perspective offers a theoretical interpretation why social groups are not 
equally likely to get involved – i.e., why socio-economic determinants are related to 
civic participation. Civic participation imposes certain requirements like time, mon-
ey and social skills (Verba et al. 1995). Citizens with few resources have less means 
to meet requirements to get involved and stay involved (Schlozman et al. 1999). 
Vice versa, citizens with abundant resources are more likely to participate; they have 
the money to pay membership fees, available leisure time to join, the skills to make 
contacts and organize social events, as well as the network and the social status that 
makes them more likely to be asked to join. In this chapter, we focus on three well-
studied structural sources of inequality in civic participation: education, income and 
gender (cf. Verba et al. 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Bekkers 2005; see also Chapter 
3). When we refer to education, income and gender, we actually mean the resources 
that are brought about by these three characteristics, like time, money, social skills.
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The level of education might be ‘the most important resource promoting active 
citizenship’ (Bekkers 2005). All modes of civic participation (i.e., membership, par-
ticipation, volunteering and donation of money) rise with educational level (Gesthui-
zen et al. 2008). There are several reasons why level of education would function as 
a resource. First, through education citizens obtain pro-social norms and a general 
interest in society (Gesthuizen 2006). Second, the highly educated develop better 
cognitive abilities, which enable them to get a better understanding of, and interest 
in, organizational procedures (Gesthuizen and Kraaykamp 2002). Finally, the highly 
educated are more likely to be integrated in social networks that contain highly edu-
cated others (Gesthuizen et al. 2008). Since ‘being asked’ is an important incentive 
to join an organization (Prouteau and Wolff 2008), participation is further boosted 
within circles of highly educated people.
Income is one of the most clear-cut resources needed for civic participation (Li et 
al. 2003; Ruiter 2008). Most voluntary associations have entry costs such as member-
ship fees, or additional costs such as expenses for traveling, drinks, meals, or materi-
als. This limits the poor in their possibilities of participating in such associations. 
Warr (2006) shows that women from socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods, with low incomes, and often without jobs but with children to take care of, 
hardly participated in voluntary associations that offer possibilities to improve their 
skills or to meet people with the resources ‘to get ahead’. A lack of skills, time and 
money kept them away from civic participation. 
A third relevant cleavage in civic participation is gender. Men and women differ 
in the type and extent of their civic participation. Overall, women are less likely 
to participate in voluntary associations, as they have fewer resources (Paxton et al. 
2007). Their social networks are different from men’s in several ways (Lin 2000): they 
are generally smaller and shower larger proportions of kin and neighbors. Moreover, 
women generally take up time-consuming care tasks. Indeed, the resource of time is 
highly determined by ‘such life circumstances as having a job, a spouse who works, or 
children, especially preschool children’ (Schlozman et al. 1999).2 As a result, women 
participate less in voluntary associations in general. Yet, the sex difference does not 
apply to all types of associations similarly. Women are less likely to participate in lei-
sure and interest organizations, whereas they are more likely to join activist organiza-
tions (see Chapter 3). 
4.3. hypotheses
The general effects of education, income and gender on civic participation are well-
studied, as well as described in the previous chapter. We build on this knowledge. To 
2  On the other hand, when women have children this does not necessarily mean that their voluntary 
participation is endangered; in fact, school-age children can have an effective positive influence, 
especially for women who are not working (Rotolo and Wilson 2007).
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answer the first research question, we develop hypotheses regarding the differential 
effects of these factors on three types of voluntary associations. To answer the second 
and third research questions we develop hypotheses as to how the effects of educa-
tion, income and gender are conditioned by social security expenditure.
Types of  organization
Because the resources that are required to participate differ from association to asso-
ciation (Verba et al. 1995), participatory inequality may differ across types of associa-
tion as well (Curtis et al. 1992; Schlozman et al. 1999). The overrepresentation of the 
affluent, well-educated, and male participants in politics and political organizations is 
well-documented (Schlozman et al. 1999). Consequently, we expect strong participa-
tory inequality within politicized organizations like interest and activist organizations. 
However, citizens may be more equally likely to join leisure organizations. Analyzing 
voluntary associations in Flanders, Coffé and Geys (2007a; 2007b) found that hobby 
clubs and arts activities are among the most equal kind of associations in terms of 
background characteristics. Similarly, sports are often thought of as a domain in 
which people with different social backgrounds interact. Studies in different coun-
tries have indicated that broad segments of society participate in sports, and that the 
percentage of participants is still rising, although certain cleavages subsist (Breedveld 
2003; Breedveld and Tiessen-Raaphorst 2006; Scheerder et al. 2005; Wilson 2002).3 
Therefore, we come to the following hypothesis.
H1  The effects of education, income and gender on civic participation are stronger for   
 interest and activist organizations than for leisure organizations.
Resource redistribution
The previous chapter showed that citizens in countries with more collective resources 
(like economic development, enforced civil rights, democratic rule and social secu-
rity) are more likely to participate civically. Until the previous chapter, the resource 
perspective has exclusively been used to explain differences between countries in 
levels of participation. However, there are indications that the degree of participa-
tory inequality differs cross-nationally as well (Bartowski and Jasinka-Kania 2004; 
Van Oorschot and Finsveen in press). These cross-national differences, too, might be 
explained with the resource perspective, namely by social security expenditure. 
Social security expenditure is likely to reduce participatory inequality in two ways. 
First, the welfare state redistributes individual level resources from the haves to the 
3  Throughout this chapter we analyze types of organizations. We are aware that our analyses on types 
of organizations does not account for segmentation within these types. For instance, although we may 
find that sport clubs are egalitarian at the aggregate level, they may nevertheless be segmented on the 
organizational level: different associations have different constituencies (Bourdieu 1986 [1979]). The 
rich may play golf, whereas the poor play soccer. Note, that this does not affect our theoretical design or 
empirical analyses.
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have-nots, for example by providing benefits for the unemployed. This increases 
the possibilities of participating in voluntary associations for the less privileged, 
while diminishing the socio-economic inequality. Hence, participatory inequality is 
reduced. Second, generous welfare states (i.e., with high levels of social security) offer 
collective resources, like subsidies to public facilities and organizations (i.e., health 
care, voluntary associations). The availability of these collective resources diminishes 
the importance of individual level resources. Hence, participatory inequality between 
those with individual resources and those without would be reduced. 
The influence of social security expenditure is not restricted to redistributing 
financial resources. Social security expenditure can also enhance the possibilities for 
women to participate civically by the redistribution of care tasks and jobs. Gender 
gaps in participation can be partly attributed to ‘large-scale social structures, which 
enhance or limit women’s opportunities for education and employment’ (Paxton et 
al. 2007). For instance child care, maternity leave, and positive discrimination on 
the job market (Esping-Andersen 1999) are ways in which states with high levels of 
social security redistribute care tasks and jobs (Geist 2005) and might thereby reduce 
participatory inequality. 
In short, we hypothesize that social security expenditures have a tempering effect 
on the three inequality gaps under research:
H2a  In states with high social security expenditure, the effect of education on civic 
 participation will be smaller. 
H2b In states with high social security expenditure, the effect of income on civic 
 participation will be smaller. 
H2c  In states with high social security expenditure, the effect of gender on civic 
 participation will be smaller. 
4.4. dAtA And meAsurement
In this chapter we test our hypotheses primarily on the European Social Survey (ess) 
2002. Data collection in the ess 2002 has been very tight and uniform, in a rather 
homogeneous set of countries (i.e., Western and Central European countries).4 Key 
individual level variables, like education and income, have been constructed by a 
single scale during the data collection process. Moreover, the ess includes a lengthy 
and detailed set of variables on civic participation – including five modes of partici-
pation for twelve types of organization. In short, the ess enables detailed and infor-
mative analyses. 
4  We analyze 17 countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany (split into East and West), Denmark, Spain, 
France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
and Slovenia.
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Dependent variables: Civic participation
This chapter builds on the three scales for civic participation constructed in Chapter 
3. Four modes of participation (membership, donating money, active participation 
and volunteering) in twelve types of organizations were reduced to three scales: lei-
sure organizations (which are primarily social and/or recreational), interest organi-
zations (which primarily aim to defend the interests of their members) and activist 
organizations (which primarily aim to change attitudinal or behavioral patterns in 
society). The three scales range from 0 to 4. 
Individual level determinants: Education, income and gender
During the data collection phase, the ess emphasized cross-national correspondence 
of all background characteristics. Therefore, we need not standardize these measures 
per country, but we can use the regular variables. Education was measured by the 
level of education, in a cross-nationally uniform scheme. We applied listwise deletion 
to deal with missing values on income and education. Income is measured as the 
actual amount of money available to the household (i.e., net income), ranked into 
12 groups (with 1 being the lowest income group and 12 being the highest). Finally, 
gender has men as the reference category.
Country level conditioning variable: Social security expenditure
To measure social security expenditure, we made use of the imf-statistics on social 
security and health care from the annual Government Finance Statistics, derived 
from the year before the survey was held. We standardized the expenditures as a 
percentage of the gdp. The imf-measure correlates strongly (>0.9) with both oecd and 
ilo data.
Individual and contextual level control variables
Finally, we control our models for several individual characteristics that might (spuri-
ously) explain inequality within and between countries (see Chapter 3): age (and 
age-squared to capture non-linear tendencies), marital status, work status (i.e., having 
a paid job), religious denomination and church attendance. This leaves us with 21718 
respondents. At the contextual level we control for four factors that explain cross-
national differences in the average level of civic participation (see Chapter 3): social 
security expenditure, civil rights enforcement, years of democratic rule (topped off at 
1920), and economic development (gdp/capita).
4.5 AnAlyses
Analytically, the finding that a characteristic has a significant effect on civic partici-
pation implies that groups (differing on that specific characteristic) do not partici-
pate equally. A significant determinant is thus equivalent to a significant source of 
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participatory inequality. Finding this determinant to have a stronger effect on civic 
participation in one country than in another, implies that participatory inequality 
along this characteristic is more pronounced. 
First, we illustrate the extent of participatory inequality by descriptive figures. 
Figures 4.2a–4.2i display participatory inequality in leisure (4.2a, 4.2d, 4.2g), inter-
est (4.2b, 4.2e, 4.2h) and activist (4.2c, 4.2f, 4.2i) organizations along education 
(4.2a–4.2c), income (4.2d–4.2f) and gender (4.2g–4.2i) lines. The figures shows to 
what extent the high educated, the rich, and men are more likely to participate than 
the low educated, the poor, and women, respectively. A score of 0 implies that the 
social groups are equally likely to participate civically: i.e., the former group is ‘0’ 
times as likely to participate than the latter group. A positive score implies that the 
former group is more likely to participate (by that factor) than the latter, whereas a 
negative score implies the opposite. The figures run from –1 (the former group does 
not participate compared to the latter group, i.e., maximal inequality) via 0 (equal 
likelihood, no inequality) to infinitely positive (the latter group hardly participates 
compared to the former, i.e., maximal inequality).
Figures 4.2a–4.2c display participatory inequality along education lines. The 
figures show that the highly educated (at least upper secondary education) are more 
likely to participate in all types of organizations than the low educated. Participa-
tory inequality is especially strong in Southern and Eastern European countries like 
Hungary, Poland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. East and West Germany have notable 
levels of participatory inequality with regards to interest organizations.
Figures 4.2d–4.2f show to what extent civic participation is unequal along income 
groups. The rich (at least a yearly household income of approximately 18000 euro) 
are more likely to participate in all types of organizations than the poor. Hungary 
and Portugal, and to a lesser extent also countries like France and Great Britain, 
show the highest levels of participatory inequality.
Finally, Figures 4.2g–4.2i display the differences between men and women in civic 
participation. Men are more likely to participate in leisure and interest organizations 
than women. This difference holds in all countries. However, women are more likely 
to participate in activist organizations than men. Although this is in line with the 
previous chapter, theoretically (i.e., from the resource perspective) this is rather sur-
prising. Note, however, that these descriptive figures are based on bivariate analyses. 
The proof of the pudding is not in these figures, but in multi-variate, hierarchical 
analysis. For that purpose we turn to the models of civic participation introduced in 
Chapter 3. We re-interpret these models and build on them for the purposes of this 
chapter.
To be able to simultaneously analyze individual, country, and cross-level effects 
on our ordinal and dichotomous dependent variables, we apply hierarchical logistic 
regression (Snijders and Bosker 1999), through the MLwin 2.0 package (Rasbash 
et al. 2004). Subsequently, (i) random intercept models (to test hypothesis H1), (ii) 
random slope models without cross-level interaction effects (as a prerequisite to test 
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Figure 4.2c. Participatory inequality: education, activist organizations
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Figure 4.2a. Participatory inequality: education, leisure organizations
Figure 4.2b. Participatory inequality: education, interest organizations
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Figure 4.2f. Participatory inequality: income, activist organizations
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Figure 4.2d. Participatory inequality: income, leisure organizations
Figure 4.2e. Participatory inequality: income, interest organizations
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Figure 4.2i. Participatory inequality: gender, activist organizations
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Figure 4.2g. Participatory inequality: gender, leisure organizations
Figure 4.2h. Participatory inequality: gender, interest organizations
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hypotheses H2a-H2c), and (iii) the random slope models with cross-level interac-
tion effects (to test hypotheses H2a-H2c) are estimated. All of the models use the 
2nd order PQL procedure for linearization in the maximum likelihood estimation 
process (Rasbash et al. 2004). In the random slope models, covariances between the 
slopes and between slopes and intercepts were simultaneously estimated. P-values for 
variance tests are halved, as recommended by Snijders and Bosker (1999). 
4.6. results
Unconditioned effects
First, Table 4.1 displays the random intercept models, which consist of the effects 
of individual and contextual level determinants on civic participation in each of the 
three types of organizations. Basically, it is a concise version of Table 3.4 in Chapter 
3. Table 4.1 builds on previous studies by distinguishing between three types of orga-
nizations. This allows both the reproduction of the general findings of these previ-
ous studies as well as the test of hypothesis H1. This chapter will not deal with the 
outcomes for the individual and contextual level control factors, as they have already 
been extensively dealt with in Chapter 3.
Unsurprisingly, and in line with these previous studies, Table 4.1 shows that educa-
tion and income both show a significant and positive effect on participation in all 
three types of association. However, similar to Figures 4.2g–4.2i, the effect of gender 
remains mixed. Indeed, men are more likely to participate in leisure and interest 
organizations than women, but less likely to join activist organizations. 
Table 4.1 also shows that the effects differ in strength across types of association. 
According to hypothesis H1 the degree of participatory inequality should be stronger 
for interest and activist organizations than for leisure organizations. However, the ef-
fect sizes in Table 4.1 show that the strength of participatory inequality along educa-
Table 4.1. Results: Hierarchical random intercept models with direct effectsa
Leisure Interest Activist
Individual level determinants
Education 0.17 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01)
Income
Sex (man) 0.08 (0.00) 0.06 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
∙ woman -0.29 (0.02) -0.37 (0.02) 0.26 (0.01)
σ2u0j 0.08 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.08 (0.03)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Age, Age squared, Marital status, Income source, Church 
attendance, Denomination, Citizenship, Having children, Household size, Length of 
residence, Urbanization of the community, gdp/capita ppp, Social security expenditure 
and Years of democracy (not displayed).
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tion, income and gender lines do not differ that much across types of organization. 
Additional tests prove that these differences are not significant. Note that even with 
regards to gender the size of the participatory inequality between men and women is 
similar across types of association, although the relative position of men and women 
are reversed for activist organizations. All in all, hypothesis H1 is falsified.
Variance in participatory inequality
Before we turn to the question whether the individual level effects of education, 
income and gender are stronger in countries with lower levels of social security 
expenditure, we need to answer the second research question, and to assert whether 
the effects differ significantly across countries. Table 4.2 elaborates on the previous 
table, in the sense that it allows the effects (B) of education, income and gender to 
vary across countries (U) simultaneously. These random slope models converged 
without problems for leisure and activist organizations. However, for interest organi-
zations the model did not converge. Only when several non-significant country level 
co-variances were set to 0, the models converged.
Table 4.2 shows that the effects of education, income and gender vary significantly 
across countries for all types of organization: all variance estimates (U) are significant. 
To facilitate interpretation, Table 4.2 also shows the estimated ranges in which 95% 
of the national effects are located under the assumption of normal distribution. They 
show that inequality is rather strong in some countries, while it is nearly lacking in 
others. Both the significant variance estimates and the ranges of effect sizes imply 
that participatory inequality differs across the seventeen countries under study. This 
Table 4.2. Results: Hierarchical random slope modelsa b
Leisure Interest Activist
Individual level determinants
Education Effect size (B) 0.20 (0.02) 0.19 (0.03) 0.31 (0.03)
  Variance (U) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01)
95% Rangea 0.09 <B <0.30 -0.01 <B <0.40 0.06 <B <0.56
Income Effect size (B) 0.09 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02)
  Variance (U) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
95% Rangea 0.00 <B <0.18 -0.04 <B <0.20 0.00 <B <0.18
Sex (man) Effect size (B) -0.38 (0.07) -0.46 (0.08) 0.24 (0.04)
∙ woman Variance (U) 0.06 (0.02) 0.09 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01)
95% Rangea -0.88 <B <0.12 -1.05 <B <0.13 0.04 <B <0.44 
σ2u0j 0.34 (0.13) 0.62 (0.23) 0.62 (0.24)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Age, Age squared, Marital status, Income source, Church attendan-
ce, Denomination, Citizenship, Having children, Household size, Length of residence, Urbaniza-
tion of the community, gdp/capita ppp, Social security expenditure and Years of democracy (not 
displayed).
b Defined as the interval of Beta +- 1.96 SD.
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urges the question what determines these differences in participatory inequality. To 
test whether participatory inequality is moderated by social security expenditure, we 
now turn to Table 4.3. 
Cross-level interaction effects
Table 4.3 is, in turn, an extension of the random slope models of Table 4.2, includ-
ing all cross-level interaction effects simultaneously. The first block (Level 1) shows 
the main effects of the individual level characteristics under study (i.e., the effects of 
education, income and gender in a country with an average level of social security 
expenditure). The second block (Level 2) shows the main effect of social security 
expenditure. The third block (Cross-level) shows whether the individual level as-
sociations differ significantly across countries with differing levels of social security 
expenditure.5
Hypothesis H2a laid down the expectation that social security expenditure reduces 
5  Like in Table 2, the model for interest organizations would not converge. The only way to make it 
converge, was by not allowing the slope of income to vary across countries. This is a heavy constraint, 
that increases the risk of Type i errors (false positives), i.e., finding a significant effect whereas this is not 
the case . To cope with this issue, additional models were estimated in which each cross-level interaction 
was modelled separately. For these models no additional constraints needed to be set. These less 
encompassing analyses resulted in less strained models, which substantially showed the same results as 
Table 3. 
Table 4.3. Results: Hierarchical random slope models: cross-level interaction effectsa
Leisure Interest Activist
Individual level determinants
Education 0.18 (0.02) 0.20 (0.02) 0.30 (0.03)
  (variance over countries) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Income 0.08 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01)
  (variance over countries) 0.00 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.00)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.30 (0.08) -0.46 (0.07) 0.25 (0.03)
   (variance over countries) 0.07 (0.03) 0.06 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)
State level determinants
Social security expenditure  8.19 (4.56) 10.57 (3.69) 7.32 (5.30)
Cross-level interactions
Education* Social security expenditure -0.57 (0.42) -2.28 (0.60) -1.65 (0.84)
Income* Social security expenditure -0.54 (0.27) -0.71 (0.17) -0.45 (0.38)
Woman* Social security expenditure 3.65 (2.41) 4.60 (1.78) 2.73 (0.78)
σ2u0j 0.43 (0.16) 0.24 (0.10) 0.54 (0.22)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Age, Age squared, Marital status, Income source, Church attendance, 
Denomination, Citizenship, Having children, Household size, Length of residence, Urbanization of 
the community, gdp/capita ppp and Years of democracy (not displayed).
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the effect of education on civic participation. The cross-level interaction in Table 
4.3 shows that the effect of education varies significantly with social security expen-
diture, but only for interest and activist organizations. The effect of education is 
less strong in countries that spend more social security expenditure. In other words, 
social security expenditure reduces participatory inequality between the higher and 
the lower educated in interest and activist organizations. We illustrate this for activist 
organizations. The main effect of education is 0.30 – which is the effect of education 
in the average welfare state. In countries with 4% less social security expenditure6 
than the average, the effect of education on participation in activist organizations is 
(0.30 + (–0.04)*(–1.65) =) 0.37. In countries with 4% more social security expendi-
ture than the average, the effect of education is (0.30 + (0.04)*(1.65) =) 0.23. This 
supports hypothesis H2a.
Similarly, hypothesis H2b stated that social security expenditure reduces the effect 
of individuals’ income on civic participation. Table 4.3 shows that the positive effect 
of income is smaller in countries with more social security spending for leisure and 
interest organizations. In other words, participatory inequality across income groups 
is smaller in more generous welfare states. This supports hypothesis H2b for these 
types of organization.
Finally, according to hypothesis H2c the relationship between gender and civic 
participation should be lower in countries with high levels of social security expendi-
ture. From Table 4.3 we derive that the effect of gender differs significantly with so-
cial security expenditure for all types of organization. However, the interpretation of 
the effects is less consistent. On the one hand, in leisure and interest organizations 
women participate less than men in the average welfare state (respectively –0.30 and 
–0.46). In states with 4% more social expenditure these gender effects are weaker (re-
spectively –0.16 and –0.28), i.e., participatory inequality is lower. This is in line with 
hypothesis H2c. On the other hand, women are more likely to participate in activist 
organizations (+0.24). This effect becomes even stronger in states with 4% more so-
cial expenditure (namely 0.34). In other words, participatory inequality across gender 
lines increases with social security expenditure for activist organizations. This does 
not support hypothesis H2c.
The finding that social security expenditure increases participatory inequality 
along gender lines for activist organizations cannot be seen apart from the main ef-
fect: women are more likely to participate than men. As social security redistributes 
resources like jobs, time and money, this redistribution primarily benefits the poor 
and the low educated as well as women. However, women are already more likely to 
join activist organizations than men – probably because of social or psychological 
characteristics – and are able to use additional individual or collective resources to 
become even more active in more extensive welfare states. This is much in line with 
the resource theory that underlies this chapter.
6  4% is the standard deviation of social security expenditure of the countries under study.
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Robustness
Replication of this analysis on the European countries of the 2004 Citizenship 
Survey of the International Social Survey Programme (issp) show that these findings 
are robust. Despite fewer7 and less detailed8 measures on partly different countries9, 
the general conclusions are the same, although somewhat fewer effects reach signifi-
cance. At the individual level, the high educated, the rich and men are more likely to 
participate in leisure and interest organizations than the low educated, the poor and 
women. These differences are moderated by social security expenditure: participatory 
inequality is lower in countries with high levels of social security expenditure.10 For 
interest organizations, the robustness analyses show a significant moderating effect 
on education, income, and gender inequalities. Yet, for leisure organizations only the 
cross-level interaction effect of social security expenditure with gender is significant.
4.6. summAry And discussion 
With this chapter the cross-national focus of this dissertation shifted from participa-
tion rates to explaining inequalities in participation. A focused analysis of 17 Europe-
an countries showed first that the rich, the highly educated and men are more likely 
to participate in associational life. However, women are more likely to join activist 
organizations. Next, the level of participatory inequality differs cross-nationally. 
Finally, social security expenditure generally reduces these levels of inequality: the 
gap between privileged and underprivileged groups declines when the state spends 
more on social security and health care. However, it enlarges the gender difference 
for activist organizations: women are even more likely to join these organizations in 
7  The issp tells whether the respondent participates actively (i) a sports, leisure or cultural group, or 
(ii) within a trade union, business or professional organization. These two types mirror the leisure and 
interest organizations constructed for the ess data set.
8  Civic participation is only measured as active participation in an organization in the issp, rather than 
the scale of activities in the ess. Education is measured as the number of years it took for respondents 
to finish their education. The measurement of income in the issp does not allow a cross-national 
comparison for several reasons: the monetary unit, the standard price level (i.e., the effective height of 
the income), and the time span in which the income was gathered (i.e., monthly vs. annually) differs 
between countries in the issp. These problems were solved by standardizing income within countries, 
similar to Chapter 2. The resulting measure indicates the relative differences in the income distribution 
within countries.
9  Austria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany (split into East and West), 
Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden, Slovakia and Slovenia.
10  In the replication on the issp-data, only the cross-level effect of social security expenditure with 
income on participation in leisure organizations differs from the ess-analysis: this cross-level interaction 
effect is non-significant.
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generous welfare regimes. These conclusions are robust, as was proven by a replica-
tion of the analyses on the European countries of the issp 2004. 
These findings are very much in line with the resource perspective. First, at the 
individual level, the resource perspective proclaims that citizens with more resources 
– like education and social skills, income and employment and less care tasks – are 
more likely to participate civically. Indeed, in line with many previous studies, this 
chapter finds significant higher levels of participation for those with resources (the 
high educated, the rich, men) than for those without. What cannot be so easily 
explained, however, is why women are more likely to participate in activist organiza-
tions. A possible explanation – in line with the resource perspective – is that women 
are directed to these types of organization, because passive involvement (member-
ship, donation) is the dominant mode of participation in these organizations, which 
consumes less scarce resources like time. Alternatively – going beyond the borders of 
the resource perspective – women might simply care more about the causes advocat-
ed in activist organizations like the environment, as well as human and animal rights. 
This explanation is supported by election surveys, that traditionally find women to 
be more supportive of these ‘care’ issues than men.
At the contextual level, the resource theory explains why social security expendi-
ture affects participatory inequality. Social security redistributes resources from the 
haves to the have-nots and is a proxy for collective resources that diminish the impor-
tance of individual resources. Consequently, most forms of participatory inequality 
are lower when a country spends more on social security. Social security expenditure 
strengthens the overrepresentation of women in activist organizations. Yet, this too is 
in line with the resource theory. Extensive welfare states provide more resources like 
time and money to women. This resource redistribution strengthens women’s level 
of civic participation: in leisure and interest organizations the disadvantage to their 
male counterparts is therefore diminished, while their edge in participation in activ-
ist organizations is increased.
These findings open up paths for future research. First, the kind of data and analyses 
employed in this chapter do not allow further elaboration about the mechanisms 
that connect social security expenditure to participatory inequality. Future in-depth 
studies should examine the processes at play; to be able to see whether our theoreti-
cal argument – that this is due to a reduction of differences in resources – applies. 
Second, while we focused on the social security, there could be other circumstances 
that are conducive to participatory equality. For example, obligatory service learn-
ing in the educational program might offer all students social resources like skills to 
participate civically. Third, this study on participatory inequality can be expanded to 
other sources of difference. In recent years the relationship between ethnicity and par-
ticipation has been increasingly put under study (cf. Grabb 2007; Putnam 2007; Letki 
2008; Hooghe et al. 2009; Gesthuizen et al. 2009; Tolsma et al. 2009). This study is 
unable to deal with participatory inequality along ethnic lines, as it suffers from two 
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problems that are, unfortunately, standard-fare in cross-national surveys. First, minori-
ties often show disproportionate non-response as a result of language and cultural 
barriers. Second, the composition of the minority groups is very different across the 
countries in our current dataset and often large differences exist between minority 
groups, making it very difficult to compare participatory inequality cross-nationally. 
Finally, given the supposedly beneficial effects of civic participation for the partici-
pants, this study implies that voluntary associations are not egalitarian organizations, 
but rather operate as organizations that reproduce social inequality (Ruiter 2008). 
Those citizens who could benefit most from voluntary association participation are 
actually the least involved (Schlozman et al. 1999). Privileged citizens (with high edu-
cation, high status, and high income), who do not need the benefits of participation 
in the first place, show the highest membership rates and occupy the most important 
position within associations. Moreover, participatory inequality – and by implication 
therefore also social inequality – appears to be increasing in the Western world (Li et 
al. 2003; Wuthnow 2002; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). Although this study shows that 
social security expenditure may moderate participatory inequality, it will not make it 
disappear.
5
id
e
o
lo
g
y
 A
n
d
 P
o
li
t
ic
A
l 
PA
r
t
ic
iP
A
t
io
n
 in
 t
w
e
n
t
y
 d
e
m
o
c
r
A
c
ie
s
t
h
e 
P
o
li
t
ic
iz
ed
 P
A
r
t
ic
iP
A
n
t

5. the Politicized PArticiPAnt
129
5.1. introduction1
The performance of democratic societies depends strongly on the participation of 
citizens. Democracy demands both high and equal levels of political participation 
(Dahl 1971). Yet in modern societies participation is ‘highly unequal’ (Lijphart 1998): 
political participation is more common in some groups than in others. This, in turn, 
causes these groups to have a stronger impact on the political process than others. 
Political scientists generally focus on participatory inequality across socio-demograph-
ic categories (Verba et al. 1978; Powell 1986; Lijphart 1997) epitomized by the (in)
famous male WASP – the privileged White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, who dominates 
political life. 
Whereas participatory inequality across socio-demographic categories results in a 
bias in the composition of parliament or voice groups on age, sex, ethnicity, income 
and/or education, differential levels of participation across ideological groups result 
directly in a bias in terms of political preferences, and thereby in terms of policy out-
put. Therefore, the issue of participatory inequality in modern democratic societies 
primarily revolves around ideological preferences. 
Participatory inequality between ideological groups is important for two reasons. 
First, participatory inequality between ideological groups may result directly in biased 
policy output. If, for instance, right-wing citizens are more likely to vote than left-
wing citizens, parliament is likely to have a right-wing bias over the population at 
large. Likewise, if extremist citizens are more likely to protest than moderate citizens, 
their voice is likely to be heard more strongly and more often by policy makers. 
Second, policy preferences have been used to explain the direction of political acts 
(i.e., who citizens vote for), but not to the choice whether to act itself. Although the 
left-right scheme is considered to underlie ‘the electorate’s orientations toward the 
surrounding political world’ (Pierce 1981: 117), no more than a few studies looked 
for an effect of ideological preferences on political participation (Verba and Nie 
1972; Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Martin and Van Deth 2007; Armingeon 2007; 
Teorell et al. 2007b). Yet, these studies focused on a single form of political participa-
tion (such as casting a ballot or protesting) or a single aspect of ideological prefer-
ences (such as left-right position or extremism).
In this chapter we systematically analyze the association between ideology and 
political participation from a comparative perspective. Once we have mapped out the 
impact of ideological preferences on political participation – i.e., the participatory 
inequality across ideological groups – the questions arises whether political systems 
1  A different version of this chapter has been published as Van der Meer, T.W.G., Van Deth, J.W. and 
Scheepers, P. (2009). ‘The politicized participant: ideology and political action in twenty democracies’. 
Comparative Political Studies 42 (in press). A previous draft of this chapter has been presented as T. 
van der Meer, J. van Deth and P. Scheepers (2008) The politicized participant: explaining the impact of 
left-right position on political action. Paper presented at the panel ‘Multivariate and multi-level models 
of determinants of party choice’, 4th ecpr Conference, Pisa (September 6, 2007).
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differ in participatory inequality and how political institutions might stimulate equal-
ity in participation. Lijphart (1998, 1999) suggested that some institutional designs 
are better equipped to stimulate equal levels of political participation than others. 
Yet, this claim has not yet been tested empirically. Furthermore, a growing literature 
points out to the willingness to act depends also on the ideological position of the 
government in office. 
More specifically, we deal with the following research questions: 
1.  To what extent are citizens’ ideological positions related to (modes of) political 
 participation?
2.  To what extent do institutional arrangements and the ideological position of the 
 government in office affect political participation?
3.  To what extent is the association between ideological position and (modes of) political  
 participation among individuals moderated by institutional arrangements?
To answer these questions we do a quantitative, hierarchical analysis on election 
survey data, incorporating 47902 respondents, and 27 elections in 20 Western coun-
tries. This chapter contributes to the literature on political participation in three 
ways. First, we will systematically develop and test the claim that left-right position 
is an important determinant of political participation, building on incentive-based 
theories. Second, we will analyze the effects of the institutional context on the aver-
age level of participation, testing rivaling hypotheses from the resource-based and 
the incentive-based theories. Finally, we will test whether the regime type conditions 
the individual level association between left-right position and political participation 
(i.e., participatory inequality).
5.2. ideologicAl preferences And politicAl pArticipAtion
Ideological preferences among citizens are usually measured on a left-right scale, 
which distinguishes between both the direction (i.e., left or right) and the extrem-
ity (i.e., distance to the midpoint of the scale) of these preferences.2 Although the 
exact meaning of the poles may differ across groups, times and places, a general 
understanding of left and right seems to be available. Over fifty years ago Lipset et al. 
(1954: 1135) defined the left as ‘advocating social change in the direction of greater 
equality – political, economic or social’, and the right as ‘supporting a traditional, 
more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change towards greater equality’. 
Later definitions echo this distinction. For Laver and Hunt (1992: 12), for instance, 
the left pole of the scale has become associated with ‘policies designed to bring about 
2  The left-right scheme has been criticized, as the exact meaning of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ sup-
posedly differs intersubjectively and cross-nationally. Nevertheless, the left-right scheme is appropriate 
for the purposes of this chapter to measure general ideological position and proximity cross-nationally.
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the redistribution of resources from those with more to those with less, and with the 
promotion of social rights that apply to groups of individuals taken as a whole even 
at the expense of individual members of those groups.’ The right pole is associated 
with ‘the promotion of individual rights, including the right not to have personal 
resources expropriated for redistribution by the state, even at the expense of social 
inequality and of poverty among worse off social groups’.
In the broad terms defined by Lipset et al. (1954) the meaning of left and right 
is similar in different countries. Even though polities may have differing conflict 
dimensions, the left-right scheme encompasses them ‘regardless of how many cleav-
age and/or identification dimensions exist’ (Sani and Sartori 1983: 330). Fuchs and 
Klingemann (1990) show that the general societal values associated with the terms 
‘left’ and ‘right’ are similar for the general public in Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United States. The left is related to equality, solidarity, progressiveness and sys-
tem change. The right is related to individualism, freedom, conservatism and system 
maintenance.
Why, then, would we expect left-right position to be related to political partici-
pation? To some extent participatory differences between left-wing and right-wing 
citizens might be spurious, i.e., the consequence of underlying factors like economic 
resources. For instance, because they have a higher level of education, citizens are (i) 
more likely to adopt a left-wing ideology and (ii) better equipped to participate politi-
cally, although no direct, causal relation exists between ideology and participation. 
Although spurious explanations are not our prime concern, they will be taken into 
account in our analyses in order to assess the direct relationship between ideology 
and political participation. We do not formulate extensive theory or estimate ad-
ditional causal models for the relationship between ideological position and these 
control factors, as we are only interested in them to eliminate spurious effects. In our 
empirical analysis we only include control factors such as sex, education and income, 
that are highly unlikely to function as intermediate factors (see also paragraph 4).
Substantially more interesting for the aim of this chapter are the ways in which 
the left-right position might be inherently related to political participation. Sum-
marizing the various theories in this area Pattie et al. (2004) distinguish between five 
main explanations that explain political participation, but they do not link them to 
ideological preferences and state institutions. Yet, these factors can be related to three 
of the five explanations: (1) the general incentives theory (Whiteley and Seyd 2002), 
which considers citizens to be primarily motivated by the benefits of the outcomes or 
process of participation; (2) the civic voluntarism theory (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972; 
Verba et al. 1995), which explains political participation by social and economic 
resources; and (3) the equity fairness theory (Clarke et al. 2004), which emphasizes 
relative deprivation as a root source of political participation: a perceived gap be-
tween expectations and outcomes (especially in comparison to a peer group) would 
motivate citizens to participate politically, especially in an unconventional mode.
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5.3. theory And hypotheses
The relationships between ideological preferences and political participation can 
be studied at several levels. Our first set of hypotheses is directed towards the ways 
in which citizens’ ideological preferences are presumed to have some impact of the 
political activities of these citizens inherently (i.e., disregarding the context they oper-
ate in). In addition, our second set of hypotheses brings in the context and relates 
the specific ideological preferences of citizens to the ideological position of govern-
ment in office. Finally, our third set of hypotheses relates institutional features of 
the political system to the relationships between ideological preferences and political 
participation.
Individual features
Probably the most straightforward relationship between citizens’ ideology on the one 
hand and participation on the other, is to consider the expected impact of the degree 
of extremism on participation regardless whether they are on the left or on the right 
side. In general, ideological extremists are likely to participate more strongly than 
ideological moderates do (Putnam 2000: 342). Ideological extremists have stronger 
incentives to become involved in politics, either to defend or to change the status 
quo. Martin and Van Deth (2007: 328) find support for this claim, as ‘the likelihood 
of being involved in a participatory way increases with the degree of [of individual 
citizens’] polarization’. This means we expect the highest levels of political participa-
tion among ideological extremist on both the left and the right side.
H1a  The more extreme the ideological position of citizens, the more likely they are to 
 participate politically.
Even if political extremists show higher levels of political participation than more 
moderate citizens, it is unlikely that right-wing and left-wing preferences have the 
same impact on political participation. For several reasons citizens with left-wing 
orientations are inherently more likely to participate than people on the right-end 
side of the ideological spectrum. Traditionally, left-wing preferences aim at changing 
society, whereas right-wing preferences are about preserving it (Fuchs and Klinge-
mann 1990; Kriesi 1993). Therefore, if we disregard the context they live in, left-
wing citizens have more outcome incentives to participate politically, as they aim for 
system change (Martin and Van Deth 2007). Right-wing citizens, on the other hand, 
do not aim for such change and lack this specific incentive. 
Beside these outcome benefits, left-wing citizens may also be motivated to par-
ticipate politically by process incentives. Inglehart (1997) found that postmaterialist 
citizens do not participate primarily to change political outcomes, but for intrinsic 
reasons: the expected satisfaction derived from the process of participating itself 
functions as an incentive. Postmaterialists are dominantly found at the left side of 
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the political spectrum (Inglehart 1997: 252). The ‘old’ – proletarian – connotations 
of the left-side of the ideological spectrum seem to be replaced gradually by the ‘new’ 
meaning, which emphasizes citizen involvement for inherent, expressive reasons. We 
come to the following hypothesis.
H1b  The more left-wing the positions of citizens, the more likely they are to participate 
 politically.
The modes of participation selected might also be related to specific positions on the 
left-right spectrum. Conventional modes of participation go within the system of rep-
resentational government: voting, campaigns, contacts with the bureaucracy (Verba 
and Nie 1972), whereas unconventional modes such as protests, strikes and boycotts 
go outside the representational system. 
The left-wing position seems to be particularly relevant for unconventional modes 
of participation. According to citizens themselves, protesting is mostly the modus 
operandi for left-wing citizens (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). As they aim to change 
the societal status quo, they are more likely to participate outside the representation-
al, supposedly elitist structures. Right-wing citizens are far less likely to even consider 
using unconventional modes of political participation (Anderson and Mendes 2005). 
A similar argument is presented by Inglehart (1997) who stresses that there is an 
intrinsic value in protest forms of political participation for left-wing (postmaterial-
ist) citizens, because they prefer elite-challenging instead of elite-directed forms of 
participation. 
The third hypothesis, then, stresses that left-wing citizens do not only show higher 
levels of participations in general (H1b), but more specifically have a stronger prefer-
ence for protest forms of political participation than rightwing citizens have.
H1c The association between left-right position and political participation is stronger for 
 unconventional modes than for conventional modes of political participation.
Contested politics
Until this point we focused on the isolated impact of ideological preferences. Yet 
the left-right scale can also be used to capture the ideological distance between the 
position of an individual citizen on the one hand, and the ideological position of the 
government in office on the other. A lack of congruence between these two ideologi-
cal positions might be an incentive to participate. In the literature on contested poli-
tics (cf. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005) election outcomes have 
different attitudinal and behavioral effects on electoral winners and electoral losers 
(Anderson et al. 2005). Citizens faced with a newly elected parliament or government 
that they do not prefer (the ‘losers’) are less satisfied with the democratic system than 
the ‘winners’. These losers have a higher incentive to participate politically. Ander-
son et al. (2005: 40–47) find that losers are more likely to think their vote can make a 
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difference, and that losers are more likely to protest than winners. Losing an election 
does not lead to political apathy (exit), but to political participation (voice). There-
fore, citizens are especially motivated to participate politically when they are faced 
with governmental policies that they disagree with (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
An explanation for this mechanism is offered by Pattie et al. (2004) in their 
equity-fairness theory. At its core this theory claims that frustration, caused by rela-
tive deprivation, can manifest itself in (aggressive) political participation. ‘If there is 
a significant gap between expectations and reality then relative deprivation is likely 
to result and this in turn will have political consequences’ (Pattie et al. 2004: 147.). 
Deprived citizens are especially more likely to participate in unconventional politi-
cal participation (Muller 1979). The bigger the gap between expectations and reality, 
between hopes and outcomes, the stronger the incentive to engage in political partici-
pation will be. In electoral terms: The less the outcome of the government forma-
tion after an election corresponds with a citizen’s hopes, the more he or she will feel 
deprived and the more he or she will engage in political participation. 
Yet, what defines being a ‘winner’ or a ‘loser’? Often the labels of ‘winner’ and 
‘loser’ are attached to citizens based on their party preference. However, the labels of 
being a winner or a loser can be more aptly measured by ideological proximity; that 
is, by the degree of congruence between the ideological positions of a citizen and 
the government. The more one’s left-right position differs from the position of the 
government in office, the higher the political loss of that citizen is. Or, vice versa, 
the more one’s left-right position resembles that of the government in office, the 
more that citizen thinks of herself a winner. This degree of loss or gain can be seen 
as an incentive to participate. More important than ‘objective’ criteria of winning 
and losing is whether a citizen perceives herself as a winner or a loser. When citizens 
perceive the ideological position of government to be more incongruent with their 
own ideological position, they are more likely to participate politically. We come to 
the following hypothesis.
H2  Citizens are more likely to participate politically, when they perceive a larger distance 
 between the left-right position of the current government and their own left-right 
 position.
We expect that citizens’ distance to the governmental ideological position party 
explains the positive effect of ideological extremism on political participation. The 
explanation of relatively high levels of participation for ideological extremists (see 
H1a) lies mainly in their stronger opinion regarding the status quo. However, based 
on the mechanism described above, this may not be the only explanation. Ideologi-
cal extremists – who position themselves at the fringes of the left-right scheme – are 
generally more likely to be a large distance to the governmental left-right position. 
The first explanation results from the general incentives model, the second from the 
equity fairness model. 
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Political institutions
Political participation does not only depend on individual resources or motivations, 
but also on the opportunities and incentives provided by the social and political con-
text. If no elections take place, people can’t cast a vote. In a similar way, there is no 
need for students to occupy a university building or for workers to block the entrance 
of their firm if, respectively, academic policies and labour relations are unchallenged. 
From this perspective, institutional arrangements condition the individual level asso-
ciation between ideology and political participation. We expect the strength and even 
direction of the association to differ cross-nationally – an expectation for which there 
is indeed some support (Martin and Van Deth 2007; Teorell et al. 2007b).
The type of democratic regime is likely to affect the level of political participa-
tion. Lijphart (1999) positions democratic regimes on a continuum from majori-
tarian to consensual systems. Pure majoritarian systems are basically ruled by a 
majority without countervailing powers such as a written constitution, multiple 
houses of parliament or minority vetoes. By contrast, consensualism is inclusion-
ist, based on coalition governments, a written constitution, division of power and 
minority vetos (cf. Powell 2000). The difference between the two types of systems 
can be summarized as the distinction between voice and accountability (Thomassen 
and Aarts 2005). Consensual systems emphasize voice. Political power is shared 
between national and local authorities, and between the governing parties and op-
position parties. This offers a large amount of possibilities to all citizens – including 
minorities – to get their opinions heard. In line with the civic voluntarism model, 
these possibilities for voice are considered valuable (shared) resources to all citizens. 
Majoritarian systems emphasize accountability: as all power is put disproportion-
ally in the hands of one executive power, citizens know who to blame when they 
wish to ‘throw the rascals out’. Concentration of institutional power functions as 
an incentive for political participation, as Jackman (1987) showed for voter turnout. 
Similarly, Franklin (2004) concludes that institutional competitiveness stimulates 
voter turnout. 
Because the voice (resource) and accountability (incentive) perspectives differ 
in their emphases, opposing hypotheses on the impact of regime type on political 
participation are formulated. From the voice perspective a direct, positive effect of 
a consensual regime type on political participation can be expected. As the system 
is more responsive to societal claims, the use of the voice strategy is more likely to 
have an effect in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems. The proportional 
and inclusive consensual systems are especially more open to minorities and dissent-
ing voices. As this results in higher levels of political efficacy, they are more likely to 
participate politically (Karp and Banducci 2008). When we consider these paths to 
be heard as a collective resources, this argument echoes the civic voluntarism model 
of Pattie et al. (2004).
The empirical record – mostly based on aggregated data – shows that voter turn-
out indeed is higher in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems (Blais and 
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Carty 1990; Lijphart 1999), although these findings might have been overstated (cf. 
Blais 2006). Social movements are more common when political cleavages are paci-
fied and government is weak and inclusive (Kriesi et al. 1995). Local autonomy, a typ-
ical characteristic of consensualism, stimulates membership of political organizations 
(Morales 2001b). These differences between consensual and majoritarian systems are 
likely to have similar consequences for other modes of political participation. 
H3a The more consensual a political system is, the more likely it is that a citizen 
 participates politically.
Yet, when we look at the incentives to participate and emphasize accountability, we 
come to opposite expectations. Consensual systems do offer citizens more possibili-
ties to voice their opinions, but they have less incentives to let their voice be heard 
since the likely outcome of the political process will be a compromise (cf. Karp and 
Banducci 2008). In majoritarian systems, by contrast, much more is at stake. Gener-
ally, the winner takes all: political power is balled together into a single organization. 
This might give citizens more incentives to participate politically. Therefore, we come 
to the opposite hypothesis:
H3b The more consensual a political system is, the less likely it is that a citizen 
 participates politically.
Lijphart (1999) claims that consensual systems are not only benevolent for levels of 
political participation, but also lead to ‘greater political equality’. Consensual democ-
racies are supposedly ‘kinder and gentler’ (Lijphart 1999: 275), i.e., ‘more egalitar-
ian and truly representative of citizen’s wishes’ (Policzer 2000: 838). In other words, 
differences between left-wing and rightwing citizens are supposedly smaller or less 
salient in consensual systems.3 We will test Lijphart’s claim more directly by focusing 
on participation and by relating these actions to citizens’ ideological preferences. 
Consensualism diminishes the individual level association between left-right 
position and political participation, because ideological conflicts are less salient and 
less relevant in these systems.4 According to this line of argument citizens’ ideological 
preferences offer less incentives to participate politically in the depoliticized consen-
3  Lijphart (1999) tests his expectation that political equality is greater in consensual regimes indirectly: 
He treats income inequality and illiteracy rates as proxies of inequality of political resources (not power). 
Both are higher in majoritarian regimes than in consensual regimes. 
4  Because the consensual system is inclusionist, there is less at stake; ideological differences matter 
less in the political sphere. The traditional consensual system of the Netherlands, for instance, was 
not defined by competitiveness between parties and ideological groups but by equal distribution of 
influence (Daalder 1995 [1964]). There was a pragmatic tolerance of ideological differences: ideological 
differences were presented ‘as if they were not political and therefore divisive phenomena, but questions 
that could be solved by objective principals of economics, of algebra (proportionality), or of the study of 
law’ (Lijphart 1976: 135).
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sual system than in the competitive majoritarian system. We build on the general 
incentives theory of Pattie et al. (2004) and expect these institutional factors to have 
conditional effects on the individual-level relationships presented above.
H3c  The more consensual a political system is, the weaker the individual-level association 
 between left-right position and political participation is.
H3d  The more consensual a political system is, the weaker the individual-level association 
 between extremism and political participation is.
Similarly, consensual regimes are likely to dampen the hypothesized relationships 
based on the congruence between the left-right position of government and citizens. 
Once in power, governments in consensual systems take minority views into account: 
even in case of a clear left-wing majority, the interests from the right-wing opposition 
will not be excluded, and vice versa. Consensualism is able to ‘satisfy large groups’ 
interests on a great number of issues’ (Colomer 2001: 2). Because governments are 
inclusive, the attitudinal difference between the electoral winners and the electoral 
losers are much smaller or less salient in consensual systems than in majoritarian 
systems (Anderson et al. 2005). In other words: winning and losing matter less under 
consensual than under majoritarian institutions (Anderson and Guillory 1997). The 
effect of the perceived ideological distance to the government in power can be speci-
fied in the following (cross-level interaction) hypotheses.
H3e  The more consensual a political system is, the weaker the individual level association 
 between the perceived distance to the current government on political participation is.
5.4. dAtA And meAsurement
The hypotheses call for a hierarchical design, which distinguishes between three 
levels of analysis: citizens (at the individual level), who are nested in governmental 
periods (at the meso level), which in turn are nested in political systems (at the 
macro level). The Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (cses), Module 2 data 
set provides us with the means to test our hypotheses: it contains the right measures, 
it covers a large number of elections and all surveys were held during election time. 
The cses data set combines many national parliamentary election surveys held in 
the period 2001–2006. To this data set we added six more election survey data sets 
that build on the cses Modules, and contain the relevant measures: Australia 2001, 
Denmark 2005, Germany 2005, Netherlands 2006, New Zealand 2005 and Norway 
2005.
Thirty eight countries participated in the second module of the cses. In our hi-
erarchical analyses we will exclusively focus on the twenty longstanding, Western de-
mocracies in our data set. As we have data on two parliamentary elections for seven 
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countries (see Appendix A, Table AIV), our data set covers twenty seven elections. 
The total number of respondents of 18 years and older is 47,902. An overview of the 
countries and elections in this chapter is presented in Appendix A.
Dependent variables: Political participation
The major aim of our analyses is to trace the impact of ideological preferences on the 
levels and modes of political participation under various political and institutional 
circumstances. We distinguish between six modes of political participation.5: Voting 
(casted a ballot at the last parliamentary elections), Contacting (contacted a politi-
cian or government official during the last five years), Campaigning (support for a 
particular party or candidate by, for example, attending a meeting, or putting up a 
poster), Persuading (talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular 
party or candidate), Cooperating (worked together with others who share the same 
political concerns), and Protesting (taken part in a protest, march or demonstration). 
All six measures are dichotomous, as the most important distinction is that between 
those who participate and those who do not.
Independent variables: Ideological positions
To test our hypotheses we need three types of measures for respondents’ ideological 
positions. First, we apply the readily available left-right self-placement (eleven point 
scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right)). Second, a measure for ideological extremism is 
required. Respondents who positioned themselves exactly in the middle of the left-
right scale are considered to be the most moderate. The distance from this midpoint 
signals the degree of self-reported ideological extremism. The resulting scale ranges 
from 0 (moderate) to 5 (extreme). Third, a measure is constructed to capture the per-
ceived distance between the respondent and the government in power directly before 
the elections.6 As respondents report their level of participation at the time of the 
new elections on which the surveys are held (i.e., time t0), the theoretically relevant 
government is the one that was in power during the preceding governmental period, 
just before these elections (i.e., time t–1). To measure the position of the government 
in office we use the left-right positions that respondents assign to the political par-
5  Not all modes of political participation are measured in all election surveys. Voting is available for all 
27 election surveys.  Contacting is available for 24 election surveys (not for Denmark 2005, Germany 
2005 and Norway 2005), campaigning for 20 election surveys (not for Australia 2001, Denmark 2005, 
Germany 2005, the Netherlands 2006, New Zealand 2005, Norway 2005 and Portugal 2005), persua-
ding for 21 election surveys (not for Australia 2001, Denmark 2005, Germany 2005, the Netherlands 
2006, New Zealand 2005 and Norway 2005), cooperating for 23 election surveys (not for Denmark 
2005, Germany 2005, the Netherlands 2006 and Norway 2005), and protesting for 25 election surveys 
(not for Denmark 2005 and Germany 2005).
6  When governments changed between elections – as they did in Italy, Israel, Norway – we calculated 
the per cei ved distance to the government in office directly before the election on which the survey data 
report.
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ties that made up government7; that is, the mean of the governing parties’ left-right 
position, weighted by their relative size in parliamentary seats. When respondents 
position themselves on the same position as the point estimate of the government, 
they are winners. The larger the ideological distance between the government and 
the respondent, the more we consider him or her as a loser.8
Country level determinants and conditioning factors: Institutional contexts 
Lijphart (1999) proposes a standardized two-dimensional measure of consensual-
ism: the executives-parties dimension, and the federal-unitary dimension. Negative 
scores are assigned to countries with more majoritarian institutions, positive scores 
to countries with a more consensual system.9 As the Lijphart indices are central to 
our study, but only available for longstanding democracies, we leave out the eighteen 
recently established democracies from the cses data set in our multivariate hierarchi-
cal analyses.
Two additional contextual control factors are included in our models that have 
been found to be important determinants of political participation. Economic 
development has been found to be an important stimulant of political participation 
(Teorell et al. 2007b). gdp per capita in the year 2000, the year preceding all elec-
tions in our survey, is used as an indicator for this control factor. Second, the voting 
system, more specifically whether or not voting is compulsory, is included. If voting 
is compulsory, the state forces its citizens to vote and thereby raises turnout (Jack-
man 1987; Lijphart 1998; Engelen 2007). Moreover, the positive effects might very 
well spill over to other domains of political participation. Because they have to vote, 
citizens might get active in contemplating about politics, discussing it and getting 
more broadly involved. Compulsory voting might also reduce unequal voter turnout 
7  Not all coalition parties are covered by the questionnaire in all countries: for France, Israel, and Italy 
we have no information on one or more junior coalition partners. Due to their small size and broad 
coalitions, their absence hardly affects our findings. Belgian data on perceived party position lack 
completely. Belgium is therefore left out of models that include perceived ideological distance.
8  As a robustness check we alternated the measure of perceived distance. First, we measured the 
governmental position both as a point estimate and as a range estimate (covering the coalition’s position 
from the most left-wing to the most right-wing coalition member). Second, we measured ideological 
distance both relatively (degree of incongruence) and absolutely (not holding the same position as the 
constitutes a loser). Despite these alterations, results were substantially the same. Therefore, we used the 
most informative measure – the perceived distance based on a point estimate of the government and a 
degree of incongruence.
Conservative: range estimate of govt. Informative: point estimate of govt.
Dichotomous Winner (0): within range of governing partiesLoser (1): outside range of governing parties
Winner (0): on govt. position (+/- 0.5)
Loser (1): not on govt. position
Range Winner (0): within range of governing partiesLoser: distance to range is degree of losing
Distance to govt. position is 
degree of losing
9  To check the effects of the executive-parties dimension, we replaced it in our analyses with a measure 
of the electoral system (pluralistic first past the post vs. proportional representation), based on the 
Quality of the Government data set (Teorell et al. 2007a). This led to substantially similar results.
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(Lijphart 1997, 1998; De Winter 1998; Hooghe and Pellerioux 1998). Following the 
experts’ assignments in the cses 2001–2006 data set we measure compulsory voting 
in three categories: strongly enforced compulsory voting, partially enforced compul-
sory voting, and non-compulsory voting.
Individual level control variables
Finally, we also control for several characteristics of individual citizens in order to 
exclude possible spurious effects: gender, age, education, marital status, socio-eco-
nomic status, household income, attendance of religious services, and urbanization 
of residence. Unfortunately, not all these characteristics are available in all surveys. 
The measure of income, for instance, is not available for Belgium; attendance is not 
included in Canada, Finland, Norway and Spain. If the association between ideology 
and political participation is not affected by the in- or exclusion of these control fac-
tors, we will exclude them to maximize the number of higher level cases. 
5.5. AnAlyses
Before we turn to multi-variate explanatory analyses, Figures 5.1a to 5.1f show the 
participatory inequality (between left and right, and between extreme and moderate) 
for all election surveys in our combined data set. On the horizontal axis we display 
the odds that left-wing citizens participate more strongly than right-wing citizens. 
The vertical axis shows the odds of ideological extremists to participate more than 
ideological moderates. Positive scores show that, respectively, left-wing citizens and 
extremists are more likely to participate; negative scores that left-wing citizens and ex-
tremists are less likely to participate. From our first set of hypotheses, we expect most 
countries to be in the first quadrant (top right section) of the figures.
Several conclusions can be derived from Figures 5.1a–5.1f. First, the figures 
show that there is little difference between left-wing and right-wing citizens in most 
countries. Only for protesting we find that left-wing citizens are far more likely to 
participate than right-wing citizens. Differences between left-wing and right-wing vot-
ers appear to be more moderate for cooperating and campaigning, and rather absent 
for voting, contacting and persuading. Second, we find consistently large differences 
between extremists and moderates: the extremists are more likely to participate on 
all modes in nearly all countries. Only for voting behaviour hardly any differences 
can be noticed, which is trivial due to fact that large numbers of respondents claim 
to have cast a ballot. Third, the figures imply that countries differ in the strength 
of association between ideology and political participation. This confirms previous 
findings (Martin and Van Deth 2007; Armingeon 2007; Teorell et al. 2007b) and 
reinforces the need of an explanation for these differing correlations.
To explain these differences, we now turn to the multivariate, hierarchical analy-
sis. Hierarchical analysis (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1999) is 
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Figures 5.1a–5.1f.  Participatory inequalities between left and right and between 
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a  Horizontal line represents the relative frequencies of participation (left:right)
 Vertical line represents the relative frequencies of participation (extreme:moderate)
 The dots represent country averages
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required, as our hypotheses and our data are hierarchically structured: individuals 
(level 1) are nested in different governmental periods (level 2), which are nested in 
different regimes (level 3). As the dependent variables are dichotomous, hierarchical 
logistic regression is selected.10 We estimate models (simultaneously at the individual 
and state level) that report the logit of participating politically. There is significant 
variance in political participation at the contextual level (see Table 5.1). This con-
firms the need for hierarchical analysis. Note, however, that while the variance at the 
regime level (σ2v
0k
) is sizable and significant, the variance at the intermediate level 
of governmental periods (σ2u
0jk
) is not. To some extent, this is caused by the few 
countries with two election studies in our data set. Otherwise, this indicates that the 
participation rates hardly differ between governmental periods. 
In order to avoid the common pitfalls of complicated models with (cross-level) inter-
action effects (cf. Brambor et al. 2005), the hypotheses are tested in several subse-
quent hierarchical models. First, we focus on the individual level effects in Table 5.2. 
Next, we model the direct, unconditional effects of contextual determinants in Table 
5.3 in order to test their main effects. In Table 5.4 we then include the perceived 
ideological distance between respondents and the government in office. Finally, with 
all main effects in place, cross-level interaction effects are introduced in Table 5.5 to 
test whether individual-level relationships differ across regime types.
10  We use the ml-win 2.0 package (Goldstein 1995). Our hierarchical logistic regressions are all 
characterized by MQL, 1st Order, no extra-binominal variance assumed.
Vote Contact Campaign Persuade Cooperate Protest
Baseline model
σ2v0k 0.34 (0.15) 0.38 (0.12) 0.63 (0.20) 0.63 (0.20) 0.30 (0.10) 0.23 (0.09)
σ2u0jk 0.12 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03)
Composition model 
σ2v0k 0.38 (0.16) 0.31 (0.10) 0.57 (0.18) 0.57 (0.18) 0.26 (0.08) 0.22 (0.08)
σ2u0jk 0.12 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.03)
Model D (Table 5.3)
σ2v0k 0.34 (0.14) 0.10 (0.04) 0.25 (0.08) 0.25 (0.08) 0.11 (0.04) 0.15 (0.06)
σ2u0jk 0.10 (0.06) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.03)
Full model (Table 5.4)
σ2v0k 0.32 (0.14) 0.11 (0.04) 0.26 (0.09) 0.26 (0.09) 0.12 (0.04) 0.14 (0.06)
σ2u0jk 0.11 (0.07) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.03)
Full model including cross-level interactions
σ2v0k 0.44 (0.21) 0.12 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07) 0.16 (0.07) 0.16 (0.07) 0.25 (0.10)
σ2u0jk 0.14 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.03)
Table 5.1. Variance analyses
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, MQL, 1st order.
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5.6 results
Individual level effects
In Table 5.2, the individual-level effects of the background characteristics, ideological 
preferences, and modes of political participation are summarized for three different 
models. Models i, first, introduce various background characteristics as determinants 
of political participation. The effects are in line with previous studies. In models ii we 
find that extremism has a positive and moderately strong association with all modes 
of political participation. This supports hypothesis H1a. Left-wing citizens participate 
more strongly than right-wing citizens in activities like persuasion, cooperation for 
political goals and protesting. However, with regards to the three most conventional 
modes of political participation (voting, contacting and campaigning) there are no 
significant differences. This is in line with hypothesis H1b and H1c: overall, left-wing 
citizens are more likely to participate than right-wing citizens, especially in unconven-
tional modes.
When we model the control factors and the ideological measures simultaneously 
(Model C), we find little changes compared to Model B. There is, however, one 
important exception. The effect of left-right position on voting, which was non-
significant in Model B, becomes significant and positive when we control for the 
other determinants. Right-wing citizens are more likely to vote than left-wing citizens, 
taking other factors into account. In other words, hypothesis H1b is not supported 
for voting. Further analysis shows that the positive effect of left-right position on vot-
ing comes into being when we control for education and sex specifically. The other 
control factors do not affect the associations between ideology and the six modes of 
political participation. In our subsequent analyses we can therefore safely exclude 
those control variables that have many and/or country-specific missing values.11
Country level effects
To what extent is the level of political participation affected by contextual determi-
nants? Table 5.3 provides the results of empirical tests of Lijphart’s (1999) claim that 
consensualism stimulates electoral participation (H3a). However, we find that voting 
is not significantly more widespread in consensual than in majoritarian democra-
cies. This is not in line with studies using aggregated turnout data. Yet, Blais (2006) 
already casted doubt on these studies, noting that empirical evidence is inconsistent, 
and the impact of institutions on voting might have been overestimated. He referred 
to hierarchical analysis on voter turnout to get a better estimation. Indeed, our find-
ings are in line with a recent hierarchical study of Karp and Banducci (2008) that dis-
11  Due to country specific missing values, Table 1 focused on a subset of countries in our data set. By 
leaving out most control factors, Table 2 includes more countries. We find that the effects of extremism 
are effectively the same. The effects of left-right position are now also negative and significant but weak 
for contacting and campaigning leftwing citizens are more likely to contact officials or campaign than 
rightwing citizens. This relationship is rather weak.. It supports hypothesis H1b.
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Table 5.2. Results: individual-level determinants of political participation
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sects consensualism to several factors, for which they expect opposing effects on voter 
turnout. They find a negative effect of some factors (due to lack of incentives), and 
a positive effect of others (due to resources to participate), which apparently cancel 
each other out in our study.
Next, Table 5.3 shows that citizens are less likely to participate on several other 
modes of political participation in consensual democracies. There is a significant, 
negative effect of consensualism (on the executive-parties dimension) on contacting 
officials, campaigning and persuading others on Lijphart’s executive-parties dimen-
sion. Citizens are less likely to act in any of these three modes when they live under 
a consensual regime than under a majoritarian regime. We do not find a significant, 
positive effect of federalism. This, in short, supports the competing hypothesis H3b.
The negative effect on the executive-parties dimension is difficult to explain with 
the resource theory. Why do more inclusive governments, with more options of voice 
for especially political minorities, dampen political participation? Morales (2001b) 
comes to a similar finding, wondering why membership of political organizations is 
lower in states that are more open to the public. Surely, consensual systems with pro-
portional representation, minority rights and a general openness to society raise the 
possibilities (resources) for successful political participation. However, exactly because 
these systems are so inclusive, they dampen the need (incentives) for it. Crudely 
speaking, the winner takes all in majoritarian systems and the stakes are higher. 
Therefore, citizens will have a stronger urge to get involved in majoritarian systems 
than in consensual systems, either to support their representative’s and stimulate (re-)
election, or to voice a (probably stronger level of) dissent.
Note that these results are obtained after we controlled for economic develop-
ment and compulsory voting. Economic development stimulates contacting officials, 
campaigning and cooperating with others to reach political goals. Yet, it has no effect 
on turnout, persuasion or protesting. In line with previous authors (cf. Lijphart 1997 
and 1998), we find a positive effect of compulsory voting on voter turnout. Although 
turnout is stimulated by compulsory voting, there is no spill-over effect on other 
modes of political participation. Apparently, compulsory voting does not generate 
highly participating citizens, but merely forces them to cast their ballot. Rather, we 
find that the level of cooperation is lower in systems with compulsory voting.
Contested politics
When we include perceived ideological distance to our models (V), several interest-
ing observations arise (see Table 5.4). First of all, the larger the perceived ideological 
distance between a citizen and his or her government, the more likely that citizen is 
to participate politically. This finding holds for each mode of political participation 
except voting, and lends unequivocal support for hypothesis H2. Second, inclusion 
of perceived ideological distance decreases the impact of extremism on political par-
ticipation, although this decrease is not significant in most cases. 
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Cross-level interaction effects
In the final step we test whether the impact of left-right position, extremism and per-
ceived ideological distance on political participation is conditioned by regime type. 
We expected their impact to be lower when the system is more consensual. 
The inclusion of three cross-level interactions strains our three-level model 
severely, as we add a total of twelve parameters (including variance and covariance 
estimates). We therefore first tested all cross-level interactions separately. None of 
the interaction effects were significant. Next, we reran our analyses simultaneously. 
The models for voting and cooperating converged without problems. In the models 
for campaigning and persuading we needed to assume some covariances to be zero.12 
Based on additional tests, this assumption was not violated. Finally, the models for 
contacting and protesting would not converge. Based on our previous, separate tests 
of the cross-level interactions, we therefore left out the weakest (and of course non-
significant) of the three variance estimates: extremism (for contacting) and left-right 
position (for protesting). Leaving out these (co-)variance estimates, the models con-
verged. Although these adaptations of the (co-)variances increase the risk of overes-
timating the size of the specific accompanying cross-level effects, the results in Table 
5.5 imply that these consequences are probably very minor.
The results obtained with these modified models are shown in Table 5.5. Evident-
ly, several effects of left-right position, ideological extremism and perceived ideologi-
cal distance vary significantly over countries. The question is, of course, to what 
extent these differences can be explained by regime type. First, we look at the con-
trols we introduced for voting turnout. Although we expected compulsory voting to 
have an egalitarian effect, the opposite appears to the case. In general, extremists are 
more likely to cast a ballot than moderates (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Table 5.5 shows 
that this difference is larger in countries with compulsory voting than in countries 
without. Yet, why this would be the case is not clear.
Second, the impact of left-right position or ideological extremism could be 
conditioned by regime type. This is not the case for any mode of political participa-
tion. Clearly, the impact of left-right position and ideological extremism on political 
participation does not differ between consensual and majoritarian regimes. In other 
words: consensualism is not more egalitarian than majoritarianism when it comes 
to political participation. This falsifies hypothesis H3c and hypothesis H3d. Finally, 
perceived ideological distance is presumed to matter less in consensual systems than 
in majoritarian systems (hypothesis H3e). Again, we find no significant interaction 
effects between perceived ideological distance and regime type. This falsifies hypoth-
esis H3e. In short, we find no support at all for the claim that consensual regimes are 
more egalitarian with regards to political participation.13
12  For campaigning the co-variances between extremism and the other three factors are set to zero. 
For persuading we set the co-variances of left-right position with the constant and extremism, as well as 
those of perceived distance with the constant and extremism to zero.
13  One might argue that the absence of an interaction effect does not necessarily mean that the 
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Robustness
To limit the risks of overestimating our results, we finally test to what extent our 
findings are robust at the country level. First, the outliers for the levels of political 
participation are considered. Generally, the findings are rather robust: when deviat-
ing countries are deleted from the analyses, some effects that previously bordered on 
significance turned barely significant and vice versa. For instance, after the exclusion 
of Canada and the United States, the negative individual-level effect of left-right 
position on contacting and campaigning turned significant, in line with its effect 
on the other modes of participation. Similarly, several cross-level interaction effects 
came closer to significance (but not quite reaching it) for persuading and protesting 
after eliminating outliers (New Zealand and Canada, and France and Spain, respec-
tively). While their direction was in line with our expectations, the coefficients were 
non-significant at the five percent-level. One change deserves more attention: espe-
cially the effects of compulsory voting appear to be sensitive to outliers. The exclu-
sion of two outliers on contacting an official (Canada and the United States) turned 
the effect of compulsory voting non-significant. The exclusion of the same outliers 
from the models on campaigning and of two others (New Zealand and Canada) from 
the models on persuading turned the effect of compulsory voting significant and posi-
tive, indicating that campaigning and persuading are more common in countries 
with compulsory voting. The lack of robustness may be caused by the low share 
of countries in our analysis with partially or strongly enforced compulsory voting 
(namely Italy and Australia).
Second, we eliminated country level outliers with regards to the associations 
of left-right position and extremism with political participation. Figures 5.1a–5.1f 
identifies outliers for two modes of political participation on the difference between 
extremists and moderates. Our findings on contacting turned out to be robust to the 
in- or exclusion of Spain. However, when we excluded Italy from our model on coop-
erating, the negative effect of compulsory voting turned non-significant. For two other 
modes of participation there were groups of outliers. The simultaneous exclusion of 
France, Norway and Spain from campaigning led to one change: the negative cross-
level interaction effect between extremism and consensualism turned significant. 
After excluding Australia (2004) and Iceland from protesting, our findings turned out 
to be fully robust. 
The exclusion of outliers, then, evidently does not affect our main findings. How-
ever, the robustness tests indicate that especially the results obtained for compulsory 
voting might be sensitive for the exact group of countries considered.
hypothesis is falsified. If citizens are less likely to position themselves at the extremes of the scale, or 
at distance from the government in consensual regimes, hypothesis 3c, 3d and 3e might still hold, 
although it would not be reflected in the models. Additional tests showed, however, that there is 
no significant relationship between consensualism and left-right position, extremism or ideological 
distance.
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5.7. summAry And discussion
This chapter started out with the idea that citizens’ ideological positions might be 
important determinants of political involvement. We found that a citizen’s ideology 
is indeed an important determinant of his or her political participation. First, left-
wing citizens are more likely to contact officials, campaign, persuade others, cooper-
ate or protest than right-wing citizens. Yet, they are less likely to cast a ballot. Second, 
ideological extremists (i.e., citizens who position themselves near the extremes of the 
left-right scale) are more likely to be involved in any of these six modes of political 
participation than ideological moderates. Third, citizens who perceive themselves to 
be ideologically distant from the government in power, are more likely to engage in 
any mode of political participation. Anderson et al. (2005) already found attitudinal 
evidence for this claim, this chapter brought behavioral evidence to the table.
Contrary to the democratic demand of equal participation (Lijphart 1997) these 
findings imply that political participation across ideological groups is not equal. 
Leftwing citizens are more likely to participate than rightwing citizens, and extremists 
more than moderates. Their voice is likely to be heard more strongly and more often 
than that of right-wing and moderate citizens by policy makers, which in turn might 
result in biased policy output. However, this structural overrepresentation can be 
counteracted. Citizens who perceive a large ideological distance towards the govern-
ment in office are more likely to engage in political participation, irrespective of their 
own ideological position.
Next, we found that context matters for political participation. Obviously, 
countries with compulsory voting have higher turnout rates than countries without 
(Lijphart 1997, 1998). However, although compulsory voting forces citizens to cast 
a ballot, it does not generate more involved citizens and even dampens cooperation 
between citizens. Compulsory voting is merely a solution to low voter turnout, not 
to a more fundamental problem of low participatory involvement (cf. Engelen 2007). 
Surprisingly, compulsory voting enlarges the inequality in turnout between ideologi-
cal extremists and ideological moderates. This goes directly against the findings from 
other studies (Hooghe and Pellerioux 1998; De Winter 1998).14 However, our robust-
ness analyses showed that the effect of compulsory voting in our models is rather 
susceptible to outliers. This is mainly due to the low number of countries with some 
form of compulsory voting in our data set. 
In line with Lijphart (1999) and the resource theory, we expected consensualism 
to have a positive impact on the level of political participation. However, this was not 
the case. Rather, we found significant, negative effects of consensualism on contact-
14  In comparison to these studies, we perform a more crucial test. The Belgian study compared the 
actual (self-reported) turnout to a hypothetical turnout (i.e., whether respondents would have voted if it 
was not compulsory), whereas we compare the actual self-reported turnout cross-nationally. A limitation 
of this study, in turn, is that is does not analyze how compulsory voting might affect turnout inequality 
for secondary (local, regional or European) elections.
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ing, campaigning and persuading and no significant effects on voting, cooperating 
and protesting. This goes straight against Lijphart’s claim that consensual democra-
cies have higher levels of electoral participation. Apparently, because there is less at 
stake, citizens are less likely to get involved, even though they have more options do 
get their voice heard. This supports the general incentives perspective.
Moreover, our findings also cast severe doubt on Lijphart’s suggestion that con-
sensual systems have a more equal dispersion of political powers across their citizens. 
We found that the associations between our three measures of ideology (left-right 
position, extremism and perceived distance) with the six modes of political participa-
tion vary over countries. Although the degree of participatory inequality between 
ideological groups differs across countries, participatory inequality is not significantly 
lower in consensual systems.
The findings of this chapter force us to reconsider Lijphart’s conclusions that 
consensual democracies are ‘more egalitarian and truly representative of citizen’s 
wishes’ (Policzer 2000:838). Lijphart based this claim on cross-national comparisons 
of income inequality and literacy rates: low income inequality and high literacy rates 
would imply a more equal distribution of political resources, and consequently of po-
litical power and representation. However, modern-day, liberal democracies focus on 
the representation of policy preferences and ideology, rather than unequal distribu-
tions of socio-economic resources. Differences in the level of political participation 
are most problematic when they arise across ideological groups. And with regards to 
these ideological groups, we conclude that consensual systems do not reduce partici-
patory inequality. 
In short, with regards to citizens’ participation in politics consensualism is out-
performed by majoritarianism. In majoritarian systems political participation is more 
wide-spread, but not less equal across the crucial factor of ideological preferences.
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6.1. introduction1
Ever since the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville (2000 [1835–1840]), social scien-
tists and political ideologists have presented participation in voluntary associations 
as an ‘all-purposive elixir for the ills of society’ (Uslaner and Dekker 2001). Recent 
decades saw renewed scholarly attention to the neo-Tocquevillian perspective, 
according to which voluntary associations act as ‘schools of democracy’ (cf. Toc-
queville 2000 [1835–1840]; Morales and Geurts 2007). Supposedly, participation 
in voluntary associations leads to a ‘social spiral’ (Lichterman 2005): through 
(joint) activities in voluntary associations citizens obtain civic skills that are neces-
sary for political participation, and build a broader and more varied social net-
work. Moreover, civic participation makes people pro-social, trusting, and politi-
cally interested (Halpern 2005). In the end, participants in voluntary associations 
are more likely to be politically active, as they have obtained the skills, the network 
and the mindset to be so. This positive, causal relationship between civic and 
political participation through socialization is the core of the ‘neo-Tocquevillian’ 
theory. Positive, small-scale experiences in associations enable people to socialize 
into larger political involvement. 
The neo-Tocquevillian theory has come to dominate scientific thought on the 
relationships between civic and political participation to such an extent, that it 
has become rather dogmatic. Over the years, neo-Tocquevillians have laid down a 
set of interlocking claims on the social spiral thesis. Yet, the empirical foundation 
of the neo-Tocquevillian theory has not kept abreast with the extensive theoreti-
cal claims (Ayala 2000). Empirical support is mostly found in macro correlations, 
where ‘elaborate lists of civic activities and social practices are thrown together in a 
single amorphous grouping, which illuminates little about [social capital] and does 
even less to demonstrate how these activities and practices matter for the health of 
political democracy’ (Boggs 2001). Moreover, empirical evidence on the validity of 
more specific claims is scarce and ambiguous. Several empirical analyses shed doubt 
on the validity of the neo-Tocquevillian theory, contesting the socialization effect in 
favor of a selection effect (Armingeon 2007). According to the latter, citizens join 
voluntary associations and engage in political activities at the same time, although 
1  A different version of this chapter has been published as Van der Meer, T.W.G. and Van Ingen, E. 
(2009). ‘Schools of democracy? Disentangling the relationship between civic participation and political 
action in 17 European countries’. European Journal of Political Research 48: 281–308. Previous 
drafts of this chapter have been presented as T. van der Meer  and E. van Ingen (2007) Schools of 
democracy? Disentangling the relationship between civic participation and political action in 17 
European countries. Paper presented at the panel ‘Issues of involvement: negativity and trust’, 4th ecpr 
Conference, Pisa (September 8, 2007); T. van der Meer and E. van Ingen (2006) A stepping stone to 
political participation: explaining the social spiral from civic to political participation. Paper presented 
at the cinefogo Conference Plovdiv (December 15, 2006); T. van der Meer and E. van Ingen (2006) A 
stepping stone to political participation: explaining the social spiral from civic to political participation. 
Paper presented at the ecpr Graduate Conference 2006, essex (September 7–9, 2006).
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there would not be a causal relation between the two. Indeed, it is ‘self-evident that 
not everyone will have the same inclination to join voluntary associations’ (Hooghe 
2003), and similarly that not everyone will have the same inclination to participate 
politically. Underlying individual resources (like time, money or skills) or personal-
ity traits (pro-sociality, outgoingness or assertiveness) could stimulate citizens to 
undertake both civic and political activities. Consequently, civic participants are 
more likely to participate politically, and vice versa, even though no direct (causal) 
relation exists.
Throughout this chapter, we strictly aim to test the (neo-Tocquevillian) social-
ization thesis to test whether its strict causal claims hold empirically. We raise the 
question to what extent the neo-Tocquevillian theory holds empirically. To advance 
the debate, we need a more thorough empirical examination, thereby filling the gap 
between theoretical claims and their empirical foundation. We dissect the neo-Toc-
quevillian literature and derive five empirical claims from it:
1. There is a strong, positive relationship between civic and political participation. 
2. The strength of this relationship differs according to the type of voluntary association:
  leisure organizations are more important than interest and activist organizations. 
3. The relationship is universal for all (Western) democratic societies. 
4. The strength of this relationship differs according to the extent of involvement. 
5. The relationship is explained by a socialization mechanism, that is, associational 
 involvement increases civic skills and civic-mindedness, which in turn stimulate 
 political participation.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we present an overview of previ-
ous research on neo-Tocquevillian theory. Second, we derive five empirical claims, 
making the theory more ‘testable’. Third, we test these claims on a detailed cross-
sectional dataset, which provides us with more nuanced insights in the nature of 
the relationship between civic and political participation. With respect to the core 
aims of this dissertation, this chapters focus (i.e., on the dominant neo-Tocquevillian 
theory on the most intensively theorized relationship between two forms of participa-
tion, namely civic and political) paves the way for the next, in which the relationships 
between all three modes (civic, political, and social) can be analyzed simultaneously 
and on more equal footing. Moreover, after dealing with the unidirectional causal 
claim (from civic to political participation) that is inherent to the neo-Tocquevillian 
theory, the next chapter will analyze the reciprocal relationships between social, civic, 
and political participation.
In the next section we will formulate the neo-Tocquevillian theory in general 
terms. Then, we will elaborate on the five neo-Tocquevillian claims in the subsequent 
sections, both theoretically and empirically.
6. schools of democrAcy?
157
6.2. the neo-tocquevilliAn theory
The idea of a positive relationship between civic and political participation is both 
attractive and old. A properly functioning democracy needs competent and involved 
citizens. Both qualities are supposedly encouraged by associational experiences in 
small scale environments, such as clubs and voluntary organizations. If the link 
between civic and political engagement worked, it would be an easy road to more 
political involvement and more vibrant democracies. Voluntary associations would 
be a stepping stone to political participation.
The idea that voluntary associations stimulate their members’ political participa-
tion is the common denominator of the studies we will henceforth label as the neo-
Tocquevillian theory. Evidently, this literature is far less homogeneous and far more 
elaborate than the basic idea suggests. The following paragraphs will do more justice 
to this diversity. However, the essence of the theory, named after its first propagist, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, is the ‘schools of democracy’ idea. Studying the 19th century 
American democracy, De Tocqueville concluded that voluntary associations kept the 
excesses of individualism at bay: 
Sentiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human spirit is developed 
only by the reciprocal action of  men upon one another. I have shown that this action is almost 
nonexistent in a democratic country. It is therefore necessary to create it artificially there. And this 
is what associations alone can do. 
      Tocqueville 2000 [1835–1840], p. 491
A neo-Tocquevillian line of reasoning was firmly established when Almond and Ver-
ba comparatively studied the importance of the ‘civic community’ as a determinant 
of political attitudes and behavior. Attention to voluntary associations was renewed 
after publications by Putnam (1993; 2000), who claimed that voluntary associations 
are crucial in the functioning of participatory democracies. 
Voluntary associations, in the neo-Tocquevillian line of reasoning, are small scale 
learning environments (Van Deth 1997), in which people gain experience in dealing 
with dissimilar others and in contributing to a common good. When people associ-
ate with others, they learn to cooperate, discuss, organize and trust. In civic associa-
tions members obtain the abilities (civic skills) and the urge (civic-mindedness) they 
need in order to participate in politics (Lichterman 2005). Civic participation would 
be most beneficial when involvement is active, when participants have face-to-face 
contact, and the organizations are horizontally structured (cf. Selle and Stromsnes 
2001). 
Although this argument has been found in political science for a long time, it 
is not obvious that it is valid. There are encouraging (e.g. McFarland and Thomas 
2006), discouraging (Van Deth 2000), and mixed findings (e.g. Sobieraj and White 
2004) on the extent to which civic participation stimulates political participation. 
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Some studies even conclude that voluntary association participation sometimes 
encourages turning away from politics (Eliasoph 1998; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 
2005). Moreover, there may be negative outcomes to involvement in certain types of 
associations, notably isolationist and hate groups, the so-called ‘dark side of social 
capital’ (Portes 1998). On the whole, voluntary associations seem unable to meet 
theoretical expectations empirically (Dekker 2004). 
In sum, what is needed is a clear specification of hypotheses from the theoretical, 
neo-Tocquevillian work, and thorough empirical tests to see whether these ideas are 
valid. Below we present both. Lack of sufficiently detailed measures is probably the 
main reason why such a dissection has not yet been done. However, recently, new 
datasets have been released that make such an investigation of the schools of democ-
racy thesis possible.
6.3. dAtA And meAsurement
As the stepping stone thesis is at its core an individual level explanation (that is, the 
mechanism takes place between citizens), we opt to use survey data to test it. The 
theoretical claims put a high demand on the quality of our dataset, which is met by 
the first wave of the European Social Survey (ess), collected in 2002 and 2003. The 
ess presents high quality data: it has a mean response rate of over 70 per cent and the 
data collection has been tight and uniform, based on strict procedures of sampling, 
questioning and coding. 
Our dataset includes 17 countries: 13 Western European countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, West-Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden), and four former communist countries 
(East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia). Luxembourg is left out of the analysis, 
as the country is an outlier on several of the independent variables (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Furthermore, due to measurement issues, we had to exclude Finland, Israel 
and Italy (see Chapter 3). Our dataset contains a total of 28,439 respondents aged 
18 years and older. To a large extent these seventeen societies are similar on general 
cultural and political characteristics, as they are all European liberal democracies and 
predominantly Christian. 
An important caveat of this chapter is our inability to draw conclusions on the 
causal direction between civic and political participation. Neo-Tocquevillian theory 
puts forward a clear sequence: civic participation causes political participation. 
However, as we lack longitudinal, comparative panel data, we can at best test this 
claim indirectly, that is, by combining cross-sectional data with theoretical reasoning. 
When we speak in causal terms about our findings, this is – strictly speaking – only 
in statistical terms: we consistently introduce measures of civic participation as deter-
minants of political participation in our hierarchical regression models.
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Dependent variables: Political participation
Political participation is defined as ‘legal activities by private citizens that are more 
or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or 
the actions they take’ (Verba et al. 1978). The distinction between conventional and 
unconventional political participation is ‘one of the most common classifications of 
political participation’ (Sabucedo and Arce 1991). Conventional political participa-
tion aims to influence the political process in a system of representation through the 
electoral process (Verba and Nie 1972). Unconventional political participation aims 
to influence the political process from the outside, for instance by holding a demon-
stration or boycotting products.
Conventional political participation includes four activities: contacting a politi-
cian; working for a political party; wearing a campaign badge or sticker; and donating 
money to a political organization. Unconventional political participation contains: 
lawful demonstration, product boycott, signing a petition, buying products for politi-
cal reasons, and illegal protests. Both measures of political participation are dichoto-
mized into doing at least one activity or not. 2
Individual level determinant: Civic participation
The ess dataset addresses twelve types of voluntary associations (ranging from sports 
clubs to environmental organizations) and four modes of involvement (membership, 
active participation, volunteering and donation of money). To cope with this over-
load of information, data reduction is needed. We distinguish three types of associa-
tions based on their primary purpose: leisure organizations, interest organizations, 
and activist organizations (see Chapter 3).3 Leisure organizations consist of sports, 
cultural and social associations. Interest organizations consist of trade unions, profes-
2  For reasons of conceptual clarity, we leave out some forms of political participation. Discussing 
politics with peers is both a measure of political interest and a measure of political participation. To 
keep the boundaries of these concepts clear empirically, we leave them out of the analysis.
We also do not include voting turnout. The neo-Tocquevillian literature focuses strongly on political 
activities that need a pro-social attitude, social and political skills. Voting, however, is a more ritualistic 
activity, needing little political skills. Moreover, it is strongly affected by the voting and party systems, 
which we are not able to pay proper attention to within the confines of this dissertation. We leave it to a 
future study to investigate the association between civic participation and voting.
3  From the twelve types of voluntary associations we leave out political parties and religious/church 
organizations. We leave out participation in political parties as it overlaps with both civic and political 
participation. 
Participation in religious and church organisations is left out for several reasons. First, ‘church 
membership [...] may be somewhat less ‘voluntary’ than other types of association involvement’ (Curtis 
et al. 1992). Second, the exact meaning of religious and church organizations is unclear: do they only 
encompass church related groups like Christian youth organizations, or also church membership in 
general? Third, related to the previous comments, there is a country specific bias in the registration 
of church members (Van Oorschot et al. 2006), as some countries have a tradition of registration of 
citizens as church members. 
We exclude church and religious organizations from our analysis to do right to the neo-Tocquevillian 
argument. However, this does not mean that they cannot function as schools of democracy. 
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sional/business and consumer organizations. Finally, activist organizations consist of 
environmental and humanitarian/peace organizations. For each type of organization 
we construct four dichotomized variables (cf. Curtis et al. 1992; Ruiter and De Graaf 
2006). We examine whether each respondent (i) was a member of, (ii) participated 
actively in, (iii) volunteered for, and (iv) donated money to at least one such volun-
tary association. Based on these variables, we construct metric scales of civic partici-
pation (one for each type of association). Mokken scale analysis showed that the four 
modes of civic participation are hierarchically related. As the scalability coefficient H 
is 0.58 for leisure organizations, 0.60 for interest organizations, and 0.40 for activist 
organizations, all three scales can be classified as strong. However, the scales do not 
hold up in Italy, Israel and Finland, where – likely due to measurement errors – only 
a fraction of the respondents report more than one mode of participation per type of 
association (see Chapter 3). We therefore left these countries out of the analysis. 
The resulting scales of civic participation (separately for leisure, interest and activ-
ist organizations) range from 0 to 4. The score of 0 represents no civic participation; 
the score of 4 represents the most intense form of civic participation.
Individual level control variables
Bivariate analyses of the neo-Tocquevillian theory run the risk of erroneous conclu-
sions. A bivariate association between civic and political participation might be 
explained by selection effects: people with socio-economic resources or pro-social 
dispositions might be civic participants and politically active at the same time, 
without a direct relation between the two forms of involvement. To take such effects 
into account, we control the association between civic and political participation for 
background characteristics: gender; education; income; income source; age (as a non-
linear effect – see Putnam 2000); length of residence in a community; urbanization 
of residence; marital status; household size; denomination; church attendance; and 
citizenship. Measures of pro-social dispositions are scarce, unfortunately, although 
the indicators of civic-mindedness (see below) cover one aspect of this disposition. 
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out selection effects due to a lack of avail-
able measures of a pro-social disposition in our data set. 
Intermediate factors
Finally, the ess dataset includes proxy-measures of civic skills and civic-mindedness 
that, according to the fifth claim, we expect to intermediate the association between 
civic and political participation. First we distinguish measures of political inter-
est. One is self-reported political interest. The second is the use of media: the time 
people spend watching television (to measure disinterest in politics), and watching 
the news more specific (to measure interest in politics). Next, we distinguish two 
measures of trust: trust in other people and trust in the national parliament. Third, 
political efficacy – the idea that the respondent is able to affect the political process – 
is measured in two aspects: with regard to knowledge (whether one thinks politics is 
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too complicated to understand) and with regard to skills (whether one could take an 
active role in a political group). Finally, political cynicism is measured as agreement 
with the idea that politicians do not care for the voice of the respondent.
Analyses
The respondents in our dataset are nested in different countries. We therefore 
employ hierarchical analysis (Snijders and Bosker 1999) using the ml-win 2.0 package 
(Goldstein 1995) for all subsequent models. As the dependent variables (conven-
tional and unconventional political participation) are dichotomous, we use hierarchi-
cal logistic regression (PQL, 2nd Order, no extra-binominal variance assumed). We 
specify models (simultaneously at the individual and contextual level) that estimate 
the odds of participating politically. Positive values indicate a higher chance of being 
conventionally or unconventionally politically active, negative values a lower chance. 
Respondents with one or more missing values on any of the variables were left out of 
the analyses; all models are based on the same set of respondents.
6.4. the bAse clAim
Our first claim is the most basic claim in neo-Tocquevillian theory and reads:
H1.  There is a strong, positive relationship between civic and political participation.
Almond and Verba (1963) were the first to posit this claim in a systematic, empirical 
fashion. Based on data from five countries, they concluded that, in general, members 
in voluntary associations are different from non-members in the sense that they (i) 
feel more confident of their ability to influence the government; (ii) are more active 
in politics; (iii) are more ‘open’ in their political opinions; and (iv) are more com-
mitted to democratic values. Several scholars have worked in this tradition, finding 
positive associations (Verba et al. 1995), and the idea has come to a point where it 
is almost axiomatic. Nevertheless, we will (re-)test this claim, if only to use it as a 
reference for the subsequent (more specific) analyses. As the mechanisms described 
in neo-Tocquevillian theory are inherently individual, they should be analyzed at that 
level. This avoids the risk of ecological fallacy. 
Table 6.1 shows that the association between civic and political participation still 
holds in the modern day European countries that are represented in our dataset. 
Even when we control for background characteristics, there are strong, positive ef-
fects of civic participation. In other words, the base claim of the stepping stone thesis 
is supported by our findings. Table 6.1 also shows that the positive effect of civic 
participation is stronger on conventional than on unconventional political participa-
tion, although the difference between the two effects is small. 
With regard to our control factors, we find that education, income and citizen-
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ship all contribute to both modes of political participation. Religion has mixed ef-
fects: Catholics are less likely to participate politically on both dimensions, whereas 
Protestants are less likely to be involved in conventional political participation and 
more likely to be involved in unconventional political participation (compared to 
non-religious). Church attendance functions as a counterweight to these negative 
effects on conventional political participation. Effects of gender, urbanization and 
length of residence support our theoretical distinction between conventional and un-
conventional political participation. Men and people from rural areas are more likely 
to be involved in conventional political participation. However, women, citizens 
living in urbanized communities, and citizens who lived for a relative short time span 
in their communities, are more likely to participate unconventionally. In subsequent 
models we control for these determinants, but to save space, we do not present them 
in the tables.
Table 6.1. Civic and political participation 
Conventional 
political participation
Nonconventional 
political participation
Individual level determinants
Participation in voluntary associations 0.38 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.18 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03)
Age 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Age-squared (effect *100) -0.02 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01)
Income 0.02 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
Education 0.19 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
Length of residence 0.01 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01)
Household Size 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Urbanization -0.03 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01)
Source of income (salary/profit)
∙ pensioned -0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.05)
∙ unemployed 0.23 (0.12) 0.15 (0.11)
∙ other social benefits 0.45 (0.09) -0.09 (0.09)
∙ other income 0.39 (0.13) 0.26 (0.13)
Marital status (mar)
∙ separated -0.05 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12)
∙ divorced 0.10 (0.07) 0.11 (0.06)
∙ widowed -0.03 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07)
∙ unmarried -0.03 (0.05) 0.16 (0.05)
Children at home -0.05 (0.05) -0.02 (0.04)
Citizen of country of residence 0.22 (0.11) 0.43 (0.10)
Attendance of religious services 0.04 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.11 (0.05) -0.15 (0.05)
∙ Protestant -0.07 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05)
∙ Orthodox -0.26 (0.19) -0.39 (0.18)
∙ Other -0.18 (0.10) 0.04 (0.09)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
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6.5. the second clAim: type of AssociAtion mAtters
In recent years, several authors have examined how effects of civic participation dif-
fer between the types of associations in which people participate (Stolle and Hooghe 
2005). ‘Advocates of social capital and civil society acknowledged that not all associa-
tions might be equally well equipped to function as ‘schools of democracy’ and as 
an aid to social and political problems’ (Roßteutscher and Van Deth 2002). There 
are two lines of reasoning that justify the expectation of differences in effect sizes 
between types of associations. 
Theoretically, leisure associations serve as the most important stepping stone to-
wards political participation in the neo-Tocquevillian argument. Putnam (2000) em-
phasizes the role of associations like bird watcher clubs, choirs and bowling leagues, 
as they are heterogeneous (Coffé and Geys 2007b) and built around horizontal face 
to face relations (Glover and Hemingway 2005). Heterogeneous associations stimu-
late public discourse and deliberation (Gutmann 1998). Experiences in groups with 
demographic differences allow the leap of faith from in-group to generalized trust 
(Stolle 1998). As heterogeneous associations are better representatives of society as a 
whole than homogeneous association, positive experiences in these contexts serve as 
better preparations for society at large. A second argument is the horizontal structure 
leisure organizations often have. An internal organizational democracy is tradition-
ally seen as a requirement for learning about cooperation and proliferation of civic 
virtues (Putnam 1993; Selle and Stromsnes 2001), as a horizontal structure offers 
opportunities for the majority of the members to become engaged. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between leisure associations and politics 
is ambiguous. In Norway, for example, Seippel (2006) found that participation in 
sports clubs can increase levels of trust and political commitment. However, other 
types of associations performed better, as did multiple memberships. Similarly, other 
authors claimed a positive democratic role of community gardening (Shinew et al. 
2004; Glover et al. 2005), singing (Jeannotte 2003), and social gatherings in bars and 
coffeehouses (Oldenburg 1989). On the other hand, Armingeon (2007) finds that 
members of non-political organizations like ‘bird watchers and members of soccer 
clubs [are] hardly more prone to participate politically than [...] citizens without any 
active associational involvement’. Erickson and Nosanchuk (1990) conclude that 
‘intense involvement in a very apolitical organization is at best irrelevant to political 
participation and may even divert people from political activity’. 
The alternative line of reasoning focuses on the goal of the organizations and 
comes to different expectations. Some organizations have an inherently politicized 
dimension (Donovan et al. 2004), most notably interest organizations such as labor 
unions, and activist organizations such as environmental groups. Citizens join an 
interest organizations to defend the direct interests of their specific group, and join 
an activist group to defend a broader societal cause not directly beneficial to its own 
constituents (Newton 1999). In both cases, a group of people has a desire that will be 
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hard to meet without exerting influence on politics and government. In these orga-
nizations, citizens come into contact with political processes, and with a network of 
people who have the skills and the mindset to participate politically. Consequently, 
members of interest and activist organizations are more likely to obtain civic-minded-
ness, political interest and familiarity with political procedures. Leisure organizations, 
on the other hand, do not have goals that are related to political processes (with the 
exception of an incidental call for a permit). Since involvement in cultural associa-
tions and sports clubs mainly serves entertainment purposes, one would expect 
smaller effects on political participation.
Therefore, we come to two hypotheses (H2a and H2b) against we formulate an 
alternative hypothesis (H2c):
H2a. The effect of civic participation on political participation is positive for all types of 
 voluntary association. 
H2b. The effect of civic participation on political participation is stronger for leisure 
 organizations than for interest and activist organizations. 
H2c. The effect of civic participation on political participation is stronger for interest and 
 activist organizations than for leisure organizations. 
To test these hypotheses, we simultaneously inserted three measures of civic partici-
pation in Table 6.2: participation in leisure, interest and activist organizations. 
The first thing to note from Table 6.2 is that involvement in any of the three types of 
voluntary associations has a positive impact on the chance to participate politically. 
Taking participatory overlap into account, the effects remain positive for all types of 
voluntary associations. In other words, participation in each type of association con-
tributes to political participation. Contrary to Bowler et al. (2003) we do find that 
leisure associations have a positive impact on both modes of political participation. 
This supports hypothesis H2a.
Second, as expected, the effects are not equally strong. Participation in activ-
Table 6.2. Civic and political participation, by type of organization a
Conventional 
political participation
Nonconventional 
political  participation
Individual level determinants
Participation in leisure organizations 0.18 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01)
Participation in interest organizations 0.29 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02)
Participation in activist organizations 0.37 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Gender, Age, Age squared, Income, Education, Length 
of residence, Household size, Urbanization of the community, Income source, 
Marital status, Having children, Citizenship, Church attendance, Denomination (not 
displayed).
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ist organizations is more strongly related to political participation than the others. 
Although we repeat again that we cannot make causal inferences, the high correla-
tions of participation in activist organizations support the politicization argument 
rather than the neo-Tocquevillian claim. The leisure organizations (encompassing the 
bowling clubs, the bird watchers, the Elks, the choirs and the reading groups) that 
are emphasized by Putnam are least strongly related to political participation. These 
findings are in line with a similar analysis by Van Deth (2006), who focuses on the 
impact of civic participation in twelve types of voluntary associations on political 
engagement (interest and saliency). 
In short, our analysis gives uniform support for hypothesis H2c and none for 
H2b. We find the smallest impact from involvement in leisure organizations, and the 
strongest impact from involvement in activist organizations. Interest organizations 
fall somewhat in the middle.
Third, we can look into the differences across types of associations in more detail, 
by comparing the impact of each type of organization across modes of political par-
ticipation. The impact of participation in interest organizations is significantly stron-
ger on conventional than on unconventional political participation. Participation in 
activist organizations, on the other hand, is more strongly related to unconventional 
than to conventional political participation. Finally, for participation in leisure orga-
nizations there is no significant difference in the size of the effects.
6.6. the third clAim: cross-nAtionAl vAriAnce
Although the neo-Tocquevillian theory finds its theoretical and empirical roots in 
American political science, the socialization mechanism is regarded as a universal 
characteristic of stable democracies (Howard and Leah 2008). Nevertheless, a uni-
versal, positive association between civic and political participation is not evident at 
all (Armony 2004). The social spiral may depend on the institutional environment. 
The literature offers different theories. One claims that the social spiral may not 
function in countries that have, or recently had, a repressive regime. In authoritarian 
or totalitarian regimes the state controls the public sphere, and citizens take refuge 
in small, private networks (Howard 2003a). In such a regime, associations’ most 
important function is opposing the political system, rather than supporting it (Fung 
2003). Another theory focuses on the institutional relationship between state and 
civil society. When states actively seek cooperation with voluntary association in the 
policy process (that is, in pluralist and corporatist societies), members are more likely 
to contact officials, engage in politics, and have an entrance to political life (Bowler 
et al. 2003). Yet, when bureaucracies actively discourage voluntary associations to 
contribute to public affairs (that is, in statist societies), the social spiral is expected to 
be far weaker or even absent.
Therefore, we test whether hypothesis H1 holds in all of the 17 European coun-
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tries that are in our dataset. Until now, we acknowledged that the respondents in our 
dataset are citizens who are nested in countries (and treated them as such in hierar-
chical analyses), but we have not yet allowed the associations to vary cross-nationally. 
Here we test the following hypotheses:
H3a.  The effect of civic participation on political participation is positive in all countries.
H3b.  The effect of civic participation on political participation is similar in all countries.
Table 6.3 displays the results of analyses on the country level variance (U) of the as-
sociation (B). In general, we find the association between civic and political participa-
tion to be positive for all distinctions.
Hypothesis H3a is supported: the association between civic and political participa-
tion is positive in all countries under study. However, this is not to say that the asso-
ciation is similar in all these countries. We hardly find any significant cross-national 
variance in the strength of the association between civic and political participation. 
Regarding unconventional political participation there is no significant variance in 
the effect slope for participation in any type of voluntary association. This supports 
hypothesis H3b. Regarding conventional political participation, however, there is 
some slope variance to be explained for participation in leisure and interest organiza-
tions, although these effects are rather small. Being strict, we should reject hypothesis 
H3b. Despite the large country differences in levels of civic and political participa-
tion (see Chapters 3 and 5), the strength of their correlation shows little variation. 
Apparently, at the individual level the two covary similarly in all countries. This does 
not imply, however, that the institutional and cultural environment does not mat-
ter. Yet, based on these results there are no a-priori reasons to assume that different 
mechanisms are at play.
Table 6.3. Cross-national differences in the relation between civic and political participationa
Conventional 
political participation
Nonconventional 
political  participation
Individual level determinants
Participation in leisure organizations 0.21 (0.03) 0.16 (0.02)
 (variance over countries) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Participation in interest organizations 0.31 (0.04) 0.21 (0.02)
 (variance over countries) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Participation in activist organizations 0.37 (0.03) 0.52 (0.04)
 (variance over countries) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Gender, Age, Age squared, Income, Education, Length 
of residence, Household size, Urbanization of the community, Income source, 
Marital status, Having children, Citizenship, Church attendance, Denomination (not 
displayed).
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6.7. the fourth clAim: extent of involvement
Several researchers have formulated more nuanced hypotheses on associational 
effects, paying attention to the mode of participation (Stolle and Rochon 1998; 
Anheier and Kendall 2002; Glanville 2004; Maloney et al. 2008; Howard and Leah 
2008). Higher levels of involvement come with more ‘exposure’ to and interactions 
with other members, and often more tasks to accomplish and a more important posi-
tion in the organization. The greater the involvement and cooperation, the greater 
the chances of positive effects arising (Rosenblum 1998). In our study, we would 
expect subsequent levels of civic participation to be related to increased political 
participation: the most intensive civic participants should be the most involved in 
political participation.
But are subsequent levels of civic participation also expected to contribute to 
political participation equally? Or are some levels of involvement or types of civic 
activities more important than others? Or, to rephrase these questions in technical 
terms: is the effect of civic participation linear? When it comes to the number of ac-
tions that can be deployed in voluntary associations, the existing literature offers no 
clear expectations. However, a lot of focus has been put on the unequal importance 
of certain types of civic activities.
In the neo-Tocquevillian line of reasoning some types of activities are more benefi-
cial than others. A distinction is made between passive involvement (for example, 
formal membership or donating money) and active participation (for example, 
partaking in activities or doing voluntary work). Being involved in voluntary work 
is most likely to be beneficial for political engagement. According to Wilson (2000), 
the difference between active and passive involvement coincides with producing 
versus consuming collective goods. Helping to produce some common good is the 
kind of experience researchers expect to have beneficial side effects, such as stimu-
lating democratic values and increasing political skills and interests. Erickson and 
Nosanchuk (1990) emphasize that volunteers – compared to ordinary members – are 
more involved in the administrative work of organizations. Volunteer work can in-
volve activities that are like politics on a small scale: organizing, meeting, discussing, 
planning, and contacting officials and administrators. Knoke (1990) concludes that 
participation in the internal politics of an organization is strongly related to being 
involved in external politics, although the relationship was stronger for ‘problem-
solving organizations’ than for ‘non problem-solving organizations’. 
Ordinary – passive – members do not have these experiences. Rather, most 
authors expect little impact from passive involvement (‘checkbook membership’), 
because the social spiral is supposed to be caused by socialization and network ef-
fects. These can only take place through face to face interaction (e.g. Putnam 2000; 
Skocpol 2003). Putnam (2000), for example, expects little ‘social capital effects’ from 
passive involvement, since checkbook membership does not bring people into con-
tact with other members. However, we must not completely rule out passive member-
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ship as a source of political engagement (Selle and Stromsnes 2001). There are some 
ways in which this could still have an encouraging effect. For example, members 
often receive newsletters that can trigger political interest, passive membership may 
evoke a certain commitment and identification with political causes, or fellow (pas-
sive) members may meet outside the organization and still have political discussions 
as a result of their membership (Wollebaek and Selle 2002). Nevertheless, these 
effects of passive membership should pale in comparison to the socialization effects 
of active involvement.
H4a.  The higher the level of civic participation, the higher the level of political participation.
H4b.  Passively involved citizens are as politically active as non-involved. 
H4c.  Compared to passive members, volunteers and active participants will show 
 disproportionately higher levels of political participation.
To test hypotheses H4a, H4b and H4c we dissected the civic participation scales that 
we used in Table 6.2 by showing the results for each category (0–4) on the scales sepa-
rately. This enables us to test hypothesis H4a. Hypothesis 4b and 4c can be tested 
by the same measures: as we noted above, the Mokken scales are constructed by the 
count procedure. The ‘easiest items’ for each of the three scales were measures of pas-
sive involvement: membership (for leisure and interest organizations) and donation 
(for activist organizations). We can compare whether this first step makes a difference 
at all, and whether the subsequent steps are more important determinants of politi-
cal participation. 4 
Figure 6.1 describes the differences between the five categories of each of the 
three scales, without controls for the background characteristics. On the horizontal 
axis the figure displays the average level of conventional political participation, on 
the vertical axis the average level of unconventional political participation. The three 
lines represent the three types of associations, the sequence of dots on each line 
represents the intensity of civic participation (0–4).
As Figure 6.1 clearly shows, all categories of civic participation are positively 
related to political participation. The average level of political participation rises with 
each subsequent category of civic participants. This gives credibility to hypothesis 
H4a. The most important difference in political participation is between those who 
are not involved in voluntary associations and those who are, regardless of the extent 
and the type of activities. The latter criteria play a role, but not as much as the differ-
ences between the civically involved and the civically non-involved. Especially when 
we look at unconventional political participation, it seems to be the first step that 
counts. 
The proof of the pudding is not in Figure 6.1, however, but in the multivariate
4  To test this even further, we ran different models, including a typology of activities in voluntary 
associations rather than the categorized scale used in Table 4. These additional tests confirm the results 
in Table 4. 
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analysis of Table 6.4. The findings of Table 6.4 strongly echo those from Figure 6.1. 
The effect of each category of civic participation on political participation (compared 
to the reference group of the non-involved) is significant and strongly positive. More-
over – with the exception of the first few steps in leisure associations – subsequent 
levels of civic participation are related to more political participation. This roughly 
supports hypothesis H4a, the claim that a higher degree of involvement in voluntary 
associations leads to a higher chance of participation politically.
However, the effect of degree of civic participation on political participation is 
not linear. In general, the step that increases the odds of political participation most, 
is the one from no involvement to doing one civic activity. In other words, the most 
important difference in terms of political participation is between those who are and 
those who are not involved in a voluntary association. This is most apparent for lei-
sure organizations, where in fact only two steps seem to matter: from no civic involve-
ment to some, and from three civic activities to four. For interest organizations, on 
the other hand, subsequent steps contribute to political participation more equally. 
The effect of civic participation on political participation is evidently non-linear. But 
what does this mean? If we go back to the general meaning of the civic participation 
scales, we recapitulate that for each of the three scales the easiest item (the first category 
on the scales) is a measure of passive involvement. For leisure and interest organizations 
category 1 generally represents ‘membership’, for activist organizations ‘donation of 
money’. And, surprisingly, we find that this measure of passive involvement is in fact 
the most important step stimulating political participation. As ‘doing anything at all’ 
generally means passive involvement (membership or donation of money), these are 
apparently relatively strong determinants of political participation. This completely op-
poses the neo-Tocquevillian claims that passive involvement is of little or no use, and 
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that active involvement and face-to-face contacts are necessary preconditions for the 
social spiral to set in. Therefore, hypothesis H4b is refuted. Reasoning from our theo-
retical perspective, this finding is surprising. However, a comparable result was found in 
other recent research, with regard to the generation of trust (Wollebaek and Selle 2007). 
Likewise, hypothesis H4c is refuted. Levels of political participation are higher 
amongst active participants. But contrary to our expectations, active participation is 
hardly the most important determinant. The main distinction in terms of political 
participation is between the non-involved and the involved, regardless whether the 
latter are passive or active.
6.8. the fifth clAim: civic-mindedness And civic skills As explAi-
ning mechAnisms
So far, we have tested several neo-Tocquevillian claims without explicitly dealing with 
their rationale – the expected underlying mechanisms. In this section we delve into 
the mechanisms that supposedly explain the relationship. Although the neo-Toc-
quevillian theory has been criticized for lack of focus on these mechanisms (Mondak 
and Mutz 1999; Stolle 2001), a process of socialization is claimed to account for the 
Table 6.4. Extent of involvement in voluntary associations and political participationa
Conventional 
political participation
Nonconventional 
political  participation
Individual level determinants
Participation in leisure organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.42 (0.04) 0.40 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.44 (0.05) 0.45 (0.05)
∙ 3 activities 0.48 (0.06) 0.42 (0.06)
∙ 4 activities 0.82 (0.07) 0.63 (0.07)
Participation in interest organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.34 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.57 (0.06) 0.42 (0.06)
∙ 3 activities 0.91 (0.09) 0.64 (0.10)
∙ 4 activities 1.09 (0.16) 0.71 (0.18)
Participation in activist organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.49 (0.04) 0.69 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.71 (0.06) 1.03 (0.07)
∙ 3 activities 1.13 (0.12) 1.24 (0.14)
∙ 4 activities 1.21 (0.15) 1.34 (0.17)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Gender, Age, Age squared, Income, Education, Length 
of residence, Household size, Urbanization of the community, Income source, 
Marital status, Having children, Citizenship, Church attendance, Denomination (not 
displayed).
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relationship between civic and political participation. In this reasoning, voluntary 
associations are schools of democracy, because they provide their members with the 
competence (civic skills) and the mindset (civic-mindedness) to participate in the 
wider, political world (Ayala 2000). ‘De Tocqueville argued that secondary associa-
tions draw individuals out of their primary associations, educating them about their 
dependence upon others’ (Warren 2001). Similar ideas can be found in the work 
of Putnam (2000): ‘Internally, associations and less formal networks of civic engage-
ment instill in their members habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well 
as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life.’ 
Civic-mindedness is the outcome of interactions with diverse others. One of the 
main concerns of voluntary associations is ‘cultivating the disposition to cooper-
ate’ (Rosenblum 1998). Getting to know people from different backgrounds, and 
bridging gaps in language and customs contribute to tolerances and appreciation of 
diversity. Civic participation thus ‘makes people care more, and think more, about 
the wider world’ (Eliasoph 1998). Furthermore, voluntary associations ‘contribute to 
the shaping of public discourse’, by creating collective values (Wuthnow 1991). The 
instilling of civic values needs not be purposive; it can also occur as a side-effect of 
participation. 
Like civic values, the creation of civic skills is related to being part of an organiza-
tion: members cooperate with others, speak up in meetings, perform tasks for the 
group and make arrangements with third-parties (Verba et al. 1995; Ayala 2000). 
People who are involved in organizations in this sense are likely to get into contact 
with administrators, officials, and politicians. They become exposed to political 
processes, policy making and the implementation of legislation, causing a strong link 
between involvement in the internal politics of an organization and involvement in 
external politics (Knoke 1990).
The mechanism of political socialization is the cornerstone of neo-Tocquevillian 
theory, which sets it apart from the rival selection explanation. If civic skills and 
civic-mindedness cannot explain the correlation between civic and political participa-
tion, the socialization thesis needs revision, possibly in favor of the selection mecha-
nism. The accompanying hypothesis we test is:
H5. The association between civic and political participation is explained by civic skills 
 and civic-mindedness.
In statistical terms, we expect a mediating effect of civic skills and civic-mindedness. 
We should see a decline in the effect of civic participation once civic skills and civic-
mindedness are taken into account. 
To test whether hypothesis H5 holds, we elaborate on our most sophisticated 
model – shown in Table 6.4 – by incorporating measures of civic skills and civic-
mindedness as determinants of conventional and unconventional political participa-
tion. If the causal chain indeed goes from civic participation through civic skills and 
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civic-mindedness to political participation, the direct effects of civic participation 
should be strongly reduced by the incorporation of these intermediary variables. This 
should become apparent by comparison of the effect sizes in Table 6.4 and Table 
6.5.5
Table 6.5 shows that most of the direct effects of the intermediary variables are 
5  In our cross-sectional (i.e., non-panel) analysis we cannot verify the fifth claim. Even if we do find that 
the effect of civic participation is strongly reduced by incorporating civic skills and civic-mindedness, 
this does not necessarily mean that the neo-Tocquevillian line of reasoning is right. It could signal an 
intermediary effect (which is the claim we test), but couldc also signal a spurious relationship (civic 
participation and political participation are not directly related, but both caused by civic skills and civic-
mindedness). This selection effect is plausible as well: people who have more social and civic resources, 
and who are more confident may be more inclined to participate civically and politically.
Table 6.5. Civic skills and civic-mindedness as explaining mechanismsa
Conventional 
political participation
Nonconventional 
political  participation
Individual level determinants
Participation in leisure organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.36 (0.04) 0.34 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.37 (0.05) 0.38 (0.05)
∙ 3 activities 0.40 (0.06) 0.34 (0.06)
∙ 4 activities 0.70 (0.08) 0.50 (0.07)
Participation in interest organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.29 (0.04) 0.24 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.51 (0.07) 0.37 (0.06)
∙ 3 activities 0.74 (0.10) 0.51 (0.10)
∙ 4 activities 0.79 (0.17) 0.46 (0.18)
Participation in activist organizations 
∙ no activities (ref)
∙ 1 activity 0.40 (0.04) 0.62 (0.04)
∙ 2 activities 0.60 (0.07) 0.95 (0.07)
∙ 3 activities 0.93 (0.12) 1.11 (0.15)
∙ 4 activities 1.00 (0.15) 1.16 (0.18)
Political interest 0.40 (0.02) 0.37 (0.02)
Political efficacy 0.29 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01)
Political understanding 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Political cynicism -0.04 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Political trust -0.02 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01)
Time spent watching tv -0.05 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01)
Time spent watching politics on tv 0.03 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01)
Social trust -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
a Models are controlled for: Gender, Age, Age squared, Income, Education, Length 
of residence, Household size, Urbanization of the community, Income source, 
Marital status, Having children, Citizenship, Church attendance, Denomination (not 
displayed).
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significant and in the expected direction. High levels of (self-reported) civic skills 
(political efficacy) and civic-mindedness (political interest, social trust, absence of po-
litical cynicism, watching politics on television) are related to a high level of political 
participation. The civic skill of political understanding is not significantly related to 
either mode of political participation. 
Remarkably, the effect of political trust is negative. Our findings suggest that 
people who are less trusting in politics, are somewhat more likely to participate politi-
cally. As the effect of political trust did not turn out negative in the bivariate associa-
tion, we considered the possibility that the negative effect in Table 6.5 might have 
been caused by multicollinearity. However, additional tests showed this was not the 
case. Note that low levels of political trust do not necessarily mean that citizens are 
cynical; they could also be skeptics: citizens who simply do not trust politicians on 
their blue eyes. They feel the need to participate politically, if only to keep the politi-
cians on their toes (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Conversely, previous research 
also found examples of citizens who are not actively involved, but who do show high 
levels of political trust and interest. Van Deth labeled them ‘political spectators’ (Van 
Deth 2000). 
The crucial question is, of course, whether the inclusion of the intermediary 
variables also reduces the direct effect of civic participation. The answer to this 
question is a clear no. Comparison of the effects in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 univocally 
refute hypothesis H5. Admittedly, the estimated effect sizes of civic participation are 
somewhat smaller in Table 6.5 than in Table 6.4 – the decrease ranging between 10 
and 20 percent, with a peak at 35%. But this reduction is not near the strong reduc-
tion expected from true intermediary effects. Moreover, in none of the cases is the 
decrease in effect size significant.6 
We should conclude that the socialization mechanism does not explain the strong 
correlations between civic and political participation we have found throughout this 
chapter. Another mechanism must account for the correlation. 
6.9. summAry And discussion 
In this chapter, we have attempted to disentangle the neo-Tocquevillian theory into 
five empirically testable claims. The quintessence of the paradigm is that participa-
tion in voluntary associations leads to political participation through a socialization 
mechanism. Voluntary associations form a friendly environment in which interac-
6  Admittedly, due to the splintered nature of our civic participation measures it might be hard for an 
effect size to decrease significantly. Therefore we also did separate analyses in which we included the 
intermediary variables in Table 6.1 and in Table 6.2. Although the decline of the effect size of civic 
participation reached significance in these cases, the reduction of the effect was limited to a meagre 12 
to 13 per cent. This still does not approach the strong reduction of the effect size needed to support 
Hypothesis 5.
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tions are converted into positive experiences. In these schools of democracy people 
learn the value of cooperating with others with different backgrounds. Moreover, 
they acquire skills in debating, negotiating, organizing events, and managing an 
organization. This adds up to an increased level of political participation among 
members; they have acquired both the skills and the urge to become involved. Theo-
retically, the idea is attractive. As active citizens are needed for a properly functioning 
democracy, why not get them involved through voluntary associations? Empirically, 
however, the evidence does not build a strong case. 
The first of five claims we advanced to test the empirical validity of the theory was 
‘There is a strong, positive relationship between civic and political participation’. The 
claim of universal validity was made explicit in our third claim, ‘The relationship 
is universal for all (Western) democratic societies’. Both claims were supported by 
our data, the relationship between civic and political participation was positive and 
significant in each country. These findings, however, are far from sufficient evidence 
for the neo-Tocquevillian theory. They only prove that there is a universal, strong 
and positive correlation between civic and political participation. Tests of the three 
remaining claims cast severe doubts on whether this correlation can be explained by 
a socialization mechanism. 
In our second claim we argued that – if socialization is the guiding mecha-
nism – we should see that: ‘The strength of this relationship differs according to 
the type of voluntary association: leisure organizations are more important than 
interest and activist organizations’. In line with the neo-Tocquevillian literature we 
expected the strongest effects to emerge among the associations with most social 
interaction, that is, leisure organizations. However, our findings indicate the op-
posite: leisure associations bring about the smallest effects. Rather, the correlations 
with political participation are strongest for involvement in interest organizations 
and activist organizations – organizations with goals that are related to politics, or 
that need political support to be attained. This implies that the goals of associa-
tions are more important than their structure. The selection mechanism offers a 
more plausible explanation: people who are more politically minded in the first 
place join associations more often and show higher levels of political participation. 
They join interest and/or activist – and not leisure – organizations for the same 
reasons why they become politically active, namely to reach specific political goals 
or get involved in political discourse. 
Our fourth claim stated that ‘The strength of this relationship differs according 
to the extent of involvement’. Our analysis revealed that the first step of involve-
ment in an organization is the most important; the biggest difference in political 
participation is between non-involvement and passive involvement. Although there 
is little socialization effect to be expected from a neo-Tocquevillian point of view, 
checkbook membership turns out to be the most important determinant of politi-
cal participation. This, too, points to selection rather than socialization effects: Pas-
sive members can hardly be socialized by the association, so we should look for the 
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reason why they are politically active in themselves rather than their association. A 
pre-existing pro-social disposition or specific interest might explain the ‘effect’ of 
passive membership.
A dynamic of selection and adaptation could account for these associational 
effects (Hooghe 2003; Stolle and Hooghe 2003). The core of this idea is that the 
socialization and self-selection mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but depend 
on each other. Socialization effects cannot emerge without preceding selection. Mem-
bers are confirmed and further stimulated in their initial values and behavior only 
when value congruence emerges. If people do not meet with similar others, there will 
be no socialization effect. Our findings imply that selection effects account for a large 
part of the correlation between civic and political participation: if not, we would not 
find such strong effects of passive involvement. However, additional effects of higher 
levels of involvement remain, and the question is: could this additional effect be 
explained as the outcome of a socialization process? 
There are some indications that the answer is ‘no’. This becomes clear when we 
look at our final claim: ‘The relationship is explained by a socialization mechanism, 
i.e., associational involvement increases levels of civic skills and civic-mindedness 
which in turn stimulates political participation’. If the increase in political participa-
tion among the most active civic participants is the result of socialization, civic skills 
and civic-mindedness should explain much of this correlation. Yet, our analyses told 
a different story. The socialization mechanism on which the neo-Tocquevillian theory 
is built faces serious lack of empirical support. Voluntary associations do not contrib-
ute to their members’ levels of political participation; instead, their members were 
already more likely to participate politically. Rather than schools of democracy this 
makes voluntary associations pools of democracy. 
Nevertheless, even if they are not socializing agencies, voluntary associations may 
still contribute to democratic societies in other ways. As pools of democracy, volun-
tary associations facilitate citizens with high levels of political action, although they 
do not generate them (Wollebaek and Selle 2007). By combining the pooled skills 
of their members, voluntary associations may balance (and even resist) governmental 
power, and represent the interests of their constituencies (Fung 2003). 
The assertion of associations as pools of democracy opens up a set of intrigu-
ing research questions. First, how does the process of selection and adaptation take 
place? Which crucial pro-social selection criteria are at play? These need not even 
be the same in different countries. Again, we point to the necessity of a broad and 
time-spanning panel study to shed light on the causality at play. Second, even if vol-
untary associations do not stimulate political participation among adults, might they 
nevertheless socialize the youth? More generally, we need a lifecycle perspective on 
the socialization effect: do early socialization effects hold over a lifetime, or do they 
need constant confirmation? And finally, if voluntary associations do not function 
as schools of democracy, what about other candidates such as the workplace, church, 
school, and the family? 
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In sum, the results of this chapter imply that there are no easy ways to generate 
politically engaged citizens. Voluntary associations do not make citizens politically ac-
tive, but bring politically active citizens together. Social scientists should not assume 
that there is a unidirectional socialization effect of associations on their members. 
The strict causal model finds little empirical support. Because there is no reason to 
assume a unidirectional causal relationship, we may focus on the reciprocal relation-
ships between social, civic, and political participation in the next chapter. 
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7.1. introduction
In previous chapters we focused on the role of state institutions – first as a determi-
nant of levels of social, civic, and political participation, and second as a determi-
nant of inequality in civic and political participation. In this chapter we investigate 
to what extent state institutions affect the associations between the three forms of 
participation.
Several studies have focused on more than one form of participation, like social 
and civic participation (cf. Pichler and Wallace 2007; Gesthuizen et al. 2008), or 
even social, civic, and political participation (Putnam 2000; Van Oorschot and 
Arts 2005). Apparently, these forms of participation were considered to have 
something in common. Yet, despite simultaneous attention, the three forms of 
participation have not truly been analyzed in symphony. Up to this point we fol-
lowed that tradition: the three forms of participation (i.e., social, civic, and politi-
cal) were analyzed in separate sections and effectively treated as independent from 
each other. 
Up to this point, we did not relate these three forms of participation to each 
other in order to assess the overall (direct and indirect) effects of state institutions on 
social, civic, and political participation. However, social, civic, and political participa-
tion are likely to be related to each other. These relationships may be positive, as well 
as negative or even absent. On the one hand, participation in one sphere provides 
citizens with social resources (social networks, social skills, social mindset) that facili-
tate participation in other spheres (Lichterman 2005). On the other hand, resources 
(time, money) spent in one sphere of participation cannot be spent in the other 
two. Moreover, too intensive participation in a family or a voluntary association may 
induce isolationism (Banfield 1958). We aim to establish the relationships between 
social, civic, and political participation simultaneously, and therefore formulate our 
first research question:
1.  To what extent are social, civic, and political participation related?
Secondly, the associations between social, civic, and political participation need not 
be the same in all countries. Recent studies showed that the strength of the relation-
ships between different forms of participation differs across countries (Bowler et al. 
2003; Chapter 6). Yet, these country level differences in association strength remain 
unexplained. The institutional setting may (very well) explain these differences. Spe-
cifically, two institutional explanations are proposed. First, the relationships between 
social, civic, and political participation may be stronger in longstanding democracies 
than in former authoritarian and especially former communist countries, where citi-
zens ‘compartmentalized’ their social lives (Völker and Flap 2001; Mars and Altman 
1992; Howard 2003a). Second, different types of state bureaucracies may differ-
ently affect the entrance of citizens from civil society to the political sphere and vice 
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versa (Jepperson 2000, 2002; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Our second 
research question therefore reads: 
2. To what extent does variation in state institutions condition the correlations between  
 social, civic, and political participation?
Finally, the relationships between the three forms of participation are likely to be 
spurious to some extent: selection effects might explain why citizens who are active in 
one sphere of society, are also active in another one, while no direct causal relation-
ship exists. Preceding chapters showed that individual level resources like income 
and education increase the likelihood of social, civic, and political participation. 
We expect that the associations between the three forms of participation are (at least 
partly) explained by these individual level resources. Country characteristics like eco-
nomic development or social security expenditure might similarly explain the three 
forms of participation. Therefore, our third research question is: 
3.  To what extent do individual and country level characteristics reduce the correlations 
 between social, civic, and political participation?
7.2. theory And hypotheses
Social, civic, and political participation might reinforce each other (Bowlby 1988; 
Lichterman 2005), be unrelated, or even have an adverse relation with each other 
(Banfield 1958; Eliasoph 1998; Völker and Flap 2001). Most of the literature argues 
that the three forms of participation are positively related, for which several mecha-
nisms have been proposed (Van Deth 1997).
Positive or negative relationship
The first rationale for a positive correlation was extensively dealt with in the previous 
chapter, namely the schools of democracy theory, that has been extensively studied 
for civic and political participation. Civic participation would lead to political partici-
pation through the acquisition of political skills and interest. This line of reasoning 
can be extended to the relationship between social and political participation: par-
ticipation in the informal sphere (i.e., within the family) creates skills and willingness 
to participate in the wider world (Bowlby 1988).1 The schools of democracy theory 
is grounded in a causal scheme, in which social and civic participation determine 
political participation (e.g. Putnam 1993). The previous chapter has shown that this 
strictly unidirectional causal scheme is unlikely. Moreover, theoretically, it is not plau-
1  See also Andeweg and Van den Berg 2003 who explain the overrepresentation of first-borns and 
singletons in politics by the sense of social obligation they develop in the relation with their parents.
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sible. The acquisition of social skills and pro-social attitudes takes place in (and con-
sequently might benefit from) all aspects of social life. Informal contact with family 
and friends provides citizens with social skills and values that benefit associational or 
political life. Vice versa, skills and norms learned through civic and political partici-
pation can be used to manage and maintain informal ties. The ‘dynamic of selection 
and socialization’ (Hooghe 2003) might drive all forms of citizen participation. First, 
there is a selection effect: citizens with a pro-social attitude are more likely to engage 
in social, civic, and/or political participation. These participants engage others with 
pro-social attitudes, which would in turn reinforce the pro-social norms of all partici-
pants. Such selection-and-socialization effects are highly likely to be reciprocal: they 
should be apparent in each form of participation, spilling over to all others.
A second rationale for positive relationships is that all forms of participation gener-
ate social networks. And through these social networks, citizens are asked to participate 
in social events. Social networks thus appear to be self-reinforcing. On the one hand, 
they are an invaluable prerequisite for social, civic, and political participation (Ruiter 
and De Graaf 2006): often, citizens need to be asked to do voluntary work or to 
become politically active. On the other hand, citizens obtain social networks through 
social, civic, and political participation (Halpern 2005). All in all, this may result in a 
virtuous circle in which new contacts from one form of participation spill over and al-
low entrance to another form of participation. Participation does not only function as 
a means to obtain new social ties, but may also reinforce pre-existing ties. Shared activi-
ties (for instance joining a sports club with a good friend; protesting with your siblings) 
function to affirm already established relations. Again, there is no a-priori reason to 
assume a unidirectional causal scheme from one form of participation to another.
Yet, these mechanisms overlook ‘complications of a more practical nature’ (Van 
Deth 1997): citizens suffer from a scarcity of resources, especially time. Social, civic, 
and political participation all consume resources like free time and money: time 
spent on one social activity cannot be spent on another. Consequently, the three 
forms of participation function as alternatives. Given the scarcity of time, social, 
civic, and political participation are in fact rather likely to be negatively related.2 
Hirschman (1979) extends this line of reasoning with his theory of shifting 
involvements. According to this theory, novice participants generally underestimate 
the time and effort they need to invest in their social activities, be it social, civic or 
political. The discrepancy between expectations and experiences leads to frustration 
among the participants and a re-evaluation of his or her activities. Increasingly frus-
trated, the participant will turn to another activity in which to engage. Due to these 
shifting involvements, social, civic, and political participation would be negatively 
related at each moment in time.
A second reason to expect a negative relationship is referenced as the ‘dark side 
of social capital’ (Fiorina 1999). According to that line of reasoning, participation in 
2  This would explain why at the macro-level, civic participation may be on the decline (Putnam 2000), 
while social participation is on the rise (Stolle and Hooghe 2003).
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specific groups (like sects or hate groups) breed anti-social norms, and limit the incli-
nation to participate in other spheres. More generally, intense participation in any 
type of environment may lead to such anti-social attitudes. In Southern Italy, close 
(bonding) family ties due to intensive social participation may induce isolationism of 
the family (Banfield 1958), which is negatively related to civic and political participa-
tion (Putnam 1993). Similarly, Eliasoph (1998) found that American citizens who 
did voluntary work (i.e., civic participation) reaffirmed their mutual distrust from 
politics, and refrained from political action.
Therefore, two opposite hypotheses are formulated on the relationships between 
social, civic, and political participation:
H1a. Social, civic, and political participation are positively related.
H1b. Social, civic, and political participation are negatively related.
Conditional relationship
Societies differ in the extent to which the three forms of participation are associated. 
Similar to Chapter 6 of this dissertation, Bowler et al. (2003) find small but signifi-
cant cross-national differences in the association between civic and political participa-
tion. We propose two explanations according to which the institutional environment 
conditions the relationship between social, civic, and political participation.
The first theory builds on the public sphere thesis from previous chapters (Mars 
and Altman 1992; Gibson 2003; Howard 2003b). It was argued that citizens in com-
munist and authoritarian states refrained from voluntary associations and political 
life, seeking ‘refuge, a shelter, from the meddling by the government and party into 
their private lives’ (Völker and Flap 2001). Broad, informal networks, voluntary as-
sociations and political communities were a liability, due to the high level of social 
distrust. As an overlap of several forms of participation would be dangerous, citizens 
‘compartmentalized their lives into small social networks made up of people whom 
they know well’ (Uslaner and Badescu 2003), while retreating from more public 
forms of participation. Voluntary associations play a different role in communist and 
authoritarian states. They were either colonized and controlled by the state apparatus 
or functioned as opposition rather than a gateway to political life (Fung 2003). In 
these politicized and distrusted states, social participation and participation in leisure 
organizations might be a retreat from a distrusted political life (cf. Eliasoph 1998). 
Consequently, social participation is less likely to breed civic or political partici-
pation, or vice versa, in communist and authoritarian states than in longstanding 
democracies. In communist and authoritarian states, citizens do not obtain pro-
social attitudes that can spill-over in other forms of participation, because of the 
untrustworthiness of civil society and political life. Moreover, because social networks 
are segmented, they are less likely to be a common resource for all forms of participa-
tion: citizens are less likely to be triggered to participate in other forms if their social 
network is strictly segmented and specifically utilitarian. Because of the segmentation 
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of social values and social networks in communist and authoritarian states, we expect 
correlations between social, civic, and political participation to be rather low com-
pared to those in the open societies of modern, liberal democracies.
Although authoritarian and communist regimes have been dissolved in most 
of Europe, decades of communist rule still have its effects on social life (Howard 
2003b). Despite the democratic transition, the established ways of life live on, at least 
among cohorts that were previously strongly socialized into these ways. It takes time 
for social and political trust to arise (Rose 1994). Therefore, the public sphere thesis 
can be extended to explain differences between longstanding and newly established 
democracies: the longer countries have been democratic, the stronger the relation-
ships between social, civic, and political participation have evolved. In other words, 
the relationships between social, civic, and political participation are stronger in 
longstanding democracies (i.e., countries with democratic rule since the Second 
World War) than in countries that had a democratic transition since the 1970s.3
H2. The positive relations between social, civic, and political participation are stronger in 
 established democracies than in former authoritarian and communist regimes.  
The second conditional theory, specifically for the association between civic and po-
litical participation, finds it origins in the writings of De Tocqueville. De Tocqueville 
(2000 [1835–1840]) focuses on the relationship between civic and political partici-
pation, which – he claims – depends on the type of bureaucracy. He distinguishes 
between strong, extensive, centralized bureaucracies and weak, small, decentralized 
bureaucracies. In societies that have centralized bureaucracies states need not involve 
voluntary associations in the policy process, neither for input nor for implementa-
tion. Vice versa, in societies with a small state bureaucracy, civic organizations are 
needed for policy input and for the implementation of state policy. Consequently, 
members of voluntary associations are more likely to develop political skills, politi-
cal interests and a network of others who are involved in politics in countries with a 
small and localized state bureaucracy than in countries with a large and centralized 
state bureaucracy. 
A similar reasoning is put forward by Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001). 
Following Jepperson (2000) they distinguish between statist and non-statist societ-
ies. Statist societies like France and Germany are characterized by centralized and 
autonomous state bureaucracies. ‘In such countries, the state constitutes a separate 
and superior order of political governance [...]. Civil society, on the other hand, is 
regarded as a source of chaos and anomie [...] and therefore often subject to some 
form of central state control.’ Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas contrast this with the 
3  A further distinction between the former authoritarian countries that had a democratic transition 
in the 1970s (in the ess data set: Spain, Portugal, Greece), and the former communist countries that 
had a democratic transition in the late 1980s or early 1990s (in the ess data set: East Germany, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovenia) methodologically suffered from small n.
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non-statist societies like the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the state apparatus derives 
its legitimacy from representing civil society. The state bureaucracy involves voluntary 
associations in the policy process in non-statist societies than in statist societies, where 
the bureaucracy discourages civic participation. The bottom-up approach towards vol-
untary associations of non-statist countries would therefore be more likely to induce 
spill-over effects between civic and political participation (Bowler et al. 2003).
These institutional differences impose differing constraints on citizens’ activities. 
The Tocquevillian ideal is more likely in non-statist societies: because they interact 
with state institutions and state officials, association members obtain political skills, 
political values and a political network that stimulate political participation. Vice ver-
sa, because they interact with voluntary associations, political activists develop civic 
skills, civic values and a civic network that stimulate civic participation. By contrast, 
in statist countries association members are kept at bay from the state organization, 
thereby giving them fewer means and less incentives to participate politically. Conse-
quently, we expect stronger relationships between civic and political participation in 
non-statist countries than in statist countries.
H3. The positive relations between civic and political participation are stronger in statist 
societies than in non-statist societies.
Spurious relationship
However, when we find significant correlations, we need to assert that they are not 
spurious. Relationships between the three forms of participation may be spurious, 
i.e., caused by selection effects. For instance, citizens with more resources have more 
means to engage in several forms of participation simultaneously: they have money 
and/or time to engage in family, associational and political life. Consequently, a 
correlation between these forms of participation may be found, even if there is no 
actual (reciprocal) causal relationship. Once we take these selection criteria into ac-
count analytically, the correlations between the three forms of participation should 
be lower. At the individual level, previous chapters (2, 3, 5 and 6) have shown that 
characteristics like income, education, gender, age and religiosity affect all forms of 
participation. Therefore, we take these characteristics into account. 
State level characteristics might also lead to an overestimation of the direct corre-
lations between social, civic, and political participation: citizens are more likely to be 
participate in several forms, because of characteristics of the country they live in. We 
focus on three aspects that were found to be relevant in previous chapters: economic 
development, corruption and democratic rule. Citizens of developed, incorrupt and/
or longstanding democratic countries are more likely to participate socially, civically 
and politically than citizens of opposite countries. Consequently, a cross-sectional 
study would show a positive individual-level relationship between the three forms of 
participation due to these contextual characteristics, that should disappear to some 
extent once we control for them. 
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Spuriousness blocks the actual test of hypotheses H1a and H1b. To determine the 
extent to which social, civic, and political participation are related, these spurious 
effect should be taken out, both at the individual and at the country level. In a cross-
sectional analysis like this chapter, one should only control for background charac-
teristics. Otherwise there is a risk of over-controlling the relationships by introducing 
intermediate factors, i.e., factors that in a causal scheme lie between two forms of 
participation. Therefore, the analyses below control only for those individual and 
contextual background characteristics that are theoretically highly unlikely to func-
tion as intermediate variables. 
H4. The positive relations between social, civic, and political participation are diminished 
 by the inclusion of individual and contextual level characteristics.
7.3. dAtA And meAsurement
Before we test the above mentioned hypotheses on the associations between social, 
civic, and political participation, we need construct variables that measure these three 
forms of participation. Unlike previous chapters, where each of these three forms 
of participation was operationalized by a multitude of modes, this chapter needs to 
reduce this multitude of modes to the three overarching factors. We therefore turn 
to confirmatory factor analysis to construct such a measurement (or: factor) model, 
based on the previously used sets of variables (paragraph 4). This factor model can be 
used to estimate, explain and condition the relationships between social, civic, and 
political participation in a structural equation model (paragraphs 5 and 6).
Data
The design of this chapter places high demands on the (individual level survey) data. 
First, the data set should include valid measurements on all these modes of participa-
tion. Second, to test whether state institutions affect the individual level associations, 
the data set needs to be cross-national and contain a sufficient number of countries 
that also substantially differ from each other on these institutional characteristics. 
Unfortunately, such cross-national survey data are scarce. Some data set contain 
respondents from a large set of countries, but lack (detailed) measures for all three 
forms of participation in a single wave (wvs, issp, Eurobarometer). Others are very 
rich and detailed, but are based on a set of countries that is too small and homoge-
neous for the purposes of this chapter (cid). 
The demands are probably best met by the European Social Survey 2002 (ess). It 
contains various measures for the three forms of participation. Eighteen countries in 
the ess have valid measures for all three forms of participation, although only seven-
teen are used in the analysis, as Luxembourg is an outlier on several characteristics 
(see Chapters 2 and 3). These seventeen countries also differ sufficiently on the key 
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institutional characteristics. However, even the ess does not fully meet our demands 
with respect to the measurement of social participation: although it includes several 
measures of participation in a broad, informal network, it does not contain specific 
information on participation in the primordial network of the (nuclear) family and 
the best friends (cf. Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the ess is the best data set at our dispos-
al for the purposes of this chapter. Therefore, when we speak of social participation 
in this chapter, we strictly refer to participation in a broad, informal network.
Dependent variables: Eight modes of  participation
To construct a three-factor model of social, civic, and political participation, we 
analyze the respective measures we introduced in previous chapters (in respectively 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). Social participation was measured through 
three variables: (y1) meeting socially with friends, relatives or colleagues, (y2) hav-
ing anyone to have intimate discussions with, and (y3) providing help to others, not 
counting (paid) work nor work for voluntary organizations. Civic participation was 
measured by the three scalograms (hierarchical Mokken scales), based on type of 
organization: (y4) involvement in leisure organizations, (y5) involvement in interest 
organizations, and (y6) involvement in activist organizations. For the construction 
of these scales we refer to Chapter 3. Political participation was measured through 
two variables: (y7) conventional political action (contacting a politician, working for 
a political party, wearing a campaign badge and/or donating money to a political 
organization), and (y8) non-conventional political action (participating in a lawful 
demonstration, product boycott, signing a petition, boycotts and/or illegal protests). 
We reduce these eight variables to three factors below, in paragraph 4.
Country level conditioning factors: former regime type and statism
Hypothesis H3 refers to regime type as a conditional factor. For former regime type 
we distinguish between two groups. On the one hand we group the established 
democracies that have been continuously democratic since at least 1950 (Austria, 
Belgium, West Germany, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden). On the other hand we lump together the former authoritar-
ian regimes that had a transition in the 1970s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the 
former communist regimes that became democratic in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). Our use of years of democracy as a 
control factor for possible spurious relationships does not harm its use to investigate 
conditional relationships.
The distinction between statist and non-statist societies is derived from the typol-
ogy by Jepperson (2000; 2002) and Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001). Jep-
person (2000; 2002) classifies most countries in our data set on historical grounds: 
historically the Anglosaxon and Scandinavian countries have been non-statist, while 
continental Europe and former authoritarian regimes followed the statist design of a 
strong state bureaucracy. However, not all countries fit the typology that clearly (Jep-
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person 2000). Belgium is considered a mixture of statist and corporatist elements, 
but in the end firmly characterized as a statist country by both Jepperson (2000) and 
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001). According to Jepperson (2000) the Neth-
erlands are a hybrid of the Anglosaxon and Scandinavian types, and therefore a non-
statist regime. However, other studies show that the design of the Dutch polity also 
has continental characteristics (scp 2001; Gelissen 2001). We therefore alternated the 
Dutch case between the typology, finding no substantial differences. Finally, Greece 
is not mentioned by Jepperson (2000; 2002), and altogether left out of the analysis 
by Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001). However, considering that Jepperson 
(2000) claims former authoritarian regimes to be statist, Greece is included as a stat-
ist regime in this study.
Individual and contextual level determinants
To control for spurious effects, we include the same background characteristics as in 
previous chapters. These characteristics are theoretically highly unlikely to operate as 
intermediate variables, meaning they do not intermediate the associations between 
social, civic, and/or political participation. To test hypothesis H2, we include the 
following determinants: sex, level of education, household income (ranked into 12 
groups), the income source (salaries/profits, age (as well as age-squared to capture 
non-linear tendencies), marital status (married, divorced, separated, widowed and 
those who did not marry), household size, religious denomination (non-religious, 
Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other), attendance to religious services, citizenship 
length of residence in a community, and level of urbanization. Moreover, three 
contextual determinants are included that were significant contextual determinants 
for all modes of participation in the previous chapters. As a measure of economic 
development we used gdp/capita pps, the national income per head of the popula-
tion corrected for differences in price levels. This index (where the score of 100 
represents the eu average) was provided by Eurostat. Perceived corruption was 
measured through the Corruption Perception Index (cpi ) 2002, issued by Transpar-
ency International. It ranges from 0 (no corruption) to 10 (highly corrupt). Length of 
democratic rule indicates how long a country has been democratic without interrup-
tion (topping off in 1920).
Missing values 
Respondents with missing values on one of the eight indicators of social, civic, and 
political participation (dependent variables) were left out of the analysis. Respon-
dents with missing values on the individual level determinants were scarce, except for 
the variable income. Respondents with missing values on income were assigned the 
average score, and controlled for with an additional dummy variable (not displayed 
in the models). For the other background characteristics, respondents with one or 
more missing values were left out of the analysis. All subsequent models are based on 
the same set of respondents.
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7.4. meAsurement model
The test of the hypotheses requires data reduction of the eight above-mentioned 
variables of social, civic, and political participation that were used in previous chap-
ters. Both practically and methodologically it is hardly feasible to relate these eight 
variables to each other. Without data reduction these eight variables would produce 
no less than 28 unique relations between pairs of variables, from which it is difficult 
to proceed. Moreover, the characteristics of the eight variables differ so strongly (with 
regards to scale and distribution), that these 28 relationships could not be compared 
to each other. To solve these issues, the number of variables is reduced through com-
firmatory factor analysis (cfa). As an additional advantage the (until now assumed) 
distinction between three factors and the (similarly assumed) assignment of variables 
to these factors is tested.
lisrel 8.80 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006) was used for the construction of the fac-
tor model. The eight variables were used as indicators of the underlying factors, tak-
ing the non-normal, non-metric distribution of the indicators into account through 
the estimation of a polychoric correlation matrix.4 A first set of analyses was based on 
the pooled data set. Several factor models were compared: a one-factor model, a two-
factor model, and two separate three-factor models (see Figure 7.1). The latter two are 
most interesting. 
The first three-factor model (Figure 7.1c; Model C in Table 7.1) refers to the soci-
etal triangle that was introduced in the Introduction (paragraph 1.3). It distinguished 
between three spheres of society that contribute to community: the intimate sphere 
(social participation), civil society (civic participation) and the state (political partici-
pation). Following this distinction, the three modes of social participation (y1-y3) 
should be related to one factor (f1), the three modes of civic participation (y4-y6) to a 
second (f2), and the two modes of political participation (y7-y8) to a third (f3), there-
fore assuming crossloadings to be absent. This model is represented in Figure 7.1c.
The second three-factor model (Figure 7.1d; Model D in Table 7.1) is an extension 
of the first, now allowing cross-loadings to differ from zero. In the Introduction, civil 
society was argued to be an intermediate sphere of society. Consequently, in Chapter 
3 we divided the sphere of civil society into three parts, reflecting the three corners 
of the triangle: leisure organizations (serving leisure interests, as it were, near the inti-
mate sphere), interest organizations (serving predominantly economic interests, as it 
were, near the market sphere) and activist organizations (serving overarching societal 
interests, as it were, near the sphere of the state). From this distinction, participation 
in leisure organizations (y4) has some characteristics of social participation (f1), while 
participation in activist organizations (y6) has some characteristics of political partici-
pation (f3).5 Consequently, the second three-factor model also allows for two indica-
4  Three of the eight indicators are dichotomous, three are ordinal, while only two are quasi-metric.
5  Participation in interest organisations would not have cross-loading in this model, as participation in 
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Figure 7.1 Schematic overview of measurement models
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tors to have crossloadings on two constructs. This model is represented in Figure 
7.1d.
Both three-factor models fit the data well, and have a significantly better fit than 
the one- and two-factor models. With a RMSEA of 0.044 the more extensive model 
(Model D) fits significantly better than the less extensive model (Model C) which has 
an RMSEA of 0.053 (see Table 7.1).6 With two additionally estimated parameters, 
the Chi-square value of Model D is significantly lower than that of Model C. How-
ever, in the extensive model, several factor loadings are rather weak (see Appendix F). 
Next, a second set of analyses tested the robustness of the factor models over 
countries. The pooled data set was broken down into each of the seventeen countries 
to estimate the structure and the model fit for each country separately. Extensive 
analyses show that the configural invariance is rather good for Model C, but not 
for Model D. In Model D, in eight of the seventeen countries, one or more factor 
loadings (especially those of the cross-loadings) were either much stronger or much 
weaker, or even flipped sign, compared to the overall model. This was not the case 
for the less extensive Model C. This model is therefore used for the subsequent 
analyses.7  
Finally, three latent variables were constructed using factorial regression scores 
and a standardization of the eight indicators on the pooled data set.8 The three 
the market sphere is not studied here.
6  As a rule of thumb, below an RMSEA of 0.05 models are considered to fit the data very well, 
between .05 and .08 reasonably well, and below 0.03 there is a close fit.
7  An additional test of measurement invariance was not done, because the large N within countries 
is very likely to produce significant results. Rather, we tested whether the specifics of the factor model 
used in the subsequent analysis would produce different results. When comparing the results in 
paragraphs 5 and 6 (which builds on model C) with a similar analysis that builds on model D, substan-
tially the same results were obtained, albeit with weaker associations between social and civic, and civic 
and political participation.
8  Using country specific regression scores and within country standardized indicators was not an 
option, as standardization within countries rules out any between-country variance and makes the 
cross-national analysis of the association between the three forms of participation relative and hard 
to interpret. Indeed, many individual and country level determinants were no longer significant in 
Table 7.1. Results: Measurement model fits
One factor 
model (a)
Two factor 
model (b)
Three factor 
model (c)
Three factor 
model cross-
loadings (d)
RMSEA 0.079 0.064 0.053 0.044
Chi-Square 3595.63 2291.73 1373.33 858.86
Degrees of freedom 20 19 17 15
Change in Log-likelihood - 1303.90 918.40 514.47
Number of parameters added - 1 2 2
Significance - 0.000 0.000 0.000
Confirmatory factor analysis, eight indicators.
Estimated through polychoric correlation matrix.
Pooled data set.
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factors, constructed through the lisrel analyses in line with Figure 7.1c, can now be 
used for further analysis.
7.5. structurAl model: AssociAtions And spurious effects
The measurement model allowed the construction of the three factors; structural 
models allow the assessment of the individual level relationships between these fac-
tors. For that purpose, the hierarchical structure of the data should again be taken 
into account. Citizens are nested in countries, and the simultaneous inclusion of 
individual and country level characteristics necessitates a correction of the standard 
errors. We did this correction with the Huber-White sandwich estimator (Huber 
1967; White 1982; Freedman 2006) in the software package MPlus 4 (Muthen and 
Muthen 2004).9 This estimation method is robust to non-normality and clustering, 
and suffices for the purposes of this chapter. The Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-squared 
difference test (TRD) allows the comparison of the overall model-fit with this estima-
tor (Satorra and Bentler 2001; Muthen and Muthen 2004).10
paragraph 5, when the country specific factor scores were used instead of the overall scores. The sign of 
economic development flipped over. 
9  Another option is to use hierarchical analysis. However, MPlus has strong demands on the number 
of parameters to be estimated, which our complicated model with a relatively low N on the higher 
level cannot meet. Hierarchical analysis is not necessary either, as no cross-level interaction effects are 
estimated. 
10  Usually, the model fit improvement is conventionally tested for its significance by the change in the 
–2LogLikelihood (–2LL), which is Chi-square distributed with the number of additionally estimated 
parameters as the degrees of freedom. However, to compare models that are estimated with the robust 
maximum likelihood, it is necessary to take the difference test scaling correction (cd) into account. This 
is calculated by the scaling correction factors (SCF) and the degrees of freedom (df) with the formula: 
cd=(df0*SCF0 – df1*SCF1)/(df0-df1). Next, the change in –2LL divided by the test scaling correction 
(TRD) is chi-square distributed.
Table 7.2. Results: Structural model
Model I. 
Basic model
(determinants set at 0)
Model fit
AIC 1801797.055
Log-likelihood -900779.527
Scaling correction factor 75.187
Number of estimated parameters 9
Correlations
Social and civic participation 0.37 (0.02)
Social and political participation 0.36 (0.01)
Civic and political participation 0.55 (0.02)
Structural model, factor loadings set.
Huber-White sandwich estimator.
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First, the model with the reciprocal relationships between the three factors is pre-
sented to test hypotheses H1a and H1b (see Model i in Table 7.2). Hypothesis H1a 
formulated the expectation that social, civic, and political participation would be 
positively related, whereas hypothesis H1b claimed the opposite. Model i shows that 
social, civic, and political participation are all positively related, thereby supporting 
hypothesis H1a. The correlation between social and civic (0.37) and social and politi-
cal participation (0.36) are moderately strong, whereas the correlation between civic 
and political participation (0.55) is even stronger.
7.6. structurAl model: conditionAl AssociAtions
Next, we assess whether these correlations are similar across groups of countries, in 
order to test hypotheses H2 and H3. According to these hypotheses the correlations 
between social, civic, and political participation differ across groups of countries: 
they would be stronger in longstanding democracies and non-statist countries than in 
newly established democracies and statist countries, respectively. Cross-level interac-
tion effects are not an option to test these hypotheses, due to the reciprocal character 
of the relationships. Yet, they can be tested by multiple group analyses in structural 
models. In multiple group analysis the structural model is estimated for the (two) 
groups of countries separately, while only specific parameters are allowed to vary. 
If the model fit improves significantly compared to the original single model, the 
conclusion is justified that the countries differ with respect to these parameters. This 
technique is available in MPlus, which continues to take the nested data structure 
into account even within the groups of countries. 
There are two limitations to multiple group analysis for the purpose of this chap-
ter. First, although hypotheses H2 and H3 propose two institutional characteristics 
that might condition the relationships between social, civic, and political participa-
tion (namely former regime type and statism), these conditional effects cannot be 
estimated simultaneously as the classifications overlap empirically: all newly estab-
lished democracies are also statist, while longstanding democracies are rather equally 
dispersed across types of bureaucracy. This calls for prudence in the interpretations 
of the findings. Second, when the correlations between the three forms of participa-
tion are allowed to vary over the groups of countries in the multiple group analyses 
in MPlus, all parameters are effectively released. Especially when we take individual 
and contextual determinants into account below, it becomes more difficult to pin-
point a possible significant improvement of the model fit to single parameters. We 
cope with this issue by doing multiple group analyses both on Model i (Table 7.2) 
and on a model where we take these individual and contextual determinants into 
account (Appendix G, Figure GI). In multiple group analyses of Model i, changes in 
model fit are more clearly pinpointed to differences in correlation strength. However, 
these correlations are not controlled for individual and contextual characteristics. 
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In multiple group analyses of the extensive model these controls have been inserted, 
but consequently differences in the correlation sizes are not considered in isolation 
across the two groups of countries and therefore cannot be tested for significance 
separately. However, the analyses do show the strength of the correlations in the two 
groups of countries, which can be compared and post-hoc tested for significance by 
equality of correlation coefficients tests.
In hypothesis H2 the correlations between the three forms of participation 
were expected to be weaker in newly established democracies than in longstanding 
democracies. Model ii in Table 7.3 shows that, compared to Model i (Table 7.2), the 
distinction between longstanding and newly established democracies significantly 
improves the model fit: with only 9 additionally estimated parameters11 the TRD 
decreases with 54835.75. The correlations are much lower for newly established than 
for longstanding democracies; especially for the relationship between civic and politi-
cal participation this difference is striking (respectively 0.33 and 0.54). This supports 
hypothesis H2. Note that both correlations are positive. 
Similarly, according to hypothesis H3, the correlations between social, civic, and 
political participation are expected to be lower in statist than in non-statist countries. 
In Model iii (Table 7.3), the results of the multiple group analysis on the basic model 
(Model i in Table 7.2) first show that the model fit improves significantly (df=9; 
TRD=9515.68). In line with expectations, only the correlation between civic and 
political participation is significantly smaller in statist countries (0.48) than in non-
statist countries (0.54). However, even that margin is rather small. This offers some, 
but not much support hypothesis H3. 
7.7. structurAl model: conditionAl AssociAtions And bAckground 
chArActeristics
In a final step, we build our most extensive models by including individual and 
contextual level determinants to test hypothesis H4. Hypothesis H4 emphasized the 
risk of spurious relationships: the correlation found above might be spurious due to 
individual or contextual level characteristics (like resources and incentives), while no 
direct relationship exists between the forms of participation. If hypothesis H2 holds, 
the inclusion of these characteristics should reduce the strength of the relationship 
between the three forms of participation considerably. 
Model iv, v and vi in Table 7.4 show that the inclusion of individual and con-
textual level determinants indeed leads to a rather strong decline in the correlations 
between the three forms of participation, compared to Models i, ii and iii respectively. 
In Model iv the correlation between social and civic participation drops significantly 
11  Next to the three correlations between the forms of participation the three group mean scores and 
the three within group variances are calculated.
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to 0.23, between social and political participation to 0.22 and between civic and 
political participation to 0.37. Additional analyses show that most of this drop is 
explained by individual level determinants. All in all, we find support for hypothesis 
H4. Note, however, that the correlations remain positive and moderately strong, and 
that the correlation between civic and political participation remains strongest. This 
still supports hypothesis H1a.
Finally, we turn to the multiple group analyses in which individual and contextual 
level determinants are taken into account (Models v and vi in Table 7.4). First, with 
regards to the two former regime types, we find that the model fit significantly better 
in Model v than in Model iv (df=90, TRD=107172.34). This implies that the model 
is not similar for the two groups of countries. However, it is even more difficult to 
pinpoint this general significant dissimilarity to specific differences in correlations 
between the three forms of participation. Nevertheless, the correlations are weaker in 
newly established than in longstanding democracies by a wide margin. All differences 
in correlation size are significant, according to an equality of correlation coefficient 
test. These findings support hypothesis H3.
Model vi in Table 7.4 shows that multiple group analysis of the extensive model 
improves the model fit significantly when we distinguish between statist and non-stat-
ist countries (df=90; TRD=133002.36). After the inclusions of all control factors, the 
correlations are lower in statist countries than in non-statist countries for all forms 
of participation. The correlation between civic and political participation is 0.33 
in statist countries and 0.43 in non-statist countries. Although a test for equality of 
correlation coefficients finds this difference to be significant, the difference remains 
rather small.
All in all, the analyses fail to reject both hypothesis H2 and hypothesis H3. Meth-
odologically, we find support for both. Effectively, we would argue that hypothesis 
H2 finds more support than hypothesis H3, especially when we consider the empiri-
cal overlap between the clustering of countries by democratic history and by statism. 
Considering the strong differences reported in Models ii and V, one would expect 
some of these differences to spill over to the analyses reported in iii and vi.12
7.7. summAry And discussion
This chapter focused on the relationships between social, civic, and political 
participation from a comparative perspective. Several scholars before us have studied 
these three forms of participation similar to the way we did in Chapters 2–5: they 
12  Although we are not fundamentally interested in the direction of direct and indirect effects in 
Model V, the effects of individual and contextual determinants on the three forms of participation are 
displayed in detail in Appendix G. By comparing Appendix G to the models in previous chapters, direct 
and indirect effects can be distinguished. Generally, effects are very much in line with the conclusions 
drawn in the previous chapters.
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were analyzed simultaneously but separately. Although social, civic, and political 
participation were apparently considered to have something in common, they were 
not related to each other empirically. To test hypotheses on contextual influences it is 
very useful to keep different forms and modes of participation unrelated – a neces-
sity even, when scholars refrain from structural modeling. However, this also clouds 
three questions. To what extent are social, civic, and political participation related? 
To what extent are these relations spurious? And to what extent are these relations 
conditioned by the institutional context? These three research questions were central 
to this chapter. In the process of answering them, several theoretical and method-
ological strands from previous chapters were combined.
First of all, this chapter shows that social, civic, and political participation are all 
positively related. This is rather surprising as time and financial resources are scarce. 
Apparently socialization effects weight up to the problem of scarce resources: through 
participation citizens develop the mindset, the skills and a broader social network 
that incite or enable them to participate through a social spiral. Second, these posi-
tive correlations are explained for 30 to 40 percent by background characteristics 
like income, education and religiosity, implying that the original correlations were 
to some extent spurious. Nevertheless, sizable, positive correlations remain between 
the three forms of participation. Third, these relations are conditioned by the 
institutional context. In longstanding democracies the correlations between social, 
civic, and political participation are stronger than in newly established democracies 
– although they are positive in both groups. In other words, citizens that participate 
in one sphere of society are more likely to participate in another sphere as well, 
but even more so when they live in a longstanding democracy. In other words, the 
informal, associational and political communities show a stronger degree of overlap 
in longstanding than in newly established democracies.
We would expect that these differences between the longstanding and newly 
established democracies in Europe diminish over time. They might very much be a 
legacy of the former authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of Southern and Eastern 
Europe. Currently, the former authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe (until the 
1970s) and the former totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe (until the late 1980s or 
early 1990s) are very much in living memory, as several living generations have been 
socialized under these regimes. However, when countries make a successful transition 
to a democratic regime and are able to develop a stable and neutral public sphere, a 
liberal-democratic tradition may arise in which citizens do not need to segment their 
social networks, but rather step into the social spiral of citizen participation.
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8.1. questions
In this dissertation, we tested the effects of state institutions on citizen participation. 
We distinguished between three forms of citizen participation, depending on the so-
cietal sphere in which it took place: social participation in the informal sphere, civic 
participation in associational sphere (i.e., civil society) and political participation 
in the sphere of the state. We set out to answer three research questions, reflecting 
the three ways in which state institutions might function as a relevant context for 
citizens’ participation. First, state institutions might explain why average participa-
tion rates are higher in some countries than in others. Previous studies had already 
described that countries strongly differ in social, civic, and political participation. In 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 we therefore set out to explain these differences by answering 
the first research question, which reads:
1. To what extent does variation in state institutions explain the differential social, civic 
 and political participation levels between countries?
Second, many studies have shown that various social groups (like those along educa-
tion, income, gender and political lines) differ strongly in their likelihood to par-
ticipate. State institutions might explain why some social groups are more likely to 
participate than others. State institutions are thus considered to affect participatory 
inequality within countries. For civic and political participation, respectively, Chap-
ters 4 and 5 answered the second general research question, which reads:
2. To what extent does variation in state institutions condition the degree of 
 participatory inequality between social groups?
Finally, we combined these three forms of participation to study their correlations, 
and the conditional effect of state institutions on these correlations. Chapters 6 and 
7 answered the third and final set of general research questions, which read:
3a. To what extent are social, civic, and political participation related cross-nationally?
3b. To what extent do state institutions determine the relations between social, civic, and 
 political participation?
This concluding chapter brings these lines of research on the relationship between 
state institutions and citizen participation together. It aims to meet two related aims. 
The first aim is to answer the three main research questions. For that purpose, the 
following paragraph offers a summary of the six empirical chapters, after which the 
general research questions will be answered. The second aim is to reflect on this 
study and to position it in the broader literature on citizen participation. Combining 
the theoretical and methodological choices made in this study, we end this disserta-
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tion with theoretical reconsiderations and implications, both for scholars and for 
policy makers.
8.2. overview of the theoreticAl Arguments And empiricAl findings
This section summarizes the most important theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings of each chapter. First, we recapitulate the general theoretical and method-
ological design.
The theoretical framework of this dissertation has several levels of abstraction, 
as we derived specific hypotheses from a rather general (actor-centered institutional-
ist) approach to answer the three research questions. At the most abstract level, this 
dissertation followed the actor-centered institutionalist approach according to which 
citizens make choices within constraints that are set by (state) institutions. Besides 
the institutionalist approach, we acknowledged the rivaling cultural approach (ac-
cording to which participation is caused by habits, traditions, and norms) in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. 
Next, within the actor-centered institutionalist approach we distinguished be-
tween two relevant theoretical mechanisms: resource-based and incentive-based theo-
ries. In the former, resources are considered to be a prerequisite for participation. 
Citizens differ in the extent to which they participate, because the means (or resourc-
es) to participate – like time, money and social skills – are unequally distributed. By 
lowering barriers to participate, by offering collective resources and by redistributing 
individual level resources state institutions can stimulate high and equal levels of 
participation. By contrast, the incentive-based theories emphasize the motivation 
to participate. When citizens have stronger incentives to participate, they are more 
likely to do so. In this perspective, state institutions can stimulate (or reduce) citizen 
participation by making incentives to participate more (or less) salient. 
Even more specifically, we formulated several resource-based and incentive-based 
theories based on the specific type of resources or incentives that are emphasized. 
Finally, from these theories (or theses) we derived specific hypotheses that explicated 
the expected effects of specific individual and contextual characteristics on social, 
civic, and political participation.
Methodologically, we chose to analyze cross-sectional survey data from Western 
countries, enriching them with contextual characteristics. Because the research ques-
tions distinguish between two levels of analysis, we used clustered data (individuals 
nested in countries) on which we applied hierarchical analysis (multi-level research) 
in various forms throughout the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 answered the question to what extent variation in state institutions explains 
the differential social participation levels between countries. We distinguished between two 
modes of social participation: along primordial ties (nuclear and extended family, 
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and best friend) and along secondary ties (a broad informal network). We tested 
three institutional theories. First, the crowding out thesis is an incentive-based theo-
ry. It assumes that social networks function as economic safety nets. However, when 
countries spend more on social security and thereby offer a collective economic safety 
net, citizens will have fewer incentives to participate, and therefore have less contact 
with family, friends, neighbors and colleagues. Second, the collective resources thesis 
is a resource-based theory. By offering their citizens more (collective) resources, coun-
tries may stimulate them to participate socially. Third, the public sphere thesis is also 
resource-based. It emphasizes collective social resources like civil rights. Supposedly, 
when citizens are able to participate freely in the public sphere, they are less likely to 
participate socially. Especially the former authoritarian and communist might suffer 
from a legacy of a untrustworthy public sphere, which stimulated them to participate 
socially. Therefore, citizens are expected to participate socially more extensively when 
they live in newly established than in longstanding democracies, more extensively 
when they live in countries that do not enforce civil rights very well than in countries 
that do, and more extensively when they live in countries where corruption is more 
widespread than in countries where it is not.
Scheme 8.1 recapitulates our findings. Empirical tests showed more convincing 
support for the resource-based than for the incentive-based explanations. Social 
security expenditure has no significant effect on any mode of social participation, 
except on contacts with the extended family: social security expenditure inhibits 
contacts with the extended family. This implies that the extended family functions as 
an economic safety net. In economically developed countries citizens are more likely 
to have extensive contacts with their best friend and their extended family, and to 
provide informal help to others. When countries enforce civil rights, citizens are less 
likely to have contacts with nuclear family and best friend. Corruption is not related 
to any mode of social participation. Finally, citizens in longstanding democracies are 
less likely to participate socially across primordial ties and to provide informal help 
than citizens in newly established democracies.
All in all, we reached several conclusions. First, the crowding out thesis is rejected 
for most modes of social participation, but not for contacts with the extended family. 
The collective resources thesis is partly supported: social security expenditure is not 
positively related to social participation, but economic development is. The public 
sphere thesis finds support: civil rights enforcement and years of democratic rule 
are negatively related to social participation. Second, we fail to find support for the 
cultural approach for any mode of social participation: average church attendance 
is not related to any form of social participation. Third, contextual effects tend to 
be somewhat stronger for the poor than for the rich (not in scheme). However these 
differences are rather small. Fourth, although we made a distinction between several 
modes of social participation, we find similar – not contradictory – effects of con-
textual characteristics on most modes of social participation. There is one exception: 
general informal contacts are not affected by any country level characteristic. Other-
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wise, the distinction between different modes social participation is less relevant for 
contextual effects.
Chapter 3 answered the question to what extent variation in state institutions explains the 
differential civic participation levels between countries. We distinguished between three 
modes of civic participation: participation in leisure, in interest and in activist orga-
nizations. Chapter 3 followed the same design as Chapter 2: the same three theories 
were tested, but with more contextual determinants. First, in line with the incentive-
based crowding out thesis, we expected that citizens would be less likely to participate 
civically when they live in countries that spend more on social security. Moreover, 
we expected large, centralized state bureaucracies crowd out the need for citizen 
initiatives, giving citizens less incentives to participate civically. Second, the collective 
resource thesis proposed that citizens are more likely to participate civically in coun-
tries that offer more collective resources. Third, the public sphere thesis proposed 
that citizens are more likely to participate civically when they live in a incorrupt and 
democratic country that enforces civil rights. 
Scheme 8.2 shows that empirical analyses rejected hypotheses derived from incen-
tive-based theories, but supported the resource-based theories. Size and centralization 
of the state bureaucracy are not significantly related to participation in any type of 
organization. When they live in a country with a high level of social security expendi 
ture, citizens are not less but more likely to participate civically. This effect is sig-
Civic participation
Leisure 
organizations
Interest
organizations
Activist
organizations
Th Ef Test Th Ef Test Th Ef Test
Crowding out (incentives)
Size of bureaucracy - o x - o x - o x
Centralization - o x - o x - o x
Social security expenditure - + x - + x - o x
Collective resources (resources)
Social security expenditure + + V + + V + o x
Economic development   + o x + o x + + V
Public sphere (resources)
Civil rights enforcement + + V + o x + + V
Corruption - o x - - V - - V
Years of democratic rule + + V + o x + o x
Cultural approach
Average church attendance + - x + o x + o x
Scheme 8.2. Summary of findings from Chapter 3
Th: Hypothesized effect 
+: positive effect 
-:  negative effect 
o: no effect 
Ef: Found effects
+: significant positive effect alpha = .05
-: significant negative effect alpha = .05
o: no significant effect at alpha = .05
Test: test evaluation
V: hypothesis not rejected
x: hypothesis rejected
x: sign. effect contrary to hypothesis
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nificant for leisure and interest organizations. In economically highly developed 
countries citizens are more likely to participate in activist organizations. Countries 
that enforce civil rights stimulate their citizens to participate in leisure and activist 
organizations. In countries with high levels of corruption, participation in interest 
and activist organization is less likely. Finally, citizens are more likely to participate 
in leisure organizations when they live in a longstanding democracy than in a newly 
established democracy.
We reached several conclusions. First, the crowding out thesis was rejected for 
civic participation, whereas the collective resources thesis and the public sphere the-
sis were supported. Second, the rivaling cultural approach, according to which civic 
participation is higher in devout countries, did not find empirical support: citizens 
are not more likely to participate civically when they live in devout countries than 
when they live in secular countries. Third, whereas state institutions are hardly able 
to affect civic participation for high income groups, they are very well able to influ-
ence it for low income groups (not in scheme). Fourth, the distinction between the 
three modes of civic participation is relevant: there are opposite individual level cor-
relates for participation in leisure, interest and activist organizations, although there 
are no opposite contextual correlates.
In Chapter 4, we turned to the second main research question: To what extent does 
variation in state institutions condition the degree of inequality in civic participation between 
social groups? In line with the resource-based theory, Chapter 4 tested to what extent 
social security expenditure explains unequal levels of civic participation within coun-
tries. 
First, we focused on participatory inequality from three sources: between citizens 
with a high education and those with a low education, between the rich and the 
poor, and between men and women. Theoretically, we argued that the former are
Civic participation
Leisure 
organizations
Interest
organizations
Activist
organizations
Th Ef Test Th Ef Test Th Ef Test
Resource theory (resources)
Education + + V + + V + + V
Effect of soc.sec.exp. on difference - o x - - V - - V
Income + + V + + V + + V
Effect of soc.sec.exp. on difference - - V - - V - o x
Gender (male) + + V + + V + - x
Effect of soc.sec.exp. on difference - - V - - V - + V
Scheme 8.3. Summary of findings from Chapter 4
Th: Hypothesized effect 
+: positive effect 
-: negative effect 
o: no effect 
Ef: Found effects
+: significant positive effect alpha = .05
-:  significant negative effect alpha = .05
o: no significant effect at alpha = .05
Test: test evaluation
V: hypothesis not rejected
x: hypothesis rejected
x: sign. effect contrary to hypothesis
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more likely to participate than the latter, because they possess more resources like 
money and social skills. Empirical findings provided much support. Higher educated 
are more likely to participate in all types of organizations than lower educated. The 
rich are more likely to participate in all types of organizations than the poor. And 
men are more likely to participate than women in leisure and interest organizations. 
There is one exception: women are more likely to participate in activist organizations 
than men. 
Second, we argued that social security expenditure might limit the degree of 
participatory inequality: countries with high levels of social security offer collective 
resources and tend to redistribute individual resources (like money) and chores (like 
household tasks) from the haves to the have-nots. Empirical analyses confirmed this 
hypothesis: participatory inequality in voluntary associations is lower in countries 
with high levels of social security expenditure than in countries with low levels. This 
is line with the resource-based theory: the gap between citizens with more resources 
compared to citizens with less resources is smaller in countries where resources are 
redistributed from the haves with the have-nots through social security expenditure.1 
Chapter 5 turned to political participation. It started out from the assertion that 
democracies require high and equal levels of political participation. We argued that 
participatory inequality may be especially harmful to representative democracy when 
it occurs along ideological lines: i.e., when ideological preferences affect the propensi-
ty to participate politically. First, we studied the individual level association between 
ideological position and political participation. Theoretically, we derived hypotheses 
from the general incentives thesis and the equity fairness thesis (which are both 
incentive-based theories): we expected leftwing citizens to have more incentives (and 
thus a greater likelihood) to participate politically than rightwing citizens, extremists 
more than moderates, and those who are ideologically distant to government more 
than those who are close. Empirically, we found support for these hypotheses.
Second, we answered the question to what extent variation in state institutions 
explains the differential political participation levels between countries. Theoretically, we 
formulated two claims. According to the resource-based perspective, citizens in con-
sensual regimes would be more likely to participate politically than citizens in majori-
tarian regimes, because their decentralized and inclusive governments are more re-
sponsive to citizen demands. However, from the incentive-based perspective, we came 
to the opposite expectation: citizens would be more likely to participate politically in 
majoritarian than in consensual regimes, because the political stakes are higher in 
majoritarian regimes due to due to centralization and power concentration. Empiri-
1  Although the inequality in participation in activist organization between men and women is even 
bigger when social security expenditure is higher, this too is explained by the resource approach. Given 
that women are more likely to participate in activist organizations than men, redistribution of time and 
money offers them even more means to participate. For leisure and interest organizations this causes 
them to close the gap with men, for activist organizations to extend their overrepresentation.
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cally, we found support for the latter hypothesis and thus rejected an important 
claim in political science. State institutions are able to influence citizens’ inclination 
to participate politically through their incentives rather than through their resources. 
In this analysis we took two additional contextual factors into account. Compulsory 
voting stimulates turnout at elections, but has no additional spill-over effect on other 
modes of political participation. Economic development stimulates various modes of 
political participation: citizens are more likely to contact an official, to campaign or 
to cooperate with others when they live in more prosperous countries.
Finally, Chapter 5 answered the question to what extent variation in state institutions 
conditions the degree of inequality in political participation between social groups. We tested 
whether the inequality in political participation between ideological groups was 
lower in consensual than in majoritarian systems. However, although there are sig-
nificant cross-national differences in participatory inequality, they are not explained 
by regime type. We therefore rejected the cross-level interaction hypotheses that we 
derived from the civic voluntarism theory.
All in all, we came to similar conclusions for all six modes of political participa-
tion (voting, contacting an official, campaigning, persuading, cooperating and vot-
ing). This implies that we need not distinguish between them.
The final two chapters turned to correlations between the different forms of par-
ticipation. Chapter 6 examined the dominant neo-Tocquevillian theory according 
to which voluntary associations are schools of democracy where members obtain 
the skills and the mindset to participate politically. The theory consists of several 
interlocked claims, that until now were assumed rather than tested. Theoretically, 
Chapter 6 dissected the neo-Tocquevillian theory to five testable, interlocking 
hypotheses. Empirically, it found support for two hypotheses. First, citizens who par-
ticipate civically are also more likely to participate politically. Second, this positive 
correlation is found in all countries under study. Note, however, that a correlation 
offers no conclusive information on the causal direction, which therefore remains 
under dispute. 
Three more informative hypotheses were not supported empirically. First, the 
neo-Tocquevillian theory, with its emphasis on face-to-face contact in horizontal 
organizations, led us to expect that citizens who participate in leisure organizations 
are even more likely to participate politically than citizens who participate in inter-
est and activist organizations. However, empirically, we found the opposite: citizens 
who participate in activist and interest organizations are more likely to participate 
politically than citizens who participate in leisure organizations. Second, according to 
the neo-Tocquevillian theory, citizens who are passively involved in voluntary associa-
tions (i.e., are member or donator, but not active participant or volunteer) should 
not be more likely to participate politically than citizens who do not participate 
in voluntary associations at all, because socialization processes can only take place 
when people are actively involved. Yet, empirically, we found that citizens who are 
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passively involved in associational life are by far more likely to participate politically 
than non-members and hardly less than active participants.2 Third, we deduced from 
the neo-Tocquevillian theory that citizens who participate in voluntary associations 
should be more likely participate politically, because they develop civic skills and a 
civic mindset in these associations. However, empirically, the relationship between 
civic participation and political participation is not explained by social skills and 
social mindedness. All in all, we conclude that the neo-Tocquevillian theory finds 
very little support. 
The elimination of the unidirectional, causal assumption underlying the schools 
of democracy theory, paved the way for Chapter 7. In this chapter we included the 
measures for social, civic, and political participation in one single model. First, a 
measurement model was constructed, that supported the distinction between the 
three forms of participation made in previous chapters. This model turned out to be 
configurally invariant over countries.
Second, it answered the question to what extent social, civic, and political participa-
tion are related cross-nationally. Theoretically, we formulated contradicting expectations. 
On the one hand, many scholars found positive associations in the past: citizens who 
engage in one form of participation develop the mindset, the skills and a broader 
social network, that incite or enable them to participate in other forms. On the other 
hand, due to scarcity of time and money, one could also expect negative associa-
tions: time spent on one activity cannot be spent on another. Empirically, we found 
support for the former hypothesis in positive correlations: citizens who participate in 
one form are also far more likely to participate in another form. 
Third, we tested to what extent the relations between social, civic, and political 
participation are explained by selection effects. Selection effects imply that there 
is no direct, causal relationship between the three forms of participation. Rather, 
underlying characteristics enable citizens to participate in several forms of participa-
tion simultaneously. For instance, citizens with the resources of time and money 
are more likely to participate in all societal spheres. Similarly, citizens in economic 
prosperous countries are more likely to participate in all societal spheres. Empiri-
cal analyses show that up to 40% of the correlation are explained by these selection 
effects. Nevertheless, sizable, positive correlations remain between the three forms of 
participation.
Fourth, we answered the question to what extent state institutions condition the 
relations between social, civic, and political participation. Theoretically, we expected 
citizens in (until recently) authoritarian and communist regimes to divide their 
social life in separate compartments. Consequently, correlations should be signifi-
cantly lower in recently established than in longstanding democracies. Empirically, 
we found support for this hypothesis. We also found empirical support for our hy-
2  Being an active member further increases the likelihood of political participation, but this increase is 
smaller.
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pothesis that correlations between civic and political participation would be lower 
in statist than in non-statist countries.
8.3. Answers
Once more, we return to the three main research questions that structured this dis-
sertation. First, to what extent does variation in state institutions explain the differential 
social, civic, and political participation levels between countries? In Chapters 2, 3 and 5 we 
found that the average participation rates differ significantly across countries. How-
ever, the within-country variance matters more: in our multilevel models, in which 
we distinguished between individuals and their context, the variance between coun-
tries made up no more than 5 to 14% of all variance.3 Much of these cross-national 
differences are explained by contextual characteristics. For social and civic participa-
tion, incentive-based theories like the crowding out thesis find little support, whereas 
resource-based theories like the collective resource thesis and the public sphere thesis 
are corroborated. For political participation this is the other way around. Both at the 
individual and at the contextual level we found support for incentive-based theories, 
but not for resource-based theories: citizens who perceive a large distance between 
themselves and the government, and citizens who live in countries where the politi-
cal stakes are higher, are more likely to participate politically than those who are 
ideologically close to government and those who live in countries with lower political 
stakes, respectively.
In comparison to the actor-centered institutionalist approach, we tested hypothe-
ses derived from the cultural approach. According to this cultural approach, citizens’ 
participation depends on the cultural norms and tradition of the society they live in. 
However, in our analyses of social and civic participation, the cultural approach did 
not explain differing levels of participation very well. In Chapters 2 and 3 we tested 
to what extent the devoutness of countries (as well as other cultural measures like tra-
ditionally dominant religion) affects social and civic participation. For most modes 
of social and civic participation we found no significant effect.4 In short, as far as 
we were able to assess, state institutions matter more than cultural characteristics as 
determinants of social and civic participation.
The second question reads: to what extent does variation in state institutions condition 
the degree of participatory inequality between social groups? In Chapters 4 and 5 we set out 
to explain the unequal civic and political participation rates between social groups 
within countries, i.e., participatory inequality. For civic participation we found sup-
3  The relative size of the country level variance is, in fact, rather high for cross-national survey data 
(Rahn and Rudolph 2005).
4  Note, however, that we should be modest regarding this preliminary rejection of the cultural ap-
proach. We were limited methodologically to insert too many contextual control variables in our rather 
strained models, and therefore did not include several cultural measures simultaneously. 
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port for the resource-based explanation: social security expenditure moderates partici-
patory inequality between the high and the low educated, the rich and the poor, and 
men and women rather well. For political participation, however, we find no support 
for the resource-based explanation: although participatory inequality differs signifi-
cantly across countries, it is neither significantly bigger nor smaller across two regime 
types. 
Finally, we answered the third set of research questions. To what extent are social, 
civic, and political participation related cross-nationally? And to what extent do state institu-
tions determine the relations between social, civic, and political participation? The analy-
ses in Chapter 6 undermined the unidirectional, causal socialization explanation 
between civic and political participation that is proposed in the neo-Tocquevillian 
theory. Structural equation models in Chapter 7 showed that the three forms of par-
ticipation are moderately strongly and positively correlated; the relation between civic 
and political participation is strongest, that between social and political participation 
weakest. These correlations differ in strength across different institutional contexts: 
in newly established democracies (that were authoritarian or communist fifteen to 
thirty years ago) correlations are significantly lower than in longstanding democracies 
(that have been democratic since at least World War ii). This implies that there is a 
heritage of state institutions from the past. We expect to see a decline in the differ-
ence between longstanding and newly established democracies over time, as younger 
generations that grew up in a democratic regime replace older ones.
In answer to all three research questions, we thus conclude that state institutions 
are highly relevant to social, civic, and political participation, as they set the context 
in which citizens have the resources and the incentives to participate.
8.4. reflections
Throughout this dissertation we distinguished between three forms of participation: 
social, civic, and political participation. Within these three forms of participation, we 
distinguished several modes of participation. Our dissertation supports the distinc-
tion between the three forms of participation in several ways. First, the measurement 
model in Chapter 7 illustrates that we should distinguish between social, civic, and 
political participation. Second, in line with the public sphere thesis, we find that in 
countries that enforce civil rights and are longstanding democracies, citizens are more 
likely to participate civically, but less likely to participate socially.
The distinction between several modes of participation within these three forms 
is less relevant, at least with regard to the effects of contextual characteristics. We did 
not find strong differences between different modes of social participation, between 
different modes of civic participation, and between different modes of political par-
ticipation. However, we did find intriguing differences between modes of participa-
tion at the individual level. Men are more likely than women to have social contacts 
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with their closest friends or to be involved in leisure and interest organizations, but 
less likely to have contact with their extended family, to help others informally and to 
be involved in activist organizations. Similarly, there are differences between religious 
denominations, even after we take church attendance into account. Compared to the 
non-religious, Catholics are more likely to participate socially along primordial ties 
and join leisure organizations, but less likely to help others outside informally and to 
be involved in interest or activist organizations. Protestants are more likely to partici-
pate socially along primordial ties and to be involved in leisure or interest organiza-
tions, but less likely to help others informally than the non-religious.
Caveats
Two important caveats returned throughout the study, and they should be empha-
sized here as well. The first is about the generalization of the findings. This study 
focused exclusively on Western – and in many analyses exclusively on European – 
countries. The findings of this study should therefore only be generalized to coun-
tries in a similar setting: i.e., Western, liberal democracies with a dominantly Chris-
tian history and rather stable institutions. Nevertheless, the most-similar design was 
a purposive choice, that strengthened this study in other ways. Through the focused 
study of a relatively homogeneous set of countries, institutional effects could be 
pinpointed with relative certainty: many other sources for variance were eliminated 
by design. Cultural and historical differences are much smaller in this focused com-
parison, than in a comparison of countries from all around the globe. Moreover, the 
methodological problem of cross-cultural equivalent measurements is smaller when 
countries under study are relatively homogeneous. 
There are some problems related to testing complex models on a relatively small 
set of countries, however: (i) complex models might become quickly saturated, (ii) 
findings may be very sensitive to influential cases, and (iii) particularly contextual 
variables might be highly correlated, which in turn leads to multicollinearity is-
sues. All three of these problems can be dealt with, and were dealt with throughout 
this dissertation. Complex models were built up carefully and in subsequent steps. 
Robustness analyses were done by adding new cases or by eliminating outliers to test 
whether they were influential. Perturbation analyses were done to test whether high 
correlations between country level determinants produced unstable outcomes, and 
diagnostic tests were done to track influential cases. These analyses showed that the 
small number of countries and influential outliers are not important caveats for this 
study. Rather, we emphasize that we should be modest regarding the generalization 
of our findings, because of the large similarities between these countries.
The second caveat, also mentioned in the introduction, refers to the causality of 
the relationship between state institutions and citizen participation. This dissertation 
built on the assumption that state institutions determine social, civic, and political 
participation. However, the opposite – the institutional design as the outcome of 
citizen participation – is a theoretical possibility as well. We tried to cope with this 
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problem in several ways. Theoretically, we argued that state institutions are generally 
stable, and are therefore more likely to be the determinant than the consequence of 
citizen participation. The assumption of stable institutions holds especially for West-
ern countries, the set of countries under study in this dissertation. Methodologically, 
institutional features were measured in the years before citizens were interviewed on 
their participatory behavior in international surveys. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional 
analyses in this dissertation cannot offer any conclusive insights regarding the causal 
direction of the found relationships.
A more refreshing theoretical outlook on the problem of causality is offered by 
the idea of spirals of causality (Rothstein 1998). In this idea, there is no strict distinc-
tion between dependent and independent variables (i.e., state institutions and citizen 
participation). Rather, the two are considered to be co-dependent. In a causal spiral, 
changes in one variable affect the other and vice versa, at least until a new equilib-
rium is reached. The crowding out thesis, for instance, was originally formulated as a 
spiral of causality (cf. Tocqueville 2000 [1835–1840]; Nisbet 1962 [1953]): ever more 
extensive states and ever more atomized citizens would only serve to stimulate each 
other. On the one hand, extensive states were supposed to atomize its citizenry, but 
on the other hand, this atomized citizenry would need to depend on the state and 
would therefore offer little counterweight to the expanding state. Reasoning in terms 
of causal spirals makes the discussion of causality obsolete. Pinpointing cause and 
consequence becomes less salient, as the focus shifts to pinpointing and theorizing 
the causal spiral. How do these social spirals come into being, and how are equilibri-
ums reached?
Methodologically, however, this dynamic of causal spirals remains problematic. 
We do not have the means to estimate extensive, recursive, multilevel models, by 
lack of cross-national and longitudinal data. Ultimately, longitudinal and especially 
panel studies are required to shed light on the causal mechanisms that underlie the 
relationships in this dissertation.
8.5. implicAtions 
The brief and obvious conclusion of this dissertation is that institutions matter. To 
some extent, state institutions provide citizens with resources and incentives to par-
ticipate socially, civically and/or politically, and especially citizens with few resources 
are likely to be affected by it. The findings in this study have several implications, 
both for social scientists (theoretically and methodologically) and for policy makers.
Theoretical implications
First, our extension of the general resource- and incentive-based theories (i.e., trans-
posing individual level determinants to the contextual level) led to some interesting 
disparities between social and civic participation on the one hand, and political par-
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ticipation on the other. Specific resource- and incentive-based theories were tested si-
multaneously in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, and separately in the other analytical chapters. 
An intriguing conclusion is that – with regards to contextual effects – the resource-
based theories explained social and civic participation, while the incentive-based 
theories were better suited to explain political participation. In other words, the tests 
of individual and contextual determinants imply that social and civic participation 
are more strongly stimulated by resources, political participation by incentives.
Why did we find this difference? Possibly, it is related to the two general perspec-
tives towards citizen participation (Lin 2001). According to the ‘developmental’ 
perspective (Parry et al. 1972), citizen participation has expressive benefits. Because 
man is inherently a social creature, all citizens want to participate in principle. In 
other words, in this perspective, all citizens have the similar incentives to participate. 
Differing levels of participation can then predominantly be explained by differing 
resources. Alternatively, the ‘instrumental’ perspective considers participation as 
a means to reach other goals, and as just one possible activity amongst others that 
citizens can engage in. In this perspective, participation also depends on citizens’ 
motivation to participate, i.e., on incentives. If we combine these two perspectives 
with the findings, an intriguing picture arises. Possibly, the idea that man is a social 
creature holds stronger for social and civic than for political participation. Social and 
civic participation may indeed be natural ways for citizens to express themselves. To 
stimulate social and civic participation, states should mainly take away the barri-
ers that prevent citizens to participate, i.e., the lack in resources like time, money 
and skills. Political participation, on the other hand, is more likely to be motivated 
instrumentally. One might argue that most citizens do not wish to participate politi-
cally, although they will come into action when much is at stake (cf. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 2002). They prefer to be political spectators and monitor politics from 
afar, and will vote, lobby or demonstrate only when they think it matters. Of course, 
citizens will also need resources to participate. But in order to stimulate political par-
ticipation, states should primarily aim to raise the (perceived) stakes for their citizens, 
for instance through decisive elections, clear choices and polarized debates.
Second, participation is unequally distributed, both within countries (between 
groups of citizens) and between countries (between populations). Citizens with more 
incentives are more likely to participate politically. This opposes Dahl’s (1971) ideal 
of democratic regimes, which are characterized by a ‘continued responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals’. Chapter 
5 showed that citizens with different ideological characteristics are not equally likely 
to participate politically, and therefore to be heard. This finding questions whether 
governments are indeed equally responsive to the preferences of all citizens: do the 
preferences of citizens from different ideological groups receive equal consideration 
from governments? Our analyses suggest this may very well not be the case.
With regards to civic participation, citizens with more resources are more likely to 
participate in civic life. This provides these citizens with the benefits of participation, 
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for instance on their career, income, and status (Lin 1999; Moerbeek 2001; Ruiter 
2008). Consequently, civic participation will increase social inequality. Unrestrained, 
the haves are more likely to participate than the have-nots, and are therefore more 
likely to reap its social and economic benefits in a circle that is virtuous for the haves 
but might be vicious for society as a whole (cf. Ruiter 2008). Yet, this dissertation 
suggests that governments can control participatory inequality within countries, for 
instance through social security programs.
Participatory inequality between countries is far less restricted. The interplay be-
tween state institutions and citizen participation may cement differences in econom-
ic, social and political performance between countries: citizens of rich, stable and 
democratic countries are more likely to participate and reap the benefits of partici-
pation than citizens of poor, unstable and non-democratic countries. Where would 
this difference lead us? On the one hand, we may witness an increasing gap between 
countries with high and countries with low participation rates. On the other hand, 
ceiling effects will probably moderate these country level differences. In the Nether-
lands, for instance, 86% of the citizens belonged to an association in 1990, and the 
average citizen was member of 2.7 associations. Such figures cannot rise indefinitely, 
if only due to the scarcity of time.
Methodological implications
This dissertation showed the benefits of hierarchical analysis for cross-national stud-
ies of social, civic, and political participation. Compared to disaggregated analysis (cf. 
Van Oorschot and Arts 2005), this study did not suffer from a highly increased risk 
of Type i errors (i.e., an underestimation of the standard errors). Compared to ag-
gregated analysis (cf. Delhey and Newton 2005), this study did not have to eliminate 
the individual level that turned out to be so important – actually more important in 
terms of explained variance than the contextual level. Moreover, the use of hierar-
chical analysis enabled us to develop new hypotheses and test them via cross-level 
interactions. These, too, turned out to be highly relevant. Two equally valid interpre-
tations of these cross-level interaction effects have been used throughout this paper: 
(i) institutional effects are not similar for the whole population, but vary across social 
groups, and (ii) the institutional environment conditions the relationship between 
individual level determinants and citizen participation, i.e., participatory inequal-
ity. Future research should take this into account. The individual level association 
between, for instance, income and citizen participation is partly determined by the 
institutional environment (see Chapters 2, 3, 4). Both in comparative analyses and in 
case-studies, it would therefore be improper to look at this association without taking 
the conditioning role of state institutions into account.
Hierarchical modeling has its own share of risks, especially in cross-national re-
search where the number of cases at the higher level is often rather small. This study 
acknowledged these limitations and faced them head on by offering several tests to 
cope with them: analyzing several modes of participation and applying alternative 
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measures for the determinants to limit cross-cultural differences, carefully building 
up complex models, robustness checks on influential cases, perturbation analyses to 
check for harmful collinearity. These tests are rather time-consuming, but necessary 
to assess the validity and reliability of the outcomes. 
How to proceed in cross-national analysis on citizen participation? A first option 
is to increase the number of countries, if not to get more power and robustness into 
the hierarchical models, than at least to increase their external validity, i.e., general-
ization. However, although raising the number of countries can be very beneficial in 
principle, it is not necessarily the best way to go at this point – at least not when the 
increase is with culturally, politically and/or historically very different (non-Western) 
countries. This might lead to several problems, also in terms of comparable data 
collection. When the most-similar design is lost, scholars need to take more charac-
teristics into account, like differing cultures and differing history. Moreover, scholars 
risk analyzing countries by measures that are not cross-culturally equivalence (Adam 
2008), for instance by including countries where participation in community life 
(and in survey research) is not voluntary. Finally, there is an increased risk of influ-
ential cases for which we suggest some graphical and numerical diagnostic tests (Van 
der Meer et al. 2009). Rather than opting for more countries like in the wvs, scholars 
do well to select their sample of countries with care. In a most similar design effects 
and mechanisms can be assessed more specifically than in other designs. Regardless, 
cross-national studies should take issues of validity and reliability seriously by doing 
diagnostic tests for influential cases and perturbation analyses.
Rather than widening the research in terms of countries, we call for deepening 
the cross-national analysis. By doing more in-depth studies, scholars should move 
forward from testing (contextual) effects on social, civic, and political participation to 
analyzing the theoretically proposed mechanisms underlying these effects. Given the 
theoretical connectedness and the high correlations, scholars might proceed theoreti-
cally by measuring and analyzing social, civic, and political participation simultane-
ously. This illuminates differential effects of individual and contextual determinants, 
and allows the distinction between direct and indirect effects. The use of longitudi-
nal data – and especially panel data – would also enable stringent tests of the effects 
of institutional change on participation. They could illuminate whether institutional 
change affects citizen participation, and if so, if there is a time lag. 
Whereas panel data remain (too) costly, longitudinal data on citizen participa-
tion are increasingly available, both within and between countries. Longitudinal data 
can shed light on the effects of institutional change too. Scholars should distinguish 
between two types of institutional change: ‘episodic and dramatic’ (Krasner 1984) 
and ‘incremental and gradual’ change (North 1995). These types of change need 
not have similar effects. Episodic and dramatic change is more likely to have strong 
period or cohort effects. Some studies have been done to see whether citizen partici-
pation changed in post-communist countries (Völker and Flap 2001; Howard 2003a; 
Uslaner and Badescu 2003). Incremental and gradual change may be more difficult 
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to analyze, but is also the most common form of institutional change. If institutions 
indeed affect citizen participation, as we claim in this dissertation, this should also 
be evidenced in incremental change.
Policy implications
The findings of this dissertation are, finally, also relevant for policy makers. Political 
theorists have renewed ideological emphases on citizen participation in community 
life in distinct ideological branches such as neo-conservatism, communitarianism, 
Third Way social-democracy and liberal-democracy. Under their influence, political 
parties and governments have aimed to stimulate social, civic, and political participa-
tion. 
The findings in this dissertation imply that the institutional context is indeed 
an important determinant of social, civic, and political participation. Perhaps just 
as importantly, this dissertation also shows some ways in which citizen participation 
– contrary to popular, scholarly and political belief – is not affected by institutional 
designs. The crowding out thesis, according to which social security is harmful to 
social and civic participation, finds little support; rather, social security expenditure 
stimulates civic participation. Consensual regimes are not superior to majoritarian 
regimes when it comes to the democratic demand of high and equal levels of politi-
cal participation. Finally, voluntary associations are not the schools of democracy 
they are proposed to be in the neo-Tocquevillian theory.
Although institutional contexts are relevant determinants of citizen participation, 
this dissertation is not a call for all-out institutional (re-)designing for several reasons. 
First, individual characteristics of citizens are by far more important determinants of 
social, civic, and political participation than the institutional environment. Second, 
states are more likely to affect the participation rates of the poor than those of the 
rich. Because they have less resources of their own, poor citizens depend more on 
state characteristics. The rich, on the other hand, are more immune to state influenc-
es. Third, policy measures may have contrary effects on different forms of participa-
tion. For instance, civil rights enforcement and social security expenditure may both 
stimulate civic participation but hamper social participation along primordial ties. Fi-
nally, although this dissertation studied the effects of institutional configurations on 
citizen participation, it did not study the (short-term) effects of institutional change. 
This is the next step in which research on institutional effects should be taken.
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Appendix A. countries under study And stAte level indicAtors
Social 
security 
(% gdp)
GNI/capita 
ppp
Years of 
democratic 
rule
Civil rights 
enforcement Corruption Religiosity
Australia 15.6 24840 80 7 1.7 24.9
Austria 29.4 28340 54 7 2.3 32.1
Canada 20.0 26630 80 7 0.8 36.5
Czech Republic 21.2 15020 9 6 5.7 13.4
Denmark 28.6 27970 80 7 0.2 8.4
Finland 26.3 25260 80 7 0.0 8.2
Great Britain 23.8 27990 80 6 1.3 20.8
Hungary 19.3 12610 9 6 4.8 17.2
Israel 19.4 22500 52 5 3.4 23.1
Italy 12.5 24830 54 6 5.4 39.7
Latvia 17.6 7940 8 6 6.6 13.0
Netherlands 21.4 28930 80 7 1.1 19.3
New Zealand 16.0 18490 80 7 0.6 21.3
Norway 24.6 33830 80 7 0.9 9.0
Poland 23.0 10320 9 6 5.9 69.6
Russia 10.1 6900 8 3 7.9 8.7
Slovenia 25.6 16920 8 6 4.5 26.4
Spain 19.0 21340 22 6 3.0 32.5
Switzerland 26.5 32830 80 7 1.4 24.4
United States 16.0 34570 80 7 2.2 44.8
Table AI. Chapter 2: International Social Survey Programme 2002
Social 
security 
(% gdp)
GNI/capita 
ppp
Years of 
democratic 
rule
Civil rights 
enforcement Corruption
Austria 28 29888 56 7 2.2
Belgium 24 29200 82 7 2.9
Switzerland 18 34019 82 7 1.5
Czech Republic 20 16376 11 6 6.3
West Germany 29 26537 53 7 2.7
East Germany 29 26537 11 7 2.7
Denmark 31 29643 82 7 0.5
Spain 18 23046 24 7 2.9
Finland 28 27006 82 7 0.3
France 29 27684 82 7 3.7
Great Britain 22 28803 82 7 1.3
Greece 24 19599 27 6 5.8
Hungary 20 13901 11 6 5.1
Ireland n.a. 30000 81 7 3.1
Israel 20 22166 54 5 2.7
Italy 25 26363 56 7 4.8
Luxembourg 24 55995 82 7 1.0
Netherlands 22 30088 82 7 1.0
Norway 26 36245 82 7 1.5
Poland 25 11110 11 6 6.0
Portugal 20 18684 27 7 3.7
Sweden 31 27405 82 7 0.7
Slovenia 26 18615 10 7 4.0
Table AII. Chapter 2: European Social Survey 2002
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Bureau-
cracy size 
(% gdp)
Local tax 
share 
(%gdp)
Social 
security 
(% gdp)
gdp/ 
capita 
pps
Years of 
democra-
tic rule
Civil rights 
enforce-
ment
Corrup-
tion
Austria 10 16 28 119.9 56 7 2.2
Belgium 12 7 24 117.5 82 7 2.9
West Germany 8 2 29 108.6 53 7 2.7
East Germany 8 2 29 108.6 11 7 2.7
Denmark 18 36 31 121.4 82 7 0.5
Spain 10 14 18 95.2 24 7 2.9
Finland 14 29 28 112.2 82 7 0.3
France 14 18 29 112.0 82 7 3.7
Great Britain 10 5 22 116.0 82 7 1.3
Greece 12 1 24 77.2 27 6 5.8
Hungary 12 16 20 58.1 11 6 5.1
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. 132.9 81 7 3.1
Israel 17 8 20 91.6 54 5 2.7
Italy 11 22 25 110.1 56 7 4.8
Netherlands 11 6 22 125.3 82 7 1.0
Norway 14 17 26 146.6 82 7 1.5
Poland 10 14 25 46.3 11 6 6.0
Portugal 15 9 20 79.5 27 7 3.7
Sweden 16 46 31 113.7 82 7 0.7
Slovenia 13 14 26 74.5 10 7 4.0
Table AIII. Chapters 3 and 4: European Social Survey 2002
Social 
security 
(% gdp)
gdp/ capita 
pps
Years of 
democratic rule
Former regime 
type (pre 1975) Statism
Austria 28 119.9 56 democratic statist
Belgium 24 117.5 82 democratic statist
West Germany 29 108.6 53 democratic statist
East Germany 29 108.6 11 nondemocratic statist
Denmark 31 121.4 82 democratic nonstatist
Spain 18 95.2 24 nondemocratic statist
France 29 112.0 82 democratic statist
Great Britain 22 116.0 82 democratic nonstatist
Greece 24 77.2 27 nondemocratic statist
Hungary 20 58.1 11 nondemocratic statist
Ireland n.a. 132.9 81 democratic nonstatist
Netherlands 22 125.3 82 democratic nonstatist
Norway 26 146.6 82 democratic nonstatist
Poland 25 46.3 11 nondemocratic statist
Portugal 20 79.5 27 nondemocratic statist
Sweden 31 113.7 82 democratic nonstatist
Slovenia 26 74.5 10 nondemocratic statist
Table AV. Chapter 7: European Social Survey 2002
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Appendix b. perturbAtion AnAlyses
High correlations among the level 2 determinants (in addition to the relatively small 
sample size at level 2) in our hierarchical analyses might lead to incorrect conclu-
sions, as the effects may overlap and the coefficients might be the result of chance. 
To test whether this is the case or that the found coefficients on the level 2 deter-
minants are stable, we performed perturbation analyses (Belsley 1991) on the ran-
dom intercept models (i.e., Table 2.4 for social participation along primordial ties; 
Table 2.7a and 2.8a for social participation along secondary ties; Table 3.4 for civic 
participation).1 
This procedure goes as follows. Basically, we reran the statistical models one hun-
dred times. For each of these hundred tests we introduced different small random 
errors in our measures at the country level. For instance, for our measure of social 
security expenditure in Chapter 2 we added a maximal error term of no less than 2% 
gdp per country. The software assigned randomly a score from a uniform distribu-
tion (minimum is –2, maximum is 2) and this score was added to the observed social 
security score. For Austria for instance the score used in each of the perturbations 
was somewhere between 27.4% (29.4–2) and 31.4% (29.4 + 2). We tried to enter 
reasonable, but large errors to have a more conservative test.
If the coefficients found in the respective tables are not stable due to harm-
ful multicollinearity, we would expect that they would be strongly affected by the 
introduction of random errors simultaneously in all measures. We tested for each 
of the one hundred perturbations the resulting coefficients in a similar hierarchical 
modeling procedure. Most important questions are (1) how often are the coefficients 
significant determinants? and (2) how often are the significant coefficients in the 
same direction as those in the original tables?
So, we reran one hundred extra hierarchical analyses besides those reported in 
the respective tables, while introducing differing random error terms for each of 
these analyses separately. Then we compared the resulting coefficients with those in 
the original models. 
I. Chapter 2. Social participation along primordial ties
When we compare the findings of table BI.a to those of model 1a in Table 2.4, we 
find confirmation that the coefficients of social security expenditure and economic 
development are generally not significant (neither at the .05 nor at the .10 level). 
Despite the error terms and general insignificant coefficients, these parameters of 
economic development are in the same direction as the one we found in model 1a. 
The coefficients of civil rights and years of democracy are found to be stable (all in 
the same direction) and significant at the .10 level in resp. 88 and 100% of the cases. 
Table BI.b is strongly in line with model 2a in Table 2.4. Model BI.b reports three 
1  We do not apply the perturbation analysis to political participation (Chapter 5), as the correlations 
between determinants are much weaker, and the ratio of contextual determinants to contextual cases is lower.
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Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 0% 0% 48%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 36% 75% 100%
Civil Rights 0.3 points 88% 100% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 100% 100% 100%
Table BI.a. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation with the nuclear family’a
a Compare to Table 2.4, model 1a
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 0% 0% 68%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 99% 100% 100%
Civil Rights 0.3 points 100% 100% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 100% 100% 100%
Table BI.b. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation with the closest friend’b
b Compare to Table 2.4, model 2a
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 59% 90% 100%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 100% 100% 100%
Civil Rights 0.3 points 17% 54% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 100% 100% 100%
Table BI.c. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation with the extended family’c
significant determinants: gdp/capita ppp, Years of democracy and Civil rights. For all 
three determinants we find 100% of the coefficients from the perturbation analyses 
is significant at the .10 level, and in all cases the direction of the coefficients is in line 
with that of the coefficients found in model 2a. In none of the perturbations the 
effect of social security expenditure reaches significance.
Finally, table BI.c supports model 3a in Table 2.4. Economic development and 
years of democracy are significant at the .05-level in all cases, and the direction of the 
effects is in line with that of model 3a for all perturbations. Civil rights, on the other 
hand, hardly ever reaches significance. So far, all is in line with model 3a. However, 
the effect of social security expenditure on participation with the extended family 
should be examined more closely. Although the direction of the effect is in line with 
the findings of model 3a, social security is a significant determinant of participation 
with the extended family in 59% of the perturbations. However in 90% of the per-
turbations, social security is a significant determinant at the .20 level)
Concluding, the perturbation analyses show that the effects found in Table 2.4 
c Compare to Table 2.4, model 3a
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are generally very stable, both in significance and in direction. 
II. Chapter 2. Social participation along secondary ties
When we compare the findings of Table BII.a to those of model B in Table 2.7, we 
find confirmation that the coefficients are generally not significant (neither at the 
.05 nor at the .10 level). This is in line with model B, where none of the level 2 deter-
minants were significant. However, despite the error terms and general insignificant 
coefficients, these coefficients are in the same direction in nearly all analyses.
Table BII.b, in turn, is much in line with model B in Table 2.8. Model B reports 3 
significant determinants: gdp/capita ppp, Years of democracy and Corruption. For 
the latter two determinants we find that resp. 97% and 81% of the coefficients from 
the perturbation analyses is significant as well at the .05 level, and 100% is signifi-
cant at the .10 level. The coefficient of gdp/capita ppp is less stable. Partly due to its 
large error term of 1500 dollars, 50% of the coefficients in the perturbation analyses 
is significant at the .05 level and 80% is significant at the .10 level. Nevertheless, 
again in nearly all cases (and for the significant determinants of model 3b: in all 
cases) the direction of the coefficients is in line with that of the coefficients found in 
model 3b.
Concluding, the perturbation analyses show that the effects found in models 
B are rather stable, both in significance and in direction. The effect of economic 
development (gdp/capita ppp) on providing help is least stable, but even there 80% is 
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 1% 12% 100%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 1% 2% 97%
Civil Rights 0.3 points 3% 7% 93%
Corruption 0.3 points 4% 5% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 0% 1% 100%
Table BII.a. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘frequency of social meetings’a
a Compare to Table 2.7, model B
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 1% 1% 92%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 50% 80% 100%
Civil Rights 0.3 points 1% 1% 91%
Corruption 0.3 points 81% 100% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 97% 100% 100%
Table BII.b. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘providing help to others’b
b Compare to Table 2.8, model B
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significant at the 0.10 level, and the direction is positive in all cases.
III. Chapter 3. Civic participation
For the logistic regression analyses on civic participation, we only did fifty perturba-
tions instead of a hundred, as – unlike the linear regression analyses – each of these 
models had to be read separately and the estimation procedure had to be started 
manually in ML-Win.
When we compare the findings of Table Biii.a to those of the Leisure model in Table 
3.4, we find confirmation that the coefficients of economic development is generally 
not significant (neither at the .05 nor at the .10 level). Despite the error terms and 
general insignificant coefficients, these parameters of economic development are in 
the same direction as the one we found in the original model. The coefficients of 
national level of religiosity, social security expenditure, civil rights enforcement and 
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 74% 88% 100%
gdp/Cap pps 3 pps 28% 42% 92%
Civil Rights Enforcement 0.3 points 76% 94% 100%
Years of democracy 1 year 94% 98% 100%
National level of religiosity 0.3 points 100% 100% 100%
Table BIII.a. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation in leisure organizations’a
a Compare to Table 3.4, Leisure
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
Social security expenditure 2% gdp 94% 98% 100%
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 0% 4% 92%
Corruption 1 year 98% 100% 100%
National level of religiosity 0.3 points 0% 0% 62%
Table BIII.b. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation in interest organizations’b
b Compare to Table 3.4, Interest
Maximal 
errorterm
% sign.
p < 0.05
% sign.
p < 0.10
% same 
direction
gdp/Cap ppp $1500 58% 76% 100%
Civil Rights Enforcement 0.3 points 78% 92% 100%
Corruption 0.3 points 82% 88% 98%
Years of democracy 1 year 10% 20% 100%
National level of religiosity 0.3 points 6% 22% 94%
Table BIII.c. Significance and direction of level 2 coefficients on ‘participation in activist organizations’c
a Compare to Table 3.4, Activist
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years of democracy are found to be stable (all in the same direction) and significant 
at the .10 level in resp. 100%, 88%, 94% and 98% of the cases. 
Table Biii.b is strongly in line with the Interest model in Table 4. Table Biii.b 
reports two significant determinants: social security expenditure and corruption. For 
both determinants we find that in all cases the direction of the coefficients is in line 
with that of the coefficients found in the original model. These effects are significant 
at the .10 level in respectively 98% and 100% of the cases. Like in Table 3.4 the ef-
fects of national level of religiosity and economic development is generally positive 
(in respectively 62% and 92% of the cases), but hardly ever significant at the .10 level 
(in respectively 0% and 4% of the cases).
Finally, Table Biii.c largely supports the Activist model in Table 3.4. National 
level of religiosity has a positive effect in 94% of the cases, and is rarely significant 
(22% at the .10 level). Civil rights enforcement stimulates participation in activist 
organizations in all models, and significantly so in 92% of the cases at the .10 level. 
Corruption has a positive effect in 98% of the cases, and is significant in 88% of the 
cases at the .10 level. Years of democratic rule generally has a positive effect (94%), 
but is rarely significant (20% at the .10 level). We are more cautious regarding the 
effect of economic development on participation in activist organizations: it shows a 
positive effect in all of our perturbations, yet it is significant in only 58% of the cases 
at the .05 level and 76% of the cases at the .10 level. Although significant in a major-
ity of the cases, this indicates a risk of Type 1 errors with regards to this relationship.
With this exception in mind, the perturbation analyses show that the effects in 
Table 3.4 are otherwise very stable, both in significance and in direction.
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Appendix c. full structurAl models: direct And indirect effects
The estimation of Model v in Chapter 7 has an additional advantage, namely that it 
combines the hierarchical analyses of Chapters 2, 3 and 6 in a single model. Many 
individual and contextual level determinants are regressed on social, civic, and politi-
cal participation simultaneously (see Figure CI). 
Model v differs from models in previous chapters in three ways. First, the respective 
modes of social, civic, and political participation have been combined in three fac-
tors. Model v shows overall effects, rather than the detailed effects for specific modes 
of the previous chapters. It therefore cancels out the differential effects we found 
in several chapters between different modes of a single form of participation, for 
instance with regards to gender and denomination. Second, the effects are estimated 
simultaneously for three significantly related factors. Effects need not be direct, but 
may also be indirect: by affecting one form of participation, indirectly (i.e. through 
their correlation) the other forms are also affected. This was not the case in the previ-
ous chapters, which analyzed each mode of participation in isolation and assessed 
the overall effects (i.e. the direct and indirect effects combined) for each mode of 
participation separately. Third, the model is split between longstanding democra-
cies (Table C1) and newly established democracies (Table C2). As a consequence, 
Figure CI. Schematic overview of structural model V
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especially the contextual effects cannot easily be compared with those we found in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6: the effects are based on subsets of countries. For instance, the 
effect of age of a democracy may very well be different, as we effectively split the 
countries between longstanding and newly established democracies. We can think 
of many configurations in which this split might result in fully different parameter 
estimations compared to the original models. 
Table CI. Full structural model (longstanding democracies)
Social Civic Political
participation participation participation
Correlations
Social participation 1 0.27 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01)
Civic participation 0.27 (0.01) 1 0.44 (0.01)
Political participation 0.26 (0.01) 0.44 (0.01) 1
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.08 (0.01) 0.15 (0.02) 0.14 (0.01)
Income 0.02 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
∙ unemployed -0.11 (0.02) -0.14 (0.05) -0.10 (0.05)
∙ other social benefit -0.08 (0.03) -0.11 (0.04) -0.05 (0.05)
∙ other 0.13 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03) 0.13 (0.03)
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.01 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
Length of residence (10 years) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00)
Urbanization 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman 0.02 (0.01) -0.04 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
∙ separated 0.00 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05)
∙ widowed 0.01 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02)
∙ unmarried 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02)
Household size -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01)
Children at home -0.05 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.05 (0.03) -0.06 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)
∙ Protestant 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox 0.02 (0.08) -0.23 (0.12) -0.29 (0.10)
∙ Other -0.03 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04)
Attendance of religious services 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.15 (0.04) 0.20 (0.03) 0.20 (0.04)
State level determinants
Economic development (/10) 0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Corruption -0.07 (0.01) -0.08 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03)
Years of democracy (/10) -0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
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Table CII. Full structural model (newly established democracies)
Social Civic Political
participation participation participation
Correlations
Social participation 1 0.23 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01)
Civic participation 0.23 (0.02) 1 0.37 (0.03)
Political participation 0.22 (0.01) 0.37 (0.03) 1
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.07 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.11 (0.01)
Income 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
∙ unemployed 0.02 (0.04) -0.09 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
∙ other social benefit -0.01 (0.10) -0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04)
∙ other 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Length of residence (10 years) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Urbanization 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.02 (0.02) -0.07 (0.01) -0.04 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
∙ separated -0.09 (0.06) -0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
∙ widowed -0.09 (0.03) -0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02)
∙ unmarried -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Household size 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Children at home -0.06 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.04 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.04)
∙ Orthodox -0.06 (0.05) -0.06 (0.03) -0.22 (0.09)
∙ Other 0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.04)
Attendance of religious services 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.24 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.32 (0.03)
State level determinants
Economic development (/10) 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.01) 0.13 (0.03)
Corruption -0.11 (0.04) -0.03 (0.01) 0.07 (0.05)
Years of democracy (/10) 0.02 (0.04) -0.07 (0.01) 0.06 (0.03)
stAtes of freely AssociAting citizens
230
Appendix d. mokken scAles for civic pArticipAtion, by country
In paragraph 3.4 we constructed three measures of civic participation – in leisure, 
interest and activist organizations – using Mokken scale analysis (Van Schuur 2003). 
We tested whether we could construct a single, hierarchical participation-scale, based 
on the four modes of civic participation. In this Appendix we will delve deeper into 
the Mokken scale analysis.
Scalability
First, we performed a Mokken scale analysis on the pooled data set to test the scal-
ability of the items for each type of association separately. There are very strong 
scales for leisure (0.58) and interest (0.60) organizations. The H-coefficient of activist 
organizations is substantially lower (0.40), but nevertheless implies that the items 
construct a Mokken scale. For leisure organizations we find that membership is the 
least difficult item, followed by active participation, volunteering and donation. For 
interest organizations the ordering from least to most difficult item is membership, 
active participation, donation and volunteering. Finally, for activist organizations this 
ordering is donation, membership, active participation and volunteering.
Next, we tested whether these three scales also fit each of the different countries 
in our data set. With the exception of three countries (Finland, Israel and Italy) they 
did. The use of the Mokken scales is hereby supported for all countries in our data 
set, save Finland, Israel and Italy. Yet, in turn this raises the question why we cannot 
construct scales for these three countries. 
Closer inspection of the data provides a possible explanation. In Finland, Israel 
and Italy very few respondents crossed more than one box for each type of associa-
tion (c.f. Figures 3.1a–3.1c). The ess was constructed, so that people could report 
for each mode of participation whether that applied to them. In other words, 
respondents are enabled to classify themselves both as, for instance, a member and 
a volunteer. Yet, less than 10% of the Finnish respondents, and approximately 5% 
of the Israeli and Italian respondents did classify themselves under more than one 
header. Generally, for each type of organization they classified themselves as either a 
nonparticipant, a member, an active participant, a donator or a volunteer. Moreover, 
there is hardly any overlap between modes of participation. We do find members, as 
well as volunteers. Yet, we hardly find any members who are also volunteers in Fin-
land, Israel and Italy. Probably the respondents in Finland, Israel and Italy classified 
themselves under the header that fits them best (f.i. either a member, or a volunteer), 
whereas the respondents in the other countries in the ess data set reported for each 
mode of participation whether they participated in that manner or not (f.i. both 
active as a member and as a volunteer). These differences may in turn be caused by 
instruction or interpretation differences.
Different patterns
Finally, we analysed for each country which ordering would make an optimized Mokken 
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scale (see Table D). Again, we found that no scales could be constructed for Finland, Is-
rael and Italy. Unsurprisingly, we found that the orderings in most countries are in line 
with the sequence of items in the scale of the pooled data set. For leisure and interest 
organizations, the main differences are found in the sequence of the two most difficult 
items: voluntary work and donation of money. Effectively, the proportion of the popula-
tion that engages in these acts is so small, yet overlaps so strongly, that this explains why 
some countries show different sequences than the dominant pattern.
Interestingly, despite all the possible differences between countries and between 
types of voluntary association, a more general pattern is found. When we leave out 
the item ‘donation of money’, the ordering from least to most difficult items is 
identical in nearly all countries for all three types of organizations, namely: member-
ship – active participation – voluntary work.2 Apparently, the difficulty of donation 
of money differs across types of voluntary associations, and to a lesser extent across 
countries. Donation of money is the most difficult item (i.e. more difficult than vol-
untary work) for leisure organizations, the second-most difficult item (i.e. more diffi-
cult than active participation, but less than voluntary work) for interest organizations 
and the least difficult item (i.e. less difficult than membership) for activist organiza-
tions. Theoretically, it is rather surprising that donating money rolls out as a difficult 
item for leisure and interest organizations, as Putnam and others in the social capital 
debate consider ‘checkbook membership’ to be an easy and possibly inconsequential 
form of participation. Empirically, however, the Mokken scale analysis shows that 
(nearly) only those who participate actively (in interest organizations) or even only 
those who volunteer (in leisure organizations) donate money. This makes it a rather 
intense form of participation for these types of organizations.
Besides the sequence of items from least to most difficult, we find differences in 
the scalability of the items, both between types of association and between countries. 
In general we find that the strength of the Mokken scales of participation in activist 
organizations is lower than those of leisure and interest organizations. Apparently, 
there is a less strict hierarchy in the items. Closer inspection shows that there are 
relatively more errors between the easy items for participation in activist organiza-
tions. Quite a few members of activist organizations do not report to donate to these 
organizations, and vice versa. This may be caused by unclarity of terminology. What, 
for instance, does it constitute to be a member and/or a donator of an environmen-
tal organization (like Greenpeace) or a humanitarian organization (like Amnesty)? Is 
it even truly possible to formally become a member of these organizations? Neverthe-
less, despite the possible conceptual unclarity, the H-coefficients are sufficiently large 
(>.3) for the scale of participation in activist organizations in all countries but the 
before mentioned Finland, Israel and Italy. Outside these three countries, the differ-
ences between countries in scalability are generally rather small, and present no clear 
pattern across types of organization. 
2  The three exceptions to this rule are activist organisations in Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovenia.
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Table D. Scalability of civic participation items, by type of association, by countrya
Social Civic Political
participation participation participation
Pooled data set H = 0.58 H = 0.60 H = 0.40 
(MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Austria H = 0.46 H = 0.50 H = 0.29
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Belgium H = 0.56 H = 0.48 H = 0.34
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
West Germany H = 0.65 H = 0.70 H = 0.47
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
East Germany H = 0.63 H = 0.73 H = 0.34
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
Denmark H = 0.65 H = 0.62 H = 0.46
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Spain H = 0.60 H = 0.60 H = 0.38
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (DAMV)
Finland H = 0.04 H =-0.07 H = 0.06
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
France H = 0.60 H = 0.65 H = 0.37
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Great Britain H = 0.61 H = 0.66 H = 0.57
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Greece H = 0.81 H = 0.87 H = 0.66
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (MDAV)
Hungary H = 0.57 H = 0.77 H = 0.28
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (ADVM)
Ireland H = 0.56 H = 0.68 H = 0.52
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Israel H = 0.21 H = 0.22 H = 0.19
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Italy H = 0.08 H = 0.04 H = 0.02
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Luxembourg H = 0.57 H = 0.56 H = 0.45
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (MDAV)
Netherlands H = 0.51 H = 0.53 H = 0.39
 (MAVD)  (MADV)  (DMVA)
Norway H = 0.63 H = 0.65 H = 0.38
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
Poland H = 0.61 H = 0.64 H = 0.43
 (MADV)  (MADV)  (DMAV)
Portugal H = 0.57 H = 0.62 H = 0.37
 (MADV)  (MDAV)  (DAMV)
Sweden H = 0.59 H = 0.71 H = 0.58
 (MAVD)  (MAVD)  (DMAV)
Slovenia H = 0.48 H = 0.69 H = 0.45
 (MAVD)  (MDAV)  (DMVA)
a The H-Coefficients indicates the strength of the Mokken scale. Between brackets 
we present the sequence of civic participation items from the easiest (relatively 
high percentage of the population participates in this mode) to the most difficult 
(relatively low percentage of the population participates in this mode). ‘M’ repre-
sents membership of a voluntary association. ‘A’ represents active participation in 
the activities deployed by a voluntary association. ‘V’ represents volunteering for a 
voluntary association. ‘D’ represents donating money to a voluntary association. 
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Appendix e. stepwise input of contextuAl determinAnts of civic  
  pArticipAtion
 
Table EI. Leisure organizations, hierarchical, logistic regression: stepwise
Leisure Composition Crowding Resource Public Full
+ religiosity out sphere model
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01)
Income 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03)
∙ unemployed -0.41 (0.07) -0.40 (0.07) -0.41 (0.07) -0.42 (0.08) -0.42 (0.07)
∙ other social benefit -0.07 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) -0.07 (0.05) -0.07 (0.06)
∙ other 0.30 (0.07) 0.30 (0.07) 0.30 (0.07) 0.31 (0.07) 0.31 (0.07)
Age 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Length of residence 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization -0.07 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.28 (0.02) -0.28 (0.02) -0.28 (0.02) -0.28 (0.02) -0.28 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
∙ separated 0.12 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07)
∙ widowed 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
∙ unmarried 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Household size 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Children at home -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03)
∙ Protestant 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02)
∙ Orthodox 0.11 (0.13) 0.10 (0.12) 0.06 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12) 0.09 (0.12)
∙ Other -0.26 (0.05) -0.26 (0.05) -0.27 (0.05) -0.27 (0.05) -0.27 (0.05)
Attendance of religious services 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.55 (0.07) 0.56 (0.07) 0.56 (0.06) 0.56 (0.06) 0.56 (0.06)
Time spent watching tv -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01)
Time spent watching politics on tv 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
State level determinants
National level of religiosity -0.98 (0.13) -0.90 (0.13) -0.45 (0.12) -0.42 (0.11) -0.41 (0.10)
Size of bureaucracy -0.11 (3.84) -
Decentralization -0.37 (1.20) -
Social security expenditure 4.98 (2.78) 2.97 (1.57) 2.57 (1.14)
Economic development (/10) 0.15 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
Civil rights enforcement 0.50 (0.19) 0.49 (0.17)
Corruption -0.06 (0.06) -
Years of democracy (/10) 0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
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Table EII. Interest organizations, hierarchical, logistic regression: stepwise
Interest Composition Crowding Resource Public Full
+ religiosity out sphere model
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Income 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned -0.42 (0.04) -0.42 (0.04) -0.43 (0.04) -0.43 (0.04) -0.43 (0.04)
∙ unemployed -0.48 (0.09) -0.48 (0.09) -0.49 (0.09) -0.49 (0.09) -0.49 (0.09)
∙ other social benefit -0.52 (0.08) -0.52 (0.08) -0.52 (0.08) -0.52 (0.07) -0.53 (0.08)
∙ other -0.32 (0.11) -0.32 (0.11) -0.32 (0.10) -0.32 (0.10) -0.32 (0.10)
Age 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.08 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00) -0.08 (0.00)
Length of residence 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01)
Urbanization -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman -0.36 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02) -0.36 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
∙ separated -0.18 (0.09) -0.18 (0.09) -0.19 (0.09) -0.19 (0.09) -0.19 (0.09)
∙ widowed -0.28 (0.06) -0.28 (0.06) -0.28 (0.06) -0.28 (0.06) -0.28 (0.06)
∙ unmarried -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
Household size -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01)
Children at home 0.09 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.09 (0.03) -0.09 (0.04) -0.09 (0.04) -0.09 (0.04) -0.09 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox -0.22 (0.15) -0.23 (0.14) -0.24 (0.14) -0.18 (0.14) -0.18 (0.14)
∙ Other -0.21 (0.06) -0.21 (0.06) -0.21 (0.06) -0.21 (0.06) -0.21 (0.06)
Attendance of religious services 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.44 (0.08) 0.44 (0.08) 0.44 (0.08) 0.44 (0.08) 0.44 (0.08)
Time spent watching tv -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01)
Time spent watching politics on tv 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
State level determinants
National level of religiosity -0.50 (0.15) -0.38 (0.14) -0.09 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.15)
Size of bureaucracy 1.59 (3.92) -
Decentralization -0.27 (1.22) -
Social security expenditure 6.12 (2.85) 4.79 (2.06) 4.27 (1.81)
Economic development (/10) 0.10 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05)
Civil rights enforcement -0.01 (0.30) -
Corruption -0.26 (0.09) -0.20 (0.08)
Years of democracy (/10) 0.00 (0.04) -
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
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Table EIII. Activist organizations, hierarchical, logistic regression: stepwise
Activist Composition Crowding Resource Public Full
+ religiosity out sphere model
Individual level determinants
Level of education 0.24 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01)
Income 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
Source of income (profit/salary)
∙ pensioned 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05)
∙ unemployed -0.17 (0.10) -0.17 (0.10) -0.18 (0.10) -0.17 (0.10) -0.17 (0.10)
∙ other social benefit 0.09 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07)
∙ other 0.45 (0.09) 0.45 (0.09) 0.45 (0.09) 0.45 (0.09) 0.45 (0.09)
Age 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Age-squared (/100) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
Length of residence -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Sex (man)
∙ woman 0.28 (0.03) 0.28 (0.03) 0.28 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02)
Marital status (married)
∙ divorced 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05)
∙ separated -0.07 (0.10) -0.07 (0.10) -0.07 (0.10) -0.07 (0.10) -0.07 (0.10)
∙ widowed -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
∙ unmarried -0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)
Household size -0.06 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02)
Children at home 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Religion (none)
∙ Catholic -0.10 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04) -0.11 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04)
∙ Protestant 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03)
∙ Orthodox -0.42 (0.18) -0.43 (0.18) -0.54 (0.17) -0.40 (0.17) -0.46 (0.17)
∙ Other -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07)
Attendance of religious services 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence 0.15 (0.08) 0.15 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08)
Time spent watching tv -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01)
Time spent watching politics on tv 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
State level determinants
National level of religiosity -0.74 (0.17) -0.69 (0.17) -0.01 (0.16) 0.10 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13)
Size of bureaucracy 3.49 (4.96) -
Decentralization 0.48 (1.55) -
Social security expenditure 3.42 (3.60) 2.41 (1.97) -
Economic development (/10) 0.22 (0.04) 0.08 (0.05)
Civil rights enforcement 0.88 (0.30) 0.73 (0.24)
Corruption -0.16 (0.07) -0.13 (0.07)
Years of democracy (/10) 0.06 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Logistic hierarchical regression analysis, PQL, 2nd order.
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between brackets.
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Appendix f.  fActor models for eight modes of pArticipAtion
(y1)
(y2)
(y3) 
(y4) 
(y5) 
(y6) 
(y7) 
(y8) 
Table FI. Three factor model (Figure 7.1c)
Social Civic Political
participation participation participation
Correlations
Social participation 1 0.57 0.53
Civic participation 0.57 1 0.83
Political participation 0.53 0.83 1
Factor loadings
Y1. Meeting socially 0.49 - -
Y2. Intimate discussions 0.46 - -
Y3. Providing help 0.37 - -
Y4. Leisure organizations - 0.63 -
Y5. Interest organizations - 0.60 -
Y6. Activist organizations - 0.68 -
Y7. Conventional political action - - 0.61
Y8. Nonconventional political action - - 0.80
meeting socially with friends, relatives or colleagues
having anyone to have intimate discussions with
providing help to others, not counting (paid) work nor work for voluntary organizations 
participation in leisure organizations 
participation in interest organizations
participation in activist organizations
conventional political action (contacting a politician, working for a political party, wearing a cam-
paign badge and/or donating money to a political organization)
non-conventional political action (participating in a lawful demonstration, product boycott, signing a 
petition, boycotts and/or illegal protests)
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(y1)
(y2)
(y3) 
(y4) 
(y5) 
(y6) 
(y7) 
(y8) 
Table FII. Three factor model with cross-loadings (Figure 7.1d) 
Social Civic Political
participation participation participation
Correlations
Social participation 1 0.48 0.52
Civic participation 0.48 1 0.73
Political participation 0.52 0.73 1
Factor loadings
Y1. Meeting socially 0.51 - -
Y2. Intimate discussions 0.46 - -
Y3. Providing help 0.36 - -
Y4. Leisure organizations 0.14 0.58 -
Y5. Interest organizations - 0.64 -
Y6. Activist organizations - 0.37 0.33
Y7. Conventional political action - - 0.61
Y8. Nonconventional political action - - 0.80
meeting socially with friends, relatives or colleagues
having anyone to have intimate discussions with
providing help to others, not counting (paid) work nor work for voluntary organizations 
participation in leisure organizations 
participation in interest organizations
participation in activist organizations
conventional political action (contacting a politician, working for a political party, wearing a cam-
paign badge and/or donating money to a political organization)
non-conventional political action (participating in a lawful demonstration, product boycott, signing a 
petition, boycotts and/or illegal protests)
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Burgers zijn als sociale wezens actief in diverse sferen van de maatschappij. Ze partici-
peren in de informele netwerken (van familie, vrienden en kennissen), in het maatschap-
pelijk middenveld (in verenigingen), en/of in de politiek (bijvoorbeeld door te stemmen 
of te demonstreren). Uit eerdere studies is bekend dat er aanzienlijke verschillen zijn 
tussen landen in de mate van burgerparticipatie. De ultieme vraag die in deze dissertatie 
centraal staat, is waarom dit het geval is. Waarom verschillen de patronen van burgerpar-
ticipatie tussen landen? Deze vraag is des te prangender, aangezien burgerparticipatie in 
verband wordt gebracht met allerlei positieve sociale, economische en politieke bijef-
fecten, voor zowel de actieve burgers zelf als voor de samenleving in het geheel.
In Hoofdstuk 1, de inleiding van het boek,  introduceer ik staatsinstituties als 
mogelijke verklaringen waarom burgers in diverse landen in verschillende mate 
participeren. Onder staatsinstituties versta ik de formele en informele regels die 
betrekking hebben op de staat, zoals de inrichting van het sociale zekerheidsstelsel, 
de centralisatie van de staat, en de mate waarin de staat burgerrechten garandeert. Ik 
ben niet de eerste die staatsinstituties aandraagt als verklaring. Toetsend, empirisch 
onderzoek op dit terrein was echter schaars en gefragmenteerd: het weinige onder-
zoek richtte zich op slechts één vorm van participatie of op één staatsinstitutie. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 beargumenteer ik dat een gestructureerd onderzoek naar de 
invloed van staatsinstituties op burgerparticipatie noodzakelijk is. Vandaar dat deze 
dissertatie meerdere vormen van burgerparticipatie simultaan bestudeert. Vanuit een 
eenduidig theoretisch raamwerk worden systematisch hypothesen afgeleid en getoetst 
met betrekking tot contextuele, individuele en cross-level interactie effecten op bur-
gerparticipatie. Bij de toetsing maak ik gebruik van geavanceerde analyses met uitge-
breide en gedetailleerde cross-nationale datasets. Bovendien beperk ik de reikwijdte 
van het onderzoek niet tot de invloed van staatsinstituties op het gemiddelde niveau 
van burgerparticipatie in een land. Ik onderzoek daarnaast of staatsinstituties van in-
vloed zijn op de ongelijkheid in participatie tussen sociale groepen (rijk en arm, links 
en rechts), alsook op de verbanden tussen de drie vormen van burgerparticipatie. 
Al met al staan de volgende onderzoeksvragen centraal in deze dissertatie:
1. In welke mate verklaart variatie in staatsinstituties dat niveaus van burger-
 participatie (in informele verbanden, in het verenigingleven en in de politiek) verschil- 
 len tussen landen?
2. In welke mate verklaart variatie in staatsinstituties dat de ongelijkheid in burger-  
 participatie tussen sociale groepen verschilt tussen landen?
3a. In welke mate hangen drie vormen van burgerparticipatie (in informele verbanden, in 
 het verenigingsleven en in de politiek) met elkaar samen in cross-nationale vergelijkingen?
3b. In welke mate conditioneert variatie in staatsinstituties de samenhang tussen de drie  
 vormen van burgerparticipatie?
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Vervolgens introduceer ik in Hoofdstuk 1 de overkoepelende theoretische bena-
dering, het actor-gericht nieuw-institutionalisme. Volgens deze benadering stellen 
(staats-) instituties de voorwaarden waarbinnen burgers rationele keuzes maken. 
Staatsinstituties hebben via twee mechanismen invloed op het gedrag van burgers. 
Het eerste mechanisme benadrukt dat burgers hulpbronnen hebben (als tijd, geld en 
sociale vaardigheden) om te participeren. De overheid kan collectieve hulpbronnen 
leveren of individuele hulpbronnen herverdelen. Het tweede mechanisme benadrukt 
dat burgers prikkels moeten hebben om te participeren. Zo kunnen burgers gemo-
tiveerd zijn actief te worden door de behoefte aan een economisch vangnet, of door 
de behoefte om invloed uit te oefenen op politieke kwesties. De overheid kan burgers 
via deze prikkels motiveren om actief te worden. Vanuit de literatuur over burger-
participatie en vanuit de twee mechanismen worden in hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 7 
verschillende theorieën gepresenteerd. Vanuit deze theorieën kom ik vervolgens tot 
specifieke, rivaliserende hypothesen die de verwachtingen over het effect van speci-
fieke individuele en contextuele kenmerken op burgerparticipatie expliciteren.
Tot slot beschrijf ik in Hoofdstuk 1 het methodologische raamwerk. Om de 
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden moeten we onderscheid maken tussen twee 
analyseniveaus: individuen (die participeren) en staatsinstituties (die dat zouden 
beïnvloeden). Om kenmerken van individuele burgers te meten, maak ik gebruik 
van bestaande crossnationale gegevens, verzameld onder de burgerbevolking van een 
groot aantal landen (issp 2001, ess 2002, cses 2001-2006, issp 2004). Aan deze ge-
gevens heb ik contextuele (lands-) kenmerken gekoppeld. Zo creëer ik databestanden 
van individuen die zijn genesteld in landen, met kenmerken op beide analyseniveaus. 
Deze geclusterde gegevens worden vervolgens geanalyseerd met verschillende vormen 
van clustercorrectie, voornamelijk door middel van verschillende vormen van multi-
niveau analyse. De empirische toetsing richt zich uitsluitend op westerse landen, zo-
wel om reden van cross-nationale vergelijkbaarheid als om de relatieve stabiliteit van 
staatsinstituties in die landen. Multivariate multiniveau analyses worden toegepast 
om de hypothesen te toetsen, onderwijl rekening houdend met een reeks alternatieve 
individuele en contextuele factoren. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 beantwoord ik de vraag in hoeverre staatinstituties verklaren waarom 
de participatiegraad in informele verbanden (sociale participatie) verschilt tussen 
landen. Ik maak onderscheid tussen twee vormen van sociale participatie: intieme 
banden met de nabije familie en de beste vriend enerzijds, en anderzijds algemenere 
informele banden met vrienden, kennissen, buren en collega’s. Drie institutionele 
theorieën staan centraal, op grond waarvan hypothesen geformuleerd en getoetst 
worden. De eerste theorie is de overwoekeringthese, volgens welke een uitgebreid 
systeem van sociale zekerheid schadelijk zou zijn voor sociale participatie. De ra-
tionale achter deze theorie is dat burgers hun familie, vrienden en kennissen niet 
langer nodig hebben als economisch vangnet, wanneer de staat garant staat voor de 
sociale zekerheid. Daarom zouden burgers minder prikkels hebben om met elkaar 
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om te gaan en dus minder participeren. Empirisch vind ik echter weinig bewijs voor 
de verwachting dat sociale zekerheidsuitgaven leiden tot minder sociale participatie: 
alleen de contacten met ooms, tantes, neven en nichten zijn significant geringer in 
landen met veel sociale zekerheidsuitgaven. De tweede theorie benadrukt de (col-
lectieve) economische hulpbronnen. Wanneer een land welvarender is zullen bur-
gers meer collectieve middelen hebben om actief te zijn vanwege onder meer betere 
fysieke en digitale infrastructuur. Inderdaad vind ik bewijs dat de economische 
ontwikkeling van een land vormen van sociale participatie stimuleert. De derde theo-
rie, de publieke sfeer these, benadrukt het belang van een vrije en neutrale publieke 
sfeer, gegarandeerd door burgerrechten, democratie en de afwezigheid van corruptie. 
Wanneer de publieke sfeer niet vrij en neutraal is, zullen burgers eerder terugvallen 
op met name de intieme banden (familie en goede vrienden). Dit was onder meer 
het geval onder de voormalige autoritaire en communistische regimes van Zuid- en 
Oost-Europa. De empirische bevindingen bevestigen deze verwachtingen goeddeels: 
sociale participatie is hoger in landen waar de overheid burgerrechten minder ver-
regaand steunt en in landen met een recent niet-democratisch verleden. De publieke 
sfeer these (burgerrechten en democratisch bestuur) blijkt de belangrijkste verklaring 
waarom sociale participatie verschilt tussen landen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 heeft eenzelfde theoretisch en methodologisch kader, dat ik toepas op 
participatie in verenigingen. Daartoe construeer ik eerst een empirisch gefundeerde 
typologie van deze vorm van burgerparticipatie. Op basis van de primaire doelstellin-
gen van de verenigingen maak ik onderscheid tussen (1) ontspanningsverenigingen, 
(2) belangenverenigingen, en (3) activistische verenigingen. Binnen deze drie typen 
verenigingen kunnen burgers verschillende activiteiten ontplooien – van passief lid-
maatschap of geld doneren tot actieve deelname aan activiteiten en vrijwilligerswerk. 
Uit (Mokken) analyses blijkt dat deze activiteiten per type vereniging een hiërarchis-
che schaal vormen (die overigens per type vereniging een andere invulling krijgt). 
Vervolgens toets ik dezelfde drie theorieën over de invloed van staatsinstituties als 
in Hoofdstuk 2, maar dan toegespitst op participatie in verenigingen. Ten eerste zijn 
volgens de overwoekeringthese grote, centralistische bureaucratieën en sociale zek-
erheid schadelijk voor participatie in verenigingen. Voor deze stelling vind ik echter 
geen bewijs. Ten tweede stelt de theorie van de publieke hulpbronnen dat burgers 
actiever zijn in het verenigingsleven in landen met meer sociale zekerheid en/of eco-
nomische welvaart, waarvoor ik in empirische analyses wel bewijs vind. Bovendien 
blijkt de invloed van de publieke hulpbronnen sterker te zijn voor arme burgers dan 
voor rijke burgers. Ook dit is in overeenstemming met de theorie. Ten derde volgt 
uit de publieke sfeer these dat burgers actiever zijn in het (publieke) verenigingsleven, 
wanneer zij gesterkt zijn door burgerrechten, de afwezigheid van corruptie en een 
democratisch bestuur. Voor deze verwachtingen vind ik eveneens empirisch bewijs in 
de analyses van Hoofdstuk 3.
Al met al komen we tot een aantal conclusies. Ten eerste verwerp ik (vooralsnog) 
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de overwoekeringthese voor participatie in verenigingen, terwijl ik wel evidentie vind 
voor de theorie van de publieke hulpbronnen en de publieke sfeer these. Ten tweede 
hebben publieke hulpbronnen nauwelijks invloed op de participatie in het vereni-
gingsleven van de rijkste inkomensgroepen, maar een sterke invloed op de partici-
patie van de armste inkomensgroepen.
In Hoofdstuk 4 benader ik het onderwerp participatie in verenigingen vanuit een 
ander perspectief. In dit hoofdstuk richt ik me op ongelijkheid in participatie en 
beantwoord ik de vraag in welke mate staatsinstituties invloed hebben op de mate 
van ongelijkheid in participatie in het verenigingsleven. Theoretisch staat het mecha-
nisme van hulpbronnen centraal in Hoofdstuk 4. Allereerst richt ik me op drie 
bronnen van ongelijkheid in burgerparticipatie: opleidingsniveau, inkomen en sekse. 
Redenerend vanuit het belang van hulpbronnen verwacht ik dat hoog opgeleiden, rij-
ken en mannen actiever zijn dan laag opgeleiden, armen en vrouwen, omdat de eerst 
genoemden door hun maatschappelijke positie meer hulpbronnen tot hun beschik-
king hebben als tijd, geld en sociale vaardigheden. Daardoor zouden zij ook actiever 
zijn in het verenigingsleven. Empirische analyses bevestigden deze verwachtingen 
goeddeels. Er is slechts één uitzondering: hoewel mannen actiever zijn in ontspan-
ningsverenigingen en in belangenverenigingen, zijn vrouwen actiever in activistische 
verenigingen.
Voortbouwend op de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 3, formuleer ik in Hoofdstuk 4 
vervolgens de verwachting dat sociale zekerheidsuitgaven de ongelijkheid in partici-
patie zullen beperken: landen met een hoge mate van sociale zekerheid bieden im-
mers collectieve hulpbronnen en herverdelen individuele hulpbronnen (als geld) en 
lasten (als het huishouden). Op grond van de empirische analyse vind ik steun voor 
deze verwachting: ongelijkheid in participatie in het verenigingsleven is kleiner naar-
mate de overheid relatief meer uitgeeft aan sociale zekerheid. Er is opnieuw één uit-
zondering: de ongelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen in participatie in activistische 
verenigingen wordt groter naarmate staten meer uitgeven aan sociale zekerheid. Toch 
is dit in overeenstemming met de publieke hulpbronnen these: gegeven de bevind-
ing dat vrouwen toch al actiever zijn in activistische verenigingen dan mannen, zal 
de herverdeling van tijd en geld hun zelfs nog meer hulpbronnen geven om actief 
te zijn. Deze herverdeling biedt vrouwen de mogelijkheid om hun ‘achterstand’ op 
mannen te dichten binnen ontspanningsverenigingen en belangenverenigingen, en 
de mogelijkheid om hun ‘voorsprong’ op mannen uit te bouwen binnen activistische 
verenigingen. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 staat politieke participatie centraal. Ik begin het hoofdstuk vanuit 
het normatieve idee dat representatieve democratie niet alleen een hoog niveau 
maar ook een egalitair niveau van burgerparticipatie vereist. Ik beargumenteer dat 
ongelijkheid in politieke participatie met name schadelijk kan zijn wanneer ideolo-
gische groepen verschillen in de bereidheid om hun stem uit te brengen, voor hun 
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belangen op te komen of te demonstreren. Dit leidt immers tot een vertekening in 
de samenstelling van het parlement en een scheefgroei in de mate waarin ideologis-
che groeperingen worden gehoord. Daarom bestudeer ik in dit hoofdstuk eerst het 
verband tussen de ideologische positie van burgers en hun politieke participatie. In 
empirische analyses blijken buurgers met een linkse voorkeur vaker politiek actief te 
zijn dan burgers met een rechtse voorkeur; burgers met een extremere voorkeur vaker 
dan gematigden; en burgers die het in ideologische zin oneens zijn met de zittende 
regering vaker dan burgers die het ermee eens zijn. Deze bevindingen zijn goeddeels 
in overeenstemming met de verwachtingen.
Vervolgens onderzoek ik in Hoofdstuk 5 of politieke instituties van invloed zijn 
op het niveau van politieke participatie. Wanneer we het belang van hulpbronnen 
centraal stellen, kunnen we verwachten dat burgers actief worden wanneer over-
heden meer open staan voor burgerinitiatieven en meer mogelijkheden bieden voor 
burgers om actief te worden zoals in zogenaamde consensusdemocratieën. Wanneer 
we echter het belang van prikkels centraal stellen, kunnen we verwachten dat burgers 
pas politiek actief worden wanneer er wat op het spel staat: wanneer harde keuzes 
gemaakt moeten worden die er werkelijk toe doen zoals in electorale meerderheids-
stelsels. Uit de empirische bevindingen blijkt dat de prikkels doorslaggevender zijn 
dan de hulpbronnen: passieve burgers participeren niet in de politiek vooral omdat 
ze dat niet willen, ook wanneer ze dat eventueel wel zouden kunnen. Een derde optie – 
opkomstplicht - leidt wel tot een hogere opkomst tijdens verkiezingen, maar niet tot 
actievere burgers. 
Tot slot beantwoord ik in Hoofdstuk 5 in welke mate staatsinstituties van invloed 
zijn op de hierboven geschetste ongelijkheid in politieke participatie tussen ideolo-
gische groepen. De ongelijkheid in politieke participatie blijkt significant te verschil-
len tussen landen. De verschillende institutionele modellen blijken echter niet van 
invloed te zijn op deze ongelijkheid.
In de laatste twee empirische hoofdstukken staan de verbanden tussen verschillende 
vormen van participatie centraal. In Hoofdstuk 6 neem ik de dominante theorie op 
dit onderzoeksterrein onder de loep. Deze neo-Tocquevilliaanse theorie, vernoemd 
naar de filosoof Alexis de Tocqueville die de theorie het eerst formuleerde, stelt dat 
het verenigingsleven fungeert als een leerschool voor de democratie. Verenigingen 
zouden hun leden socialiseren tot politiek actieve burgers, doordat die leden sociale 
en politieke vaardigheden ontwikkelen en burgerschapswaarden aanleren die hen 
de middelen en de prikkels bieden om politiek actief te worden. Ik trek de theorie 
uiteen in vijf claims, die tot nu toe eerder fungeerden als aannames dan als toetsbare 
hypothesen. 
Op grond van de empirische bevindingen trek ik de neo-Tocquevilliaanse theorie 
in twijfel. Weliswaar zijn burgers die actief zijn in het verenigingsleven eerder geneigd 
om ook politiek actief te zijn, maar dit is nog geen strikt een bewijs voor het cau-
sale effect dat de theorie veronderstelt. Andere analyses in Hoofdstuk 6 zijn niet in 
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overeenstemming met dit causale idee. Ten eerste is het verband tussen participatie 
in verenigingen en politieke participatie het sterkst voor belangenverenigingen en 
activistische verenigingen, maar niet voor de ontspanningsverenigingen die in de 
literatuur worden benadrukt. Ten tweede blijkt passief lidmaatschap van verenigin-
gen, veel sterker dan actieve participatie of vrijwilligerswerk, in verband te staan met 
politieke participatie. Dit kan niet verklaard worden door de neo-Tocquevilliaanse 
theorie: hoe zou een vereniging immers leden kunnen socialiseren wanneer zij niet 
actief deelnemen aan verenigingsactiviteiten? Ten slotte blijkt dat sociale en politieke 
vaardigheden en burgerschapswaarden het verband tussen participatie in verenigin-
gen en politieke participatie in statistische zin niet (of in slechts zeer beperkte mate) 
verklaren. Al met al vind ik voor de neo-Tocquevilliaanse theorie op cruciale punten 
geen empirische bewijs. De conclusie van Hoofdstuk 6 is daarom dat verenigingen 
niet functioneren als een leerschool voor de democratie.
Nadat ik de dominante, causale theorie in Hoofdstuk 6 terzijde heb geschoven, focus 
ik in Hoofdstuk 7 op de wederzijdse verbanden tussen informele participatie, par-
ticipatie in verenigingen en politieke participatie. Ik stel allereerst de vraag in welke 
mate de drie vormen van participatie cross aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn. Om deze 
vraag te beantwoorden construeer ik een meetmodel. Aan de hand van dat model 
concludeer ik – rekening houdend met mogelijke selectie-effecten van individuele 
factoren als inkomen en opleiding, alsook van contextuele factoren als sociale zeker-
heidsuitgaven en economische ontwikkeling – dat de drie vormen van participatie 
positief samenhangen. Ondanks een mogelijke schaarste in tijd en geld, zijn burgers 
die participeren in één sfeer (gematigd sterk) geneigd om ook actief te worden in een 
andere sfeer. 
Vervolgens richt ik me op de vraag in welke mate staatsinstituties de verbanden 
tussen de drie vormen van participatie conditioneren. Verschilt de sterkte van deze 
verbanden tussen landen onder invloed van staatsinstituties? Op basis van eerdere 
studies formuleer ik de verwachting dat de verbanden sterker zouden zijn in oude 
democratieën dan in democratieën die tot voor kort een autoritair of communistisch 
bewind hadden. In autoritaire en communistische landen trokken burgers zich im-
mers terug uit het publieke leven en deelden ze hun sociale contacten op in verschil-
lende segmenten. Op basis van een cross-nationaal structureel model vind ik bewijs 
voor deze verwachting: democratisch bestuur stimuleert burgers tot het leggen van 
kruisverbanden tussen verschillende vormen van participatie.
In Hoofdstuk 8 vat ik de belangrijkste conclusies van de voorgaande hoofdstukken 
nog eens samen, en geeft zo antwoord op de centrale onderzoeksvragen. De eerste 
onderzoeksvraag luidt: In welke mate verklaart variatie in staatsinstituties dat niveaus van 
burgerparticipatie (in informele verbanden, in het verenigingleven en in de politiek) verschillen 
tussen landen? Ik concludeer dat variantie in burgerparticipatie vooral op het niveau 
van individuen zit en slechts 5% tot 14% op het landsniveau zit. Staatsinstituties 
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verklaren echter een zeer groot deel van deze laatstgenoemde variantie. Voor partici-
patie in informele verbanden en voor participatie in verenigingen loopt de invloed 
van staatsinstituties voornamelijk via hulpbronnen, voor participatie in de politiek 
blijken prikkels belangrijker.
De tweede onderzoeksvraag luidt: In welke mate verklaart variatie in staatsinstituties 
dat de ongelijkheid in burgerparticipatie tussen sociale groepen verschilt tussen landen? Voor 
participatie in verenigingen blijkt de mate van ongelijkheid in participatie inderdaad 
afhankelijk is van de institutionele omgeving (de sociale zekerheidsuitgaven). Voor 
politieke participatie vind ik echter geen aanwijzingen dat de ongelijkheid daarin 
afhankelijk is van staatsinstituties.
De laatste onderzoeksvragen hebben betrekking op de verbanden tussen drie 
vormen van burgerparticipatie. In welke mate hangen drie vormen van burgerparticipatie (in 
informele verbanden, in het verenigingsleven en in de politiek) met elkaar samen in cross-nationale 
vergelijkingen? Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de drie vormen van participatie gematigd 
sterk en positief met elkaar samenhangen, ook wanneer rekening wordt gehouden 
met zogenaamde samenstellingseffecten van andere individuele en contextuele ken-
merken. In welke mate conditioneert variatie in staatsinstituties de samenhang tussen de drie 
vormen van burgerparticipatie? De sterkte van de verbanden verschilt met de institu-
tionele context: de verbanden zijn significant sterker in oude democratieën dan in 
landen die recent nog een autoritair of communistisch bewind hadden. 
Tot slot reflecteer ik in Hoofdstuk 8 op het onderzoek en bespreek ik de belang-
rijkste theoretische, methodologische en beleidsmatige implicaties van mijn bevindin-
gen. Centraal staat dat staatsinstituties er toe doen: ze zijn van invloed op het niveau 
van burgerparticipatie, op ongelijkheid in participatie tussen sociale groepen en op 
de verbanden tussen drie vormen van participatie. 
Toch moet deze conclusie niet onverkort gelezen worden als een aanbeveling tot 
‘institutional engineering’. Ten eerste zijn verschillen binnen landen veel belangrijker 
dan verschillen tussen landen. Ten tweede is voorzichtigheid geboden, aangezien 
verschillende dominante theorieën vooralsnog worden verworpen. Ten derde hebben 
instituties tegengestelde effecten op verschillende vormen van participatie: wat goed 
is voor het verenigingsleven hoeft dat niet te zijn voor hechte familiebanden. Ten 
slotte is een belangrijke vraag open gebleven, namelijk wat de invloed is van institu-
tionele veranderingen op burgerparticipatie? 
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‘De zee vlamt, de zee brandt,
De waterdrager schroeit zijn rug.
De zon stijgt aan de achterkant,
De waterdrager haast zich terug.
Want de zee moet gered van de zon.’
– Boudewijn de Groot & 
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Citizens participate in many spheres of society: in informal networks of family and friends 
(social participation), in voluntary associations (civic participation), and in the sphere of 
politics (political participation). Interestingly, there are large differences across countries. For 
instance, Italians and Spaniards visit their extended family twice as often as Americans and 
Danes. In Scandinavia and the Netherlands more than 80% of the citizens are a member of at 
least one voluntary association, whereas this is approximately 20% in Poland and Greece. With 
regards to political participation, turnout at national elections is much higher in continental 
countries like Belgium and Luxembourg than in Anglosaxon countries like the United States. 
What causes these differences? Why do citizens participate differently in various countries?
This book aims to explain these differences in participation by studying state institutions as 
determinants of citizens’ participation. It offers a comprehensive overview and systematic 
test of  different ways in which state institutions are related to social, civic, and political 
participation. Hypotheses are deduced from rivaling actor-centered institutionalist theories 
and tested on recent, high-quality cross-national data sets, using hierarchical modeling. These 
analyses show that state institutions do indeed matter. State institutions stimulate social and 
civic participation by offering collective resources (like social security and civil rights), and 
reduce participatory inequality within countries by redistributing individual resources (like 
time and money). State institutions stimulate political participation by raising the incentives 
to participate through decisive elections and high political stakes. Finally, democratic rule 
stimulates the relationships between social, civic, and political participation: these relationships 
are  stronger in longstanding democracies than in newly established democracies.
